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CHAPTER I
The price impact under the risk-averse market maker
1 Introduction
A liquid asset market implies that traders can trade immediately with small trans-
action costs, and without moving the current market price. While the meaning of
liquidity is clear, it is not easy to measure or observe liquidity because it is related
to various trading characteristics. In the finance literature, the bid-ask spread and
the price impact cost are the most common measures of liquidity. The price impact
cost is derived from the relation between order flows and price changes, rather than
being an explicit observable measure, while the bid-ask spread is directly observed in
the financial markets. The important aspect of both measures is that they reflect the
activity of the market makers who provide liquidity to markets. The price impact
cost is the market makers’ ex post responses to manage incoming order flows, while
the bid-ask spread is the ex-ante expected costs of the market makers. Thus, these
two measures should reflect the various costs, such as informational costs and inven-
tory holding costs, that the market makers face as they provide liquidity to market
participants by managing incoming orders.
The existing market microstructure literature shows that the bid-ask spread is
composed of three components: order processing, adverse information, and inventory
holding costs. According to the adverse information theory, the bid-ask spread exists
to compensate market makers for potential losses from trading with informed traders
(Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), and Easley and O’hara
(1987)). The inventory models suggest that market makers set the bid-ask spread
because they bear the risk of holding undesired inventory that deviates from their
preferred portfolio (Stoll (1978), Amihud and Mendelson (1980), Ho and Stoll (1981,
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1983), Bollen et al. (2004)). Stoll (1978) shows that the bid-ask spread increases with
the dealer’s risk aversion and asset volatility. The inventory effect is obvious when
risk-averse market makers determine the market clearing price because risk-averse
market makers consider the inventory position, while risk-neutral market makers do
not. As a result, the risk-aversion effects of the market makers should be considered
when studying the inventory effect on liquidity.
Unlike bid-ask spread models, the existing price impact models assume that mar-
ket makers are risk-neutral. Kyle (1985) develops a model in which a single risk-
neutral informed trader and a number of noise traders submit orders to competitive
risk-neutral market makers who set the market clearing price with zero expected prof-
its. In equilibrium, the monopolistic informed trader strategically chooses his trade
size so that it is proportional to the true asset value, and risk-neutral market makers
have the linear pricing schedule in the total net order flows. Kyle’s model has been
extended in subsequent papers by considering different classes of noise traders (Ad-
manti and Pfleiderer (1991)) or multiple informed traders(Foster and Viswanathan
(1996), Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), and Back et al. (2000)). There are very
few papers considering risk-averse market makers. One notable exception is Sub-
rahmanyam (1991), who studies multiple informed traders considering competitive
risk-averse market makers. However, he does not provide a dynamic model incorpo-
rating risk-averse market makers.
The object of this paper is to develop a unified price impact model that incor-
porates competitive risk-averse market makers and asymmetric information. The
price impact cost function, similarly to bid-ask spreads, should reflect both adverse
information and inventory holding costs because illiquidity may be caused by both
informational and non-informational events. For example, a large block trade by
institutional investors may cause large price changes because a risk-averse market
maker faces severe imbalances on his trading account. Thus, the risk-averse market
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maker will consider his inventory position as well as potential adverse information
when determining the market clearing price. The inventory and informational effects
can be easily observed and derived in the single-period model. However, the static
model does not provide answers about how these two effects evolve over time. Thus,
this paper presents the first dynamic model in which a single informed trader chooses
his trade size strategically by focusing on a linear equilibrium led by Bertrand com-
petition among risk-averse market makers who ultimately earn zero expected utility
gains.
The primary results in this paper considering both inventory and asymmetric in-
formation effects are consistent with the existing theoretical and empirical literature.
The price change consists of the permanent change associated with information and
the temporary change related to the inventory effect stemming from the dealer’s risk-
averse attitude(Hasbrouck (1988), Glosten and Harris (1988)). (2) The price change
is reversed because of the temporary price impact caused by the dealer’s inventory
costs(Grossman and Miller (1988), Campbell et al. (1993), Andrade et al. (2008)).
(3) The first-order serial covariance of price changes is negative and is associated with
the illiquidity measure(Roll (1984), Stoll (1989)).
First, the price impact is composed of a permanent and a transient impact. The
permanent price impact is associated with the fundamental value of a risky asset,
and this effect updates a current price to a new equilibrium market price. However,
the inventory effect is temporary. The model in this paper predicts that risk-averse
market makers want to be compensated for the potential loss due to informed traders
and the inventory holding costs. In other words, risk-averse market makers are paid
for providing liquidity to market participants even though there is no information
asymmetry. This inventory effect is proportional to the conditional variance of a
risky asset and the dealer’s risk attitude.
Second, the price impact due to the dealer’s risk aversion is temporary and causes
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a price reversal. Market participants rationally expect that order imbalances result
in an increase in the dealer’s inventory holding costs, and price changes, according
to this temporal inventory effect, should return to the original price level. In other
words, market makers would like to maintain their preferred inventory positions by
taking positions opposite to their unwanted inventory positions. For example, if risk-
averse market makers purchase unwanted shares, they will be willing to resell these
unwanted imbalances to the market at a discount. The decision will ultimately be
executed and a price reversal will be observed.
Finally, the first-order serial covariance of price changes based on the price sched-
ule developed in this paper is shown to be negative. This covariance measure is
associated with the market depth, the risky asset volatility, and the volatility of noise
traders. That is, this serial covariance will be zero when market makers are risk-
neutral while the measure is proportional to the dealer’s risk-aversion coefficient. In
addition, Roll (1984) and successive studies show that the first-order serial covariance
has a negative relation with the bid-ask spread, which is the common measure for
illiquidity. Stoll (1989) shows how the serial covariance depends on both inventories
and information. This dependence implies that the market depth, which is the in-
verse of the price impact coefficient, is closely related to the bid-ask spread. In the
numerical illustration, the Roll spread, measured by the square root of negative serial
covariance, decreases through time. This relation implies that the private information
of the informed trader is incorporated into the price; thus the asymmetric information
cost decreases over time.
In sum, the dynamic model in this paper theoretically shows that the price change
can be decomposed into permanent change due to the information regarding the fun-
damental asset value and temporal change caused by the inventory effects of risk-
averse market makers. This temporary price impact caused by the dealer’s risk aver-
sion is the evidence of price reversal. Moreover, the model suggests that the first-order
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serial covariance measure is closely related to the price impact. This suggestion is
consistent with the existing literature, which finds that there exists a significant pos-
itive relation between a bid-ask spread and the price impact measured by Kyle’s
lambda.(Hasbrouck (2009), Korajczyk and Sadka (2008)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a single
and a dynamic auction model in which a single risk-neutral informed trader and
a number of noise traders submit orders to competitive risk-averse market makers.
Section 3 discusses properties of the linear equilibrium and derives the first-order
serial covariance measure of price changes. Section 4 presents the empirical results to
provide evidence to support the theoretical arguments. In section 5, I conclude and
summarize the paper.
2 Model
2.1 Single period model
In this section, I extend Kyle (1985) model to incorporate the pricing strategy of
competitive risk-averse market makers with identical risk aversion. Consider a market
with a single informed trader, a number of noise traders, and competitive risk-averse
market makers. Each trader submits a market order to the market maker, who sets
a price, denoted by p˜, competitively to clear the market by absorbing all of the
remaining order imbalances. When determining the price, the market makers observe
the total net order imbalances, denoted by y˜, which are the sum of the quantity
from the informed trader, denoted by x˜, and the quantity from noise traders, denoted
by u˜. All of the market participants observe the last traded price, denoted by p0.
Conditional on the last trading quantities, the ex-post liquidation value, denoted by
v˜, of the risky asset is normally distributed with mean µ0 and variance Σ0
1.The
1Kyle (1985) assumes that the mean of the risky asset is equal to the most recent observed market
price p0. This should be true when market makers are risk-neutral. The mean of the risky asset,
however, is not necessary to be equal to the trade price when market makers are risk-averse. To
be account for these concerns, I relax this assumption where the mean of the risky asset is some
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quantity submitted by the noise traders, u˜, is normally distributed with mean zero
and variance σ2u. The quantity traded by noise traders and the ex-post liquidation
value of the risky asset are independently distributed.
The informed trader knows the post-liquidation value of the risky asset and maxi-
mizes his expected profit by choosing a quantity x˜ where the profit function, denoted
by p˜i, is simply x˜(v˜ − p˜). The optimization problem of the informed trader is
max
x
E[x˜(v˜ − p˜)|v˜ = v] (1)
Consider a risk-averse market maker who has a negative exponential utility func-
tion of the form U(W˜ ) = −e−γW˜ , where γ is an absolute risk aversion coefficient.
Assume that the market makers hold zero inventory at the initial time for conve-
nience and can borrow or lend with a zero interest rate. Because the market makers
cannot distinguish the quantity of the informed trader from that of the noise traders,
they need to make a conjecture about the trading quantity of the informed trader.
As in Kyle, the quantity of the informed trader is supposed to be a linear form in
the asset value so that x˜ = α + βv˜, where α and β are some constants. Based on
this structure, market makers have the prior distribution for the total net order flow
y˜ = u˜+ x˜. The positive (negative) value of the total order flows implies that the mar-
ket buys (sells) and the dealer sells (buys), and thus the dealer should give (receive)
the y˜ shares of stocks and receive (pay) the corresponding cash amount py˜. Thus, his
terminal wealth, denoted by W˜ , can be written
W˜ = −y˜(v˜ − p) (2)
The market clearing price, denoted by p˜,is assumed to be a linear function of the
constant parameter µ0.
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total net order flow such that
p˜ = µ+ λy˜ (3)
where λ is the sensitivity of total net order flow y˜ and µ is some constant. The
linear pricing rule is proven to be true in Kyle (1985) under competitive risk-neutral
market makers. In addition, Huberman and Stanzl (2004) argue that the price-
impact function should be linear when there is no price manipulation. Moreover,
Subrahmanyam (1991) shows that the linear pricing rule holds under competitive
risk-averse market makers. So, this linear pricing rule can be applied to the world of
competitive risk-averse market makers.
Following Subrahmanyam (1991), I require that the single market maker absorbs
entire order imbalances and earns zero-expected utility gain. That is, the expected
utility of not market making is equal to −1. This approach is also introduced in Stoll
(1978), who argues that a risk-averse market maker should be compensated for market
making because his trading account deviates from his optimal portfolio to supply the
immediacy. Stoll solves the equilibrium cost function where the expected utility of
not making market is equal to the expected utility under making market. Assuming
that a dealer holds nothing initially, the dealer’s problem in this paper is identical to
that of Stoll (1978). Moreover, Ho and Stoll (1983) analyze the competition of risk-
averse market makers and show that prices are equal to the reservation price of the
second best dealer, who eventually determines the market bid-ask spread. As a result,
the Bertrand competition narrows the market spread, which eventually converges to
the reservation spread of any dealer who earns zero expected profits. Therefore, the
expected utility of the risk-averse market maker satisfies
E[U(W˜ )|y˜ = y] = −e−γE[W˜ |y]+ γ
2
2
V ar(W˜ |y) = −1 (4)
where γ is an absolute risk aversion coefficient. Combining the zero-profit condition
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of the competitive risk-averse market makers in equation (4) with the profit maxi-
mization of the informed trader in equation (1), I obtain the following equilibrium.
Proposition 1. For competitive risk-averse market makers and a risk-neutral in-
formed trader, there is a unique equilibrium for the trading strategy of the informed
trader and the pricing rule of the competitive risk-averse market makers such that
x˜ = β(v˜ − µ0) (5)
p˜ = µ0 + λ(x˜+ u˜) (6)
where µ0 = E[v˜|p0] and p0 is the recent trade price. Then, the equilibrium value of λ
and β is given by
λ =
√
Σ0
σ2u
(
γ
√
Σ0σ2u +
√
4 + γ2Σ0σ2u
4
)
(7)
and
β =
√
σ2u
Σ0
(
−γ√Σ0σ2u +√4 + γ2Σ0σ2u
2
)
(8)
where γ is the absolute risk aversion coefficient of the risk-averse market maker.
Proof. See Appendix A1.
From proposition 1, the linear price rule of the market makers and the linear
trading strategy of the informed trader still hold even if the market makers are risk-
averse. When the risk aversion coefficient γ is equal to zero, the term inside the
bracket of the equilibrium λ in (7) is equal to one half, and the equilibrium λ is
equal to the Kyle’s lambda. The proposition also shows that the price impact costs
λ should reflect both information and inventory effects. This additional term from
the original Kyle’s lambda is incurred due to the risk-aversion of market makers, and
can be interpreted as the dealer’s compensation for holding inventory or providing
liquidity.
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From equation (A.4) in the appendix, it is easy to show that the price impact costs
should still be positive even though there is no informed trader (β = 0). This result
means that the risk-averse market makers want to be compensated not only for the
potential losses due to the informed trader but also for providing liquidity to clear the
current order imbalance. In consequence, the magnitude of the price impact under
risk-averse market makers is larger than that under risk-neutral market makers.
However, the increase in the price impact cost due to inventory costs should vanish
in the long run because the inventory effect is not related to the fundamental asset
value. The single-period model does not appear to provide a reasonable explanation
for the evolution of information and inventory effects on the price change over time.
Addressing these issues, I derive the dynamic model in the following section.
2.2 Comparison with Kyle (1985)
It is of interest to compare some features of Kyle’s(1985) model to those of my model.
From equations in (7) and (8), the values of λ and β appear to increase and decrease
respectively when market makers are risk-averse. To compare the parameters of risk-
averse market makers with those of risk neutral market makers, let define θ as
θ =
γ
2
√
Σ0σ2u (9)
The value of θ is proportional to the dealer’s attitude toward the risk(γ), the
volatility of the risky asset(Σ0), and the volatility of noise traders(σu). If market
makers are risk averse (γ > 0), then the value of θ is always positive. That is, the
value of θ increases when market makers are more risk-averse, the risky-asset is more
volatile, or quantity from noise traders is more volatile. Thus, the defined parameter
θ can be interpreted as the inventory cost of competitive market makers. With this
measure θ, I discuss how the market depth, the price informativeness, and the profit
of the informed trader are changed under risk-averse market makers.
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First, the price impact coefficient λ increases when market makers are risk averse.
The price impact of risk-averse markets markers(λA) can be expressed as λA =
λN(
√
1 + θ2 + θ) where λN is the price impact of risk-neutral market makers. Kyle
defines the inverse of this price impact coefficient λ as the market depth which is
the necessary order flow to change prices by one dollar. The market depth under
risk-averse market makers is simply 1/λA = 1/λN(
√
1 + θ2 − θ). Because the term
in the bracket ((
√
1 + θ2 − θ)) ranges in (0, 1], the market depth will be close to zero
when market makers are extremely risk-averse.
Second, the price informativeness is measured as the conditional asset variance.
Kyle argues that half of the insider’s price information is reflected into asset prices
and the volatility of noise trading doesn’t affect the volatility of prices. The ratio
of the conditional variance, Σ21/Σ0 = 1/2(1 + θ/
√
1 + θ2), is greater than one-half
when market makers are risk-averse. This result implies that less than one-half of the
informed trader’s price information is incorporated into prices. When market makers
are risk-averse, the informed trader appears to be reluctant to reveal his information
because his marginal costs to exploit the private information with risk-averse market
makers. As a result, the informed trader needs more auctions to reveal his private
information through the market.
Finally, the informed trader’s profit decreases when market makers are risk averse.
The informed trader’s profit can be expressed as E[piA] = E[piN ](
√
1 + θ2 − θ). This
expression implies that the informed trader’s expected profit is affected by the mag-
nitude of the dealers’ risk aversion. The informed trader can still earn the positive
profit at the expense of noise traders. This expected profit, however, converges to
zero when market makers are extremely risk-averse. The decrease in the informed
trader’s profit is mainly because the informed trader pays some fees to market makers
who want to be compensated from the arrival of the informed trader.
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2.3 Dynamic model
In this section, I consider the sequential auction framework to derive the equilibrium
condition and the price movement when market makers are competitive and risk-
averse. Suppose there are N rounds of trade occurring in a given trading day, and tn
denotes the time at which the nth auction takes place. For simplicity, assume that
the time interval between the nth and the n− 1th auction is equally distributed, i.e.,
∆t1 = ∆t2 = · · · = ∆tN = ∆t. At the beginning stage, given the last trade price p0,
the mean and variance of the risky asset are µ0 and Σ0, respectively.
At each auction, there are noise traders and a single informed trader. The quantity
traded by the noise traders, denoted by ∆u˜n, is normally distributed with mean zero
and variance σ2u∆t. Moreover, ∆u˜n is serially uncorrelated and independent of v˜.
The informed trader chooses ∆x˜n at the nth auction to maximize his entire profits
given his guesses about the pricing rule set by a market maker. The informed trader’s
profits for each auction n is given by
p˜in =
N∑
k=n
(v˜ − pk)∆x˜k (10)
For risk-averse market makers, let W˜n denote the aggregate wealth of the market
makers after the nth auction, so that ∆W˜n denotes the wealth increment of the market
makers at the nth auction.
∆W˜n = −∆y˜n(v˜ − p˜n) (11)
For simplicity, the initial wealth and its increase at time 1 is 0, i.e., ∆W0 = W0 = 0.
This assumption means that each market maker initially has no inventory in his
account so that his initial expected utility is equal to −1 under the CARA utility
function. As in the single-period model, I also impose the restrictions that the single
risk-averse market maker absorbs the entire order imbalance by competition and earns
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zero expected profit. At each time, the market makers observe the total net order flow
∆y˜n = ∆x˜n + ∆u˜n, and they cannot discriminate the order flow from the informed
trader from the quantity from noise traders. Similar to the single-period model, the
zero profit condition is imposed so that the market maker earns zero-expected utility
gain. As a result, the expected utility of the wealth change at each auction n should
be
En
[
−e−γ∆W˜n|∆y˜n = ∆yn
]
= −1 ∀n = 1, · · · , N (12)
where γ is an absolute risk aversion coefficient. This equation implies that the ex-
pected utility obtained by not making the market should be equal to that obtained
by making the market. Combining the problem of the informed trader and the condi-
tion of expected utility from the competitive risk-averse market makers leads to the
following proposition.
Proposition 2. For a risk-neutral informed trader and a risk-averse market maker,
there is a unique equilibrium in the model such that for
∆x˜n = βn(v˜ − µn−1)∆t (13)
p˜n = µn−1 + λn(∆x˜n + ∆u˜n) (14)
Σn = V ar(v˜|∆x˜1 + ∆u˜1, · · · ,∆x˜n + ∆u˜n) (15)
µn = E(v˜|∆x˜1 + ∆u˜1, · · · ,∆x˜n + ∆u˜n) (16)
E[p˜in|p1, · · · , pn−1, v] = αn−1(v − µn−1)2 + δn−1 (17)
for all n = 1, · · · , N . The constants αn, βn, δn, and Σn are the unique solution to the
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difference equation system
αn−1 =
1 + 2γαnΣn
4
(
λn − αn
(
λn − γΣn2
)2) (18)
δn−1 = δn + αn
(
λn − γ
2
Σn
)2
σ2u∆t (19)
βn∆t =
1− 2αn
(
λn − γΣn2
)
2
(
λn − αn
(
λn − γΣn2
)2) (20)
λn =
γΣn
2
+
βnΣn
σ2u
(21)
Σn =
(
1−∆tβn
(
λn − γΣn
2
))
Σn−1 (22)
for all n = 1, · · · , N subject to the boundary condition αN = δN = 0 and the second
order condition is.
λn − αn
(
λn − γ
2
Σn
)2
> 0 (23)
Proof. See Appendix A2.
The value of βn represents the intensity with which the informed trader trades
based on his private information. Note that even if there is no informed trader
(βn = 0), the equilibrium liquidity parameter λn is still positive in (21) because the
market maker still needs compensation for the risk associated with the noise trades.
Thus, the price impact coefficient in my model reflects not only the informational
cost but also the inventory cost.
3 Properties of equilibrium in dynamic model
3.1 Numerical illustration
In this section, I present numerical examples based on the linear equilibrium derived
in the previous section. In all of the numerical examples, assume that ΣN = 1, σ
2
u = 1,
and ∆t = 1/N . Figure 1 plots λn for the particular cases of γ = 0 and γ = 1 when
the number of auctions is fixed at N = 20. As seen from Figure 1, the λn of the
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Figure 1: Liquidity parameter over time for different values of risk aversion coefficient
This figure plots the liquidity parameter at each auction for different values of risk aversion coefficient
γ = 0, 1 when the number of auction is fixed atN = 20. This figure compares the liquidity parameter,
λn, when a market maker is risk-neutral (γ = 0) and is risk-averse(γ = 1). The variance of noise
trading per unit time, σ2u, and the variance of the risky asset at the end of time, ΣN , are equal to
1. Each auction occurs at equally spaced interval, ∆t = 1/N , over [0, 1].
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risk-averse market makers is larger than that of the risk-neutral market makers. This
result implies that a risk-averse market maker bears the cost of managing his inventory
position and sets the price impact cost function to be moved up. In addition, the
difference between the price impact function of the risk-averse market makers and the
risk-neutral market makers is larger at the beginning of the auction than at the end
of the auction.
Figure 2 plots λn for the particular cases of N = 4, N = 20, and N = 100
when the risk aversion coefficient is at γ = 1. This figure is quite similar to the
risk-neutral market maker cases presented in Kyle’s original paper. The illiquidity
measure λn monotonically decreases through time. The figure shows that the price
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Figure 2: Liquidity parameter over time for different values of N
This figure plots the liquidity parameter at each auction for different values of number of auctions
N = 4, 20, and 100 when the risk aversion coefficient is fixed at γ = 1. The variance of noise trading
per unit time, σ2u, and the variance of the risky asset at the end of time, ΣN , are equal to 1. Each
auction occurs at equally spaced interval, ∆t = 1/N , over [0, 1].
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impact function declines over time regardless of the magnitude of the market maker’s
risk-aversion.
3.2 Price behavior over time
Given the equilibrium in the previous section, it is easy to derive the closed form of the
price movement. The constant term of price movement in (14) can be replaced with
the known term using the conditional mean of the multivariate normal distribution.
The closed form of price movement is shown in the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. For a risk-neutral informed trader and a risk-averse market maker, the
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pricing rule set by competitive risk-averse market maker is
∆pn = λn∆yn − γ
2
Σn−1∆yn−1 (24)
for all n = 1, · · · , N .
Proof. See Appendix A3.
This price formation in (24) is consistent with the previous empirical studies(Glosten
and Harris (1988), Madhavan et al. (1997),Huang and Stoll (1997), Sadka (2006)).
There are some implications from lemma 1. First, the price change is linear both
in the contemporary net order flow and in the lagged one. This result suggests that
the risk-averse market maker sets the market clearing price from the current order
flow to cover the losses from the informed trader and to adjust his trading account to
his optimal portfolio. Second, the coefficient of the contemporary order flow reflects
both informational and inventory effects while the coefficient of the lagged order im-
balance only reflects the inventory information. This result suggests that the price
impact occurring in the current day will reverse in the following day due to the in-
ventory cost effect. These results are consistent with the two-period model developed
in Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004). It appears that the coefficient of the lagged
order flow can provide a more accurate measure of illiquidity because it contains the
risk attitude of the market makers and the asset risk, but not the informational con-
tent(Campbell et al. (1993), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)). The intensity of the
informed trader, measured by the βn, should ultimately be impounded in the price.
But the non-informational part should disappear from the price if it is priced in the
previous period. If the market makers are highly risk-averse due to managing high
risk assets, then the immediate price change will be larger than the degree of the price
change, reflecting the information content, and the magnitude of the price reversal
could be large. Thus, the product of the asset risk and the market maker’s degree of
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Figure 3: Price dynamics from time 0 through time 2
This figure illustrates the price dynamics when a market maker is risk-averse. The order imbalance
at time n = 0, 1, and 2 is assumed to be ∆y0 = 0, ∆y1 = 1 and ∆y2 = 1.
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risk-averseness could be the appropriate illiquidity measure.
Figure 3 illustrates the price movement up to time 2 when the competitive market
makers are risk-averse. For convenience, suppose that there was no order imbalance
at time 0 (∆y0 = 0). The net order imbalances at times 1 and 2 are assumed to
be one unit(∆y1 = ∆y2 = 1). From the price rule in equation (24), the price at
time 1 is equal to p0 + λ1 and the price impact coefficient has two parts: (a) the
informational price impact, β1
σ2u
Σ1, and (b)the non-informational price impact,
γ
2
Σ1.
These two impacts imply that given orders, the risk-averse market maker sets the
price to reflect both informational and non-informational components. However, the
non-informational impact, (b) in the illustration, should vanish because it is unrelated
to the fundamental value of the risky asset. Thus, the price at time 2 first reverses
to a price level that reflects (a) the informational component and contemporaneous
price impact, which is the sum of (c) the informational price impact, β2
σ2u
Σ2, and (d)
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Figure 4: Comparisons risk-averse market maker price setting with risk-neutral mar-
ket maker price setting from time 0 through time 2
This figure compares price settings between risk-averse and risk-neutral market maker. The order
imbalance at time n = 0, 1, and 2 is assumed to be ∆y0 = 0, ∆y1 = 1 and ∆y2 = 0. The price set by
risk-averse market maker is p1 while the price set by risk-neutral market maker is p
N
1 at time n = 2
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the non-informational price impact, γ
2
Σ2 at time 2. Thus, the price change from time
0 to time 2 is β1
σ2u
Σ1 +
β2
σ2u
Σ2 +
γ
2
Σ2.
These examples suggest that the informational component at each time is im-
pounded into the price. The inventory effect appears to be transient, but it may be
long-lived unless the order imbalances are equally distributed over time. That is, the
price movement up to time n can be expressed as
pn − p0 =
n∑
i=1
(
βiΣi
σ2u
∆yi
)
+
1
2
γ (Σn∆yn − Σ0∆y0) (25)
The first term represents the sum of the informational impact over time, and the
second term indicates the inventory impact. This inventory effect shown in my model
is the primary difference from Kyle’s model. Equation (25) suggests that the price at
time n reflects all of the prior information up to time n, while only the current inven-
tory cost is impounded into the price. In other words, all of the historic information
should be related to the current price permanently, but the previous inventory costs
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are not related to the current asset price.
Figure 4 illustrates the difference in price setting between a risk neutral market
maker and a risk-averse market maker. Assume the initial conditional mean of the
risky asset is equal to the last trade price(µ0 = p0), and the order imbalances at time
0 and at time 2 are zero(∆y0 = ∆y2 = 0). At time 1, there is one unit of order
imbalance(∆y1 = 1). The price set by the risk neutral market maker, denoted by
pN1 , reflects only the informational component ((a)). However, the price set by the
risk-averse market maker, denoted by p1, reflects both the informational effect and
the inventory effect, so that the price of the risk-averse market maker is higher than
that of the risk neutral market maker. At time 2, the risk neutral market maker will
set the price at time 2 equal to the price at time 1 because there are no incoming
orders at time 2. But, the risk-averse market maker will set the price at time 2 equal
to a price that reflects only the informational component at time 1. If the risk-averse
market maker manages his inventory position toward zero, then the final price at the
end of day will converge to the price that is equal to the price of risk neutral market
maker.
3.3 Serial covariance and the Roll(1984) spread
Roll (1984) shows that the effective spread can be estimated from the first order serial
covariance of the transaction price changes. Based on the pricing rule, it is easy to
calculate the serial covariance of price differences at each auction n.
Lemma 2. At each auction n, the serial covariance of price change is
Cov(∆pn+1,∆pn) = −1
2
γ∆tσ2uλnΣn−1 (26)
Proof. See Appendix A4.
The first order serial covariance measure of price change is simply the product
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of the coefficient of the contemporary order flow, the coefficient of the lagged order
flow, and the variance of noise traders. Thus, the first-order serial covariance of
price change is affected by both information and inventory effects. These results are
consistent with the recent study by Vayanos and Wang (2012), who argue that the
negative value of the first-order serial covariance measure of price change is related to
the price reversal, and is higher when the risk-aversion coefficient increases. However,
my result indicates that the covariance measure represents not only the price impact
(λn) but also the price reversal (γ/2Σn−1). This finding implies that the covariance
measure could provide a noise measure of price reversal The coefficient of the lagged
order flow is more appropriate to measure price reversal.
Based on the covariance measure calculation, the Roll’s spread measure can be
easily obtained. From equation (26), the Roll’s spread is simply
SRolln =
√
−Cov(∆pn+1,∆pn) = σu
√
Σn−1
√
γ
2
λn∆t (27)
The Roll’s spread will be zero if the market makers are risk-neutral(γ = 0). The
Roll’s spread is widely used for estimating the bid-ask spread when the bid-ask spread
cannot be observed in the market. Based on the calculation, the serial covariance of
the price difference can be thought as the expected costs of the risk-averse market
maker when he makes the market to provide liquidity. So, the potential price impact
costs will be considered in the risk-averse market maker’s cost function and will show
that the Roll’s spread is proportional to the price impact parameter λn.
If there is no informed trader at time n (βn = 0), then the equilibrium λn is
equal to γ
2
Σn−1 from (B.10). ). In this case, the market maker will consider only his
inventory when he makes the market. The Roll’s spread is simply
SNo−informn =
1
2
γσuΣn−1
√
∆t (28)
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Figure 5: The serial covariance of price difference over time for different values of risk
aversion coefficient
This figure plots the first serial covariance of price change, Cov(∆pn,∆pn−1) = −1/2γ∆tσ2uλnΣn−1,
at each auction for different values of risk aversion coefficient γ = 1, 2 when the number of auction is
fixed at N = 20. The variance of noise trading per unit time, σ2u, and the variance of the risky asset
at the end of time, ΣN , are equal to 1. Each auction occurs at equally spaced interval, ∆t = 1/N ,
over [0, 1].
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
−3
−2.5
−2
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
Calender Time
Co
v(∆
 
p n
+
1,
 
∆ 
p n
)
 
 
γ=1 γ=2
This equation is quite similar to the bid-ask spread derived in Stoll (1978). The equa-
tion implies that the bid-ask spread still exists even though there is no information
asymmetry among traders because the market maker will want to be compensated
for deviating from his preferred portfolio.
Figure 5 and 6 plot the first order serial covariance of the price difference and the
Roll’s spread, respectively, for different degrees of the risk aversion coefficient, γ = 1
and γ = 2 when the number of auctions is fixed at N = 20. As in the previous section,
all parameters are estimated by assuming ΣN = σ
2
u = 1. Figure 5 shows that the
covariance measure increases over time, and moves toward zero. The covariance moves
faster toward zero when the market maker is more risk-averse. Figure 6illustrates the
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Figure 6: The Roll’s spread over time for different values of risk aversion coefficient
This figure plots the Roll’s spread, SRolln = σu
√
Σn−1γ/2λn∆t, at each auction for different values
of risk aversion coefficient γ = 1, 2 when the number of auction is fixed at N = 20. The variance
of noise trading per unit time, σ2u, and the variance of the risky asset at the end of time, ΣN , are
equal to 1. Each auction occurs at equally spaced interval, ∆t = 1/N , over [0, 1].
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movement of Roll’s spread over time. Roll’s spread decreases over time because both
the asset variance Σn and the price impact coefficient λn decrease over time.
4 Empirical Tests
4.1 Data and methodologies
The data used in this paper are obtained from the New York Stock Exchange(NYSE)
Trade and Quotation(TAQ) and Center for Research in Security Prices(CRSP) data
set 2. I use only the decimal tick size period for data consistency. The sample
period spans from Jan 1, 2002 to Dec 31, 2010 and price and quote data in TAQ
must occur during regular trading hours (9:30 a.m.-4:00 p.m.). I first select stocks
2Each firm is identified by CRSP permno not by ticker because ticker is used duplicate. I match
CRSP permno with TAQ ticker symbol using cusip number.
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whose CRSP share codes are either 10 or 11 so that securities such as ADRs, REITS,
certificates, shares of beneficial interest, units, closed-end funds, and preferred stocks
are excluded in my sample. The trading venues of each stock should be unchanged
during the sample period. Each stock should not have stock splits, stock dividends,
repurchases, or secondary offerings during the sample period. The monthly average
prices must be between $3 and $1000. I also require a minimum number of 100 trades
in a particular stock over the sample period. The final sample consists of 2,645 US
common stocks.
Following Lee and Ready (1991), each trade is classified as buyer-initiated or seller-
initiated using the tick rule. That is, each trade is matched with the first quote at
least five seconds prior to the transaction. As in Chordia and Subrahmanyam (2004)
and Chordia et al. (2002), I construct daily time series for six different measures of
order imbalance for each stock:
• ∆yNumt : the daily number of buyer-initiated trades less the daily number of
seller-initiated trades on day t
• ∆y%Numt : ∆yNumt divided by total number of trades on day t
• ∆yV olt : the daily buyer-initiated dollars less the daily seller-initiated dollars on
day t
• ∆y%V olt : ∆yV olt divided by total dollar volume on day t
• ∆ySht : the daily number of buyer-initiated shares purchased minus the daily
number of seller-initiated shares sold on day t
• ∆y%Sht : ∆ySht divided by total share volume on day t
For each security i, the following multiple regression model is used to estimate the
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price impact and the price reversal coefficients:
∆pi,t = αi + λi,1∆yi,t + λi,2∆yi,t−1 + t (29)
where ∆pi,t is open-to-close log price change and ∆yi,t is daily order imbalance for
firm i at time t 3. From Lemma 1, the price impact coefficient λ1 is expected to
be positive, and the price reversal coefficient λ2 is expected to be negative. For
the comparison purposes, the simple time-series regressions are also estimated. The
comparison regression models are
∆pi,t = αi + λ
S
i,1∆yi,t + ξt (30a)
∆pi,t = α
′
i + λ
S
i,2∆yi,t−1 + ξ
′
t (30b)
If both order imbalances should be included but one of them is missed in the estima-
tion of the regression model, the residual ξt (ξ
′
t) can be correlated with ∆yi,t (∆yi,t−1)
4. As a result, the specifications in (30) could violate the fundamental assumption of
OLS estimates and lead to the biased estimates 5.
4.2 Summary statistics
Table 1 provides the summary statistics for the cross-sectional averages of the daily
time-series means of the bid-ask spreads, the order imbalances, and the trading ac-
tivities. In Panel A, the average effective spread is $0.058 while the average quoted
spread is $0.068, reflecting the within-quote trading. Both proportional spreads, RQS
and RES, have similar statistics with mean 0.4% and median 0.2%. As expected, the
3I also perform the time series regression using close-to-close price change. The results were quite
similar to results reported in this paper.
4If order imbalances are not autocorrelated, equations (30) have the unbiased estimates. However,
the data shows that daily order imbalances are exhibited to be positively autocorrelated.
5Previous empirical papers didn’t consider both order flows when estimating illiquidity measures
(See Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Breen et al. (2002), Hasbrouck (2009)). Chordia and Subrah-
manyam (2004) regress excess returns on order imbalances including lagged order imbalances, find
that up to 5 days order imbalances are significant.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
This table contains the cross-sectional averages of the time-series means of the variables for 2645
US stocks from January 2002 through December 2010. All the variables are computed from TAQ
data. In panel A, each daily spread is calculated by averaging the intraday observations. The quoted
half spread, QS, is half of the difference between the ask price and the bid price of the quote. The
relative half-spread, RQS, is the absolute value of the trade price and midpoint of quoted ask and
bid divided by the midpoint. The effective spread, ES, is the absolute value of the difference between
the trade price and the quote midpoint just prior to the trade. The relative effective spread, RES,
is calculated by dividing the effective spread by the trade price. In Panel B, for each firm daily
order imbalance is the buyer-initiated order minus the seller-initiated order. The unscaled order
imbalance ∆y = ∆yNum,∆yV ol and ∆ySh is the order imbalance in number of transaction, in dollar
volume, and in number of shares traded. The scaled order imbalance ∆y = ∆y%Num,∆y%V ol and
∆y%Sh is the order imbalance in number of transaction divided by total number of trades, in total
dollar volume divided by total dollar volume, and in number of shares traded divided by total share
volume on a given day. In panel C, Sh is the daily number of transaction, V ol is the daily dollar
volume, and Sh is the daily number of shares traded.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median Skewness Kurtosis
Panel A. Spreads
QS 0.068 0.112 0.030 5.649 53.897
RQS 0.004 0.006 0.002 3.058 13.343
ES 0.058 0.090 0.026 5.178 42.595
RES 0.004 0.005 0.002 3.118 14.164
Cov(∆pt,∆pt−1) −0.013 0.104 0.000 −15.489 289.102
Panel B. Order Imbalance
∆yNum (Thousands) −0.034 0.191 −0.003 −10.618 161.288
∆y%Num(%) −0.018 0.081 −0.010 −1.626 5.781
∆yV ol (Millions) 0.138 1.956 −0.018 −0.893 79.111
∆y%V ol(%) −0.025 0.086 −0.017 −1.351 4.571
∆ySh (Thousands) 0.068 75.675 −1.208 −5.401 125.484
∆y%Sh(%) −0.026 0.086 −0.018 −1.337 4.465
Panel C. Trading Activity
Number of trades (Thousands) 2.429 6.222 0.696 7.685 87.444
Number of shares (Thousands) 739.865 2598.977 179.698 13.267 241.273
Dollar volume (Millions) 22.841 89.147 3.355 12.917 248.504
average of serial covariance has a negative mean of -0.013 and is negatively skewed.
Panel B of Table 1 presents the cross-sectional averages of the daily time-series
means of the order imbalances. The daily mean value of the order imbalance in
terms of the number of transactions is -34 transactions per day during the sample
period, indicating that more selling transactions occurred during the sample period.
On the contrary, other unscaled average values for the order imbalance in total dollar
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volume or in the number of shares have positive means and medians. These results
suggest that small or medium investors with small quantities submit their orders more
frequently than institutional investors with large quantities (Chan and Fong (2000)6).
Finally, all other scaled order imbalances have negative means but positive medians,
indicating that days with large selling pressure are more frequently observed than
days with large buying pressure.
Panel C reports the cross-sectional averages of the daily trading activities for each
firm. The mean value of the total number of trades is 2,429 transactions, the mean
value of the number of shares traded is 0.7 million shares, and the mean value of the
total dollar volume is 22 million dollars per day. Different values for the mean and
median suggest that trading activities are not symmetric; rather, they demonstrate
a positive skew.
Table 2 presents the cross-sectional averages of the time-series correlation between
order imbalance measures, the price difference, and trading activities. Panel A shows
the cross-sectional averages of the daily time-series correlations among the scaled
and unscaled order imbalances, the price differences, the total number of trades,
the dollar trading volume and the trading volume. First, the correlation between
the dollar trading volume and the trading volume is very high for both the scaled
and the unscaled measures (0.959 and 1.00). In fact, the correlation between the
scaled measures is close to one. Second, the correlation measures between one order
imbalance and another order imbalance are generally positive and very high, ranging
from 0.378 to 1. Finally, the correlations between the price difference and the order
imbalance measures are positive for all different measures of order imbalance. The
correlation between the price difference and the order imbalance in terms of the
number of transactions is higher than between the price difference and other trading
6Chan and Fong (2000) classify the trades into five categories based on trading volume, and
report that the average daily number of trades decreases from small size category to the large size
category.
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Table 2: Correlations and Autocorrelations
This table presents the cross-sectional averages of the correlations and the autocorrelation up to lag
10 for each stock. The unscaled order imbalance ∆y = ∆yNum,∆yV ol and ∆ySh denotes the order
imbalance in number of transaction, in dollar volume, and in number of shares traded. The scaled
order imbalance ∆y = ∆y%Num,∆y%V ol and ∆y%Sh represents the order imbalance in number of
transaction divided by total number of trades, in total dollar volume divided by total dollar volume,
and in number of shares traded divided by total share volume on a given day. Sh is the daily number
of transaction, V ol is the daily dollar volume, and Sh is the daily number of shares traded.
Panel A. Correlations
∆yNum ∆y%Num ∆yV ol ∆y%V ol ∆ySh ∆y%Sh Num V ol Sh
∆p 0.315 0.284 0.188 0.226 0.185 0.226 0.015 0.014 0.010
∆yNum 0.659 0.579 0.517 0.583 0.516 −0.096 −0.075 −0.081
∆y%Num 0.378 0.792 0.397 0.792 −0.052 −0.023 −0.024
∆yV ol 0.544 0.959 0.544 −0.122 −0.154 −0.158
∆y%V ol 0.576 1.000 −0.051 −0.031 −0.034
∆ySh 0.576 −0.130 −0.154 −0.168
∆y%Sh −0.051 −0.030 −0.034
Num 0.755 0.782
V ol 0.938
Panel B. Daily Autocorrelation
Lag ∆yNum ∆y%Num ∆yV ol ∆y%V ol ∆ySh ∆y%Sh
1 0.222 0.232 0.162 0.200 0.159 0.200
2 0.139 0.165 0.106 0.142 0.104 0.142
3 0.109 0.140 0.086 0.118 0.085 0.118
4 0.094 0.120 0.078 0.103 0.077 0.103
5 0.082 0.111 0.069 0.096 0.068 0.096
6 0.072 0.101 0.062 0.087 0.061 0.087
7 0.065 0.093 0.058 0.084 0.058 0.084
8 0.063 0.093 0.056 0.081 0.055 0.081
9 0.059 0.087 0.054 0.077 0.054 0.077
10 0.056 0.085 0.052 0.076 0.052 0.076
volume based imbalance measures.
In Panel B of Table 2, the cross-sectional averages of the time series autocor-
relations for different measures of order imbalances are reported. All of the order
imbalances are positively autocorrelated. For example, the first-lag autocorrelation
ranges from 16% to 23%. The autocorrelations for the order imbalance in terms of
the number of transactions is slightly higher than for the order imbalance in terms
of the number of shares or in terms of the dollar trading volume. The autocorre-
lations for the scaled order imbalances are higher than for the unscaled ones. The
existence of autocorrelations suggests that both order imbalances should be included
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when estimating either the price impact or the price reversal measure. Otherwise,
the exclusion of one of those variables cause biased regression estimates as a result of
a missing variable problem.
4.3 Empirical results
Table 3 reports the summary for the regression estimation results of equations (29)
and (30). In each line, reported are cross-sectional average coefficients of the regres-
sion estimates for each stock and the percentages of the significance at the 5% level for
each coefficient. Column 1 indicates the use of order imbalances for independent vari-
ables when estimating the regression lines. Columns 2 and 3 are the averages of price
impact and price reversal coefficients estimated from the equation (29). Columns 4
and 5 report results of (30a) and (30b) respectively. The last two columns present
the test results whether estimated coefficients from equation (29) are different from
the estimated one from equation (30a) or (30b). Odd lines report the results of from
using unscaled order imbalances, and even lines report the results from using scaled
versions.
Throughout the lines, column 2 shows that the average coefficients for the current
order imbalance are positive and significant for most firms. More than 95 of esti-
mated price impact coefficients are positive and significant. Furthermore, column 3
shows that the averages of price reversal coefficients for most firms are negative with
approximately 50% of coefficients being negative and significant. Although there are
some cases with positive price reversal coefficients, the significance level of these pos-
itive coefficients are negligible (approximately less than 1%). The empirical results
support the theoretical predictions such that the price coefficient is positive and the
price reversal coefficient is negative.
For the comparison, the average coefficients λS1 without the lagged order imbal-
ance are also reported in column 4. The magnitude of the coefficient without lagged
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Table 3: Daily regressions of open-to-close price differences on order imbalances
This table presents the cross-sectional averages of coefficients for individual daily time series
regressions. For each stock, I estimate the time series regression ∆pi,t = αi + λi,1∆yi,t +
λi,2∆yi,t−1 where ∆pi,t is the open-to-close log price difference of stock i on day t, and ∆y =
∆yNum,∆yV ol,∆ySh,∆y%Num,∆y%V ol, and ∆y%Sh. ∆yNumi,t ,∆y
V ol
i,t and ∆y
Sh
i,t is the unscaled or-
der imbalance in number of transaction, in dollar volume, and in number of shares traded for stock
i on day t. ∆y = ∆y%Numi,t ,∆y
%V ol
i,t and ∆y
%Sh
i,t is the scaled order imbalance in number of trans-
action divided by total number of trades, in total dollar volume divided by total dollar volume,
and in number of shares traded divided by total share volume for stock i on day t. λSi denotes the
coefficient when the regression model is estimated with missing one of independent variables. λS1 is
estimated with excluding lagged variable and λS2 is estimated with excluding contemporary variable.
The significance of coefficients in each stock’s time series is tested at 5% level.
∆y
Multiple Single Difference
λ1 λ2 λ
S
1 λ
S
2 λ1 − λS1 λ2 − λS2
(%+, %+Sig) (%-, %-Sig) (%+, %+Sig) (%-, %-Sig) (t-stat) (t-stat)
∆yNum
0.2316 −0.0287 0.2257 0.0069 0.0059 −0.0356
(99.09, 95.73) (89.41, 59.47) (98.98, 95.58) (55.80, 9.60) (13.45) (−21.75)
∆y%Num
0.0426 −0.0109 0.0394 −0.0006 0.0032 −0.0103
(99.74, 96.90) (86.96, 54.48) (99.70, 96.86) (52.36, 7.49) (32.94) (−53.81)
∆yV ol
0.0194 −0.0021 0.0189 0.0001 0.0005 −0.0022
(97.13, 83.14) (77.96, 29.11) (97.20, 82.76) (55.84, 5.82) (3.61) (−6.24)
∆y%V ol
0.0277 −0.0067 0.0258 −0.0007 0.0019 −0.0060
(99.66, 95.58) (82.61, 41.55) (99.62, 95.58) (53.65, 6.28) (26.52) (−45.42)
∆ySh
0.2849 −0.0203 0.2806 0.0102 0.0043 −0.0305
(96.90, 85.52) (78.03, 32.78) (96.98, 85.41) (55.50, 7.37) (5.37) (−12.24)
∆y%Sh
0.0277 −0.0067 0.0258 −0.0007 0.0019 −0.0060
(99.66, 95.58) (82.57, 41.55) (99.62, 95.54) (53.61, 6.35) (26.52) (−45.42)
imbalance decreases, implying the existence of a correlation between the current order
imbalance and the error term. The estimated price impact coefficients are shown to be
underestimated when excluding the lagged order imbalances. Column 5 reports the
estimated reversal coefficient when excluding current order imbalances. The estima-
tion results are disappointed. The percentages of negative values are approximately
less than 55% and those of negative and significant values are less than 10%. Compar-
ing with the results in column 3, the percentages of negative values in column 5 are
significantly lower than those in column 3. Moreover, some average values in column
5 are positive suggesting that excluding the contemporaneous order flows could cause
the serious biased estimates when estimating the price reversal measures.
The last two columns present the test results whether there exist any differences
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between coefficients from multiple regression and from simple regression. The column
6 reports the test results of comparing λ1 from (29) with λ
S
1 from (30a). The test
results show that λS1 without lagged variable is significantly different from λ1 from full
regression model. The column 7 also provides the test results of λ2 from (29) versus λ
S
2
from (30b). Similarly, the test results show the estimated coefficients from the simple
regression are overestimated and are significantly different from the estimated price
reversal coefficients from the full regression. These results confirm that both order
imbalances variables should be included in the model specification when researchers
need to correctly estimate the price impact and the price reversal coefficients.
Note that the results are much stronger when scaled order imbalances are used
than when unscaled order imbalances are used. For example, the percentage of signif-
icant price impact coefficients in terms of the number of shares increases from 95.73%
for an unscaled order imbalance to 96.90% for a scaled order imbalance as shown in
lines 1 an 2. Among the different measures for the order imbalance, the order imbal-
ance in terms of the number of transactions has much stronger results than the order
imbalance in terms of the dollar trading volume or the order imbalance in terms of
the number of shares traded.
Table 4 summarizes the cross-sectional averages of the correlation matrix between
the estimated parameters and other observed illiquidity measures like the serial co-
variance of price changes and bid-ask spreads. First, the price impact coefficients
λ1 estimated from the unscaled order imbalances are positively correlated with the
bid-ask spread measures and are negatively correlated with the first-order serial co-
variance of price difference. However, the correlations between the price impact when
the scaled imbalances are used and the bid-ask spreads are not highly correlated and
are negative in most cases. Second, the price reversal coefficients λ2 estimated from
the unscaled order imbalances are negatively correlated with the bid-ask spread. This
result suggests that the absolute value of the price reversal coefficient, which is the
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Table 4: Correlation of open-to-close price difference regression
This table shows the cross-sectional averages of correlations among liquidity variables. λ1 and λ2 are
estimated from the daily time series regression of open-to-close log price difference on both contem-
porary and lagged order imbalances. Cov(∆pt+1,∆pt), QS, and ES are averages of daily measures
from TAQ data. QS is the half quoted spread and ES is the half effective spread. Cov(∆pt+1,∆pt)
is the daily serial covariance of price difference.
Variables QS RQS ES RES Cov(∆pt,∆pt−1)
Panel A. Order imbalance in number of shares
λ1 0.470 0.533 0.470 0.531 −0.016
λ2 0.068 −0.081 0.094 −0.077 0.063
λ1λ1 −0.037 −0.205 −0.031 −0.213 0.079
Panel B. Scaled order imbalance in number of shares
λ1 −0.330 −0.383 −0.329 −0.377 −0.051
λ2 0.302 0.360 0.303 0.355 0.169
λ1λ1 0.186 0.227 0.182 0.222 0.124
Panel C. Order imbalance in number of dollars
λ1 0.250 0.521 0.256 0.530 −0.047
λ2 −0.054 −0.259 −0.055 −0.268 0.078
λ1λ1 −0.081 −0.271 −0.087 −0.286 0.072
Panel D. Scaled order imbalance in number of dollars
λ1 −0.330 −0.383 −0.329 −0.377 −0.051
λ2 0.302 0.360 0.303 0.355 0.170
λ1λ1 0.186 0.227 0.182 0.222 0.124
Panel E. Order imbalance in number of transactions
λ1 0.471 0.666 0.495 0.686 0.013
λ2 −0.130 −0.328 −0.139 −0.345 0.104
λ1λ1 −0.096 −0.242 −0.104 −0.252 0.077
Panel F. Scaled order imbalance in number of transactions
λ1 −0.374 −0.444 −0.371 −0.433 −0.035
λ2 0.365 0.439 0.367 0.434 0.192
λ1λ1 0.241 0.298 0.236 0.291 0.136
inventory effect, is positively correlated with the bid-ask spread. However, the corre-
lation between the reversal coefficient in the scaled version and the first-order serial
covariance of price difference is negative although it should be expected to be positive.
The product of these two coefficients represents the covariance measure as in
(26) and is shown to be positively correlated with the serial covariance measure in
both the scaled and the unscaled versions. Although the estimated coefficients have
different signs when using the scaled or the unscaled order imbalance, the product
of the two coefficients is a meaningful parameter to estimate the liquidity. Overall,
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the correlation table confirms that the theoretical predictions are consistent with the
actual market data.
5 Conclusion
This paper has presented a theory regarding the price impact costs when competitive
market makers are risk-averse in markets with asymmetric information. I extend the
Kyle’s model to incorporate the inventory effect incurred by the dealer’s risk aversion.
First, the single-period model shows that both information and inventory effects
are reflected in the price impact function. The inclusion of these effects implies that
the non-informational price impact cost, compensation to risk-averse market makers
for providing liquidity, can exist although there are no informed traders in the market.
Second, the dynamic model shows that the information effect is permanent while the
inventory effect is temporary. The current market price reflects all of the available
information as well as temporal non-informational events due to the arrivals of large
orders. The inventory effect, however, is temporary and disappears in the subsequent
trade. The predictions of the dynamic model are more consistent with previous bid-
ask spread decomposition models. Based on the derived price in the dynamic model,
the first order serial covariance measure is proportional to both the price impact and
the price reversal.
In empirical tests, the estimated coefficients show that the average price impact
coefficients are positive and the price reversal coefficients are negative. Most coeffi-
cients are quite significant, and the signs of the coefficients are consistent with those
predicted in the model. The estimated coefficients are compared with those when one
of order imbalances are excluded from regression specification. Both price impact and
reversal coefficients from simple regressions tend to be biased and be underestimated.
This result suggests that both order imbalances should be included when estimating
the price impact and reversal coefficients correctly. Moreover, the estimated coeffi-
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cients are highly correlated with the existing illiquidity measures such as the bid-ask
spread or the first order serial covariance of the price difference. This finding confirms
that my theoretical results are well supported by the empirical findings.
This paper presents a unified model that incorporates both inventory and infor-
mation effects. Although the existing microstructure studies separately incorporate
either the inventory or the information effect, there are very few papers that theoreti-
cally combine these two effects. The important contribution of this paper is that both
the inventory and the information effects are shown in one unified model. Moreover,
the derived price behavior in this paper reflects empirical regularities.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
From (1), the optimal quantity traded by the informed trader is x = 1
2λ
(v−µ) which
should be equal to the market maker’s conjecture x˜ = α + βv˜. Thus, we have
α = −µ/2λ and β = 1/2λ (A.1)
Substituting for the linear pricing rule in (3) into (4), the zero profit condition of
competitive risk-averse market makers implies
−yE[v˜|y] + µy + λy2 − γ
2
y2V ar(v˜|y) = 0 (A.2)
Then, the above equation can be written
µ+ λy = E[v˜|y] + γ
2
yV ar(v˜|y) (A.3)
From the properties of conditional normal distribution, we have get the following
equations
µ =
σ2uµ0 − αβΣ0
σ2u + β
2Σ0
and λ =
(
β + γ
2
σ2u
)
Σ0
σ2u + β
2Σ0
(A.4)
Solving (A.1) and (A.4), we have µ = µ0 and
λ =
√
Σ0
σ2u
(
γ
√
Σ0σ2u +
√
4 + γ2Σ0σ2u
4
)
(A.5)
because the second order condition in the problem of the informed trader in (1) implies
λ > 0 such that only the positive value of λ is valid.
B Proof of Proposition 2
At each auction n, given the price pn−1 the mean and variance of the risky asset are
µn−1 and Σn−1, that is v˜|pn−1 ∼ (µn−1,Σn−1). As in Kyle (1985), the optimization
problem of the informed trader can be written
E[p˜in+1|p1, · · · , pn, v] = αn(v − µn)2 + δn (B.1)
for some constants αn and δn. Since pin = (v˜ − p˜n)∆x˜n + p˜in+1, we have
E[p˜in|p1, · · · , pn−1, v] = max
∆xn
E[(v˜− p˜n)∆x˜n +αn(v−µn)2 + δn|p1, · · · , pn−1, v] (B.2)
The market pricing rule is given by
p˜n = µn−1 + λn(∆x˜n + ∆u˜n) (B.3)
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Plugging (B.3) and the formula of µn into (B.2), the conditional expectation yields
max
∆xn
{
(v − µn−1 − λn∆xn)∆xn + αn
(
v − µn−1 − βnΣn
σ2u
∆xn
)2
+ αn
(
βnΣn
σ2u
)2
σ2u + δn
}
(B.4)
Solving the optimization problem, we have
∆xn =
1− 2αn
(
βnΣn
σ2u
)
2
(
λn − αn
(
βnΣn
σ2u
)2)(v − µn−1) = βn(v − µn−1)∆t (B.5)
And the second order condition is
λn − αn
(
βnΣn
σ2u
)2
> 0 (B.6)
Plugging (B.5) into (B.4), we have
1 + 4αn
(
λn − βnΣnσ2u
)
4
(
λn − αn
(
βnΣn
σ2u
)2)(v − µn−1)2 + αn(βnΣnσ2u
)2
σ2u∆t+ δn (B.7)
Now for the risk-averse market maker, the conditional expected utility in a mean-
variance fashion with zero profit condition is
−∆ynE[v˜|∆yn] + µn−1∆yn + λn∆y2n −
γ
2
∆y2nV ar(v˜|∆yn) = 0 (B.8)
The above equation implies that
µn−1 + λn∆yn = E[v˜|∆yn] + γ
2
∆ynΣn (B.9)
where Σn = V ar(v˜|∆yn). Using the properties of the conditional normal distribution,
the solutions are
λn =
βnΣn−1 +
γ
2
σ2uΣn−1
σ2u + ∆tβ
2
nΣn−1
(B.10)
Σn =
σ2uΣn−1
σ2u + ∆tβ
2
nΣn−1
(B.11)
35
These are equivalent to (21) and (22). Plugging (21) and (22) into (B.5) and (B.7),
we can have (18) , (19), and (20). Finally, combine (20) with (21) to obtain(
1−
(
λn − γΣn
2
)2
σ2u
Σn
∆t
)(
1− αn
(
λn − γΣn
2
))
=
1
2
+
γ
2
∆tσ2u
(
λn − γΣn
2
)
(B.12)
This is a cubic equation in λn and has three real roots. The middle root of (B.12)
satisfies the second order condition.
C Proof of Lemma 1
Assume that the risky asset has the conditional normal distribution with mean µn−1
and variance Σn−1, that is v˜|pn−1 ∼ N(µn−1,Σn−1). From the definition of (13), we
know that
v|pn ∼ N
(
µn−1 +
βn (pn − µn−1) Σn−1
λn (σ2u + ∆tβ
2
nΣn−1)
,
σ2uΣn−1
σ2u + ∆tβ
2
nΣn−1
)
(C.1)
Thus, E[v˜|pn] = µn can be written as
µn = µn−1 +
(pn − µn−1) βnΣn
λnσ2u
(C.2)
Moreover, since µn−1 = pn − λn∆yn, we have
µn = pn −
(
λn − βnΣn
σ2u
)
∆yn (C.3)
Combining (21) with (C.3), we get the (24).
D Proof of Lemma 2
Given a recent traded price pn−1 at the end of n−1 and at the beginning of n, the risk
asset is normally distributed with mean µn−1 and variance Σn−1. To get the serial
covariance measure, we need to rearrange the price difference ∆pn and ∆pn+1. From
the (1) and (13), the price difference at time n and n+ 1 can be written
∆pn = (∆un + ∆t (v − µn−1) βn)λn − 1
2
γΣn−1∆yn−1 (D.1)
and
∆pn+1 = (∆un+1 + ∆t (v − µn) βn+1)λn+1 − 1
2
γ (∆un + ∆t (v − µn−1) βn) Σn (D.2)
where µn is
pn−1 + (∆un + ∆t (v − µn−1) βn)
(
λn − 1
2
γΣn
)
− 1
2
γΣn−1∆yn−1 (D.3)
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Then, the covariance measure Cov[∆pn+1,∆pn] is
−1
2
∆tλn
((
σ2u + ∆tβ
2
nΣn−1
)
(γΣn + ∆tβn+1λn+1 (2λn − γΣn))− 2∆tβnβn+1λn+1Σn−1
)
(D.4)
From (21) and (B.11)
2λn − γΣn = 2βnΣn
σ2u
(D.5)
σ2u + ∆tβ
2
nΣn−1 =
σ2uΣn−1
Σn
(D.6)
Plugging (D.5) and (D.6) into (D.4) and rearranging, we have
Cov(∆pn+1,∆pn) = −1
2
γ∆tσ2uλnΣn−1 (D.7)
which is the serial covariance measure at time n.
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CHAPTER II
The behavior of merger arbitrage investors: the role of market making
and price discovery
1 Introduction
Merger arbitrage or risk arbitrage is a specialized investment strategy in which arbi-
trageurs purchase the target company’s stock and profit from the arbitrage spread,
the difference between the purchase price and the offer price. The merger arbitrage
spread can be caused by uncertainty regarding the merger, the investors’ limited
capital, or transaction costs. The relation between the merger arbitrage spread and
liquidity will be examined by investigating the trading behavior around the merger
announcement. In other words, the investigation will determine whether those two
spread variables affect each other through the market microstructure model. More-
over, it is important to understand how the incorporation of new information occurs
during a merger period because new information associated with the target stock
will result in a change in the value of the merged firm, which will be reflected in
the current bidder stock price, and the change in the bidder’s stock price may affect
the target stock price that the target shareholders receive when the deal completes
successfully. Thus, the time series behavior of both bidder and target stocks and the
price discovery after the merger announcement must be discovered by considering the
prices of the two stocks simultaneously.
The existing studies of the microstructure effect on mergers study the behavior
of the bid-ask spread of target stocks around a merger announcement by focusing
on changes in the bid-ask spread and its components. (Conrad and Niden (1992),
Jennings (1994), Foster and Viswanathan (1995)) 1. However, the bid-ask spread
1Foster and Viswanathan (1995) find that spreads increase before announcement, and decrease
after announcement using daily date. On an intraday analysis, Jennings (1994) finds that the
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of target stocks may be affected by the activities of merger arbitrage; thus, only
focusing on the time series for the target stock may result in a biased estimate. For
example, when investors purchase a target stock and sell a bidder stock at the same
time, they may postpone buying or adjust the bidding price because they may be
exposed to greater deal failure risk if it is difficult to short-sell the target stock. This
postponement or adjustment can potentially affect the liquidity of the target stock.
Moreover, if a bidder stock lacks liquidity, the holders of the target shares face the
risk of holding an exchanged bidder stock because they may have trouble selling the
exchanged stock after the deal completes. Thus, a structural model is developed to
estimate the components of a bid-ask spread using multiple time series to account for
the interactions between the bidder and the target stock.
In this paper, I study how investors trading merger stocks are exposed to risks
and are compensated, using the Huang and Stoll (1994) spread decomposition model.
Thus, each price change can be expressed as the function of the bid-ask spread compo-
nents, and the arbitrage spread can also be expressed as the sum of the informational
component and the inventory component of the bid-ask spread. This analogy sug-
gests that the arbitrage opportunity can be associated with liquidity risk(Kumar and
Seppi (1994), Roll et al. (2007)). Roll et al. (2007) argue that deviations from the
no-arbitrage relations should be related to liquidity because liquidity facilitates ar-
bitrage. They investigate the relation between stock market liquidity and the index
futures basis and show that arbitrageurs affect liquidity with their trading and that
liquidity plays an important role in moving markets toward an efficient outcome. Sim-
ilarly, if the positive excess merger arbitrage returns are thought to be compensation
to merger arbitrageurs for providing immediacy to the target shareholders, merger
arbitrage returns and liquidity should be related.
quoted bid-ask spread of target company shares is abnormally high immediately after the takeover
announcements but falls quickly thereafter. In a recent study, Lipson and Mortal (2007) show that
spreads drop and that quoted depth increases for bidder firms, and these changes can be explained
by firm characteristics.
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The existing merger arbitrage literature shows that the merger arbitrage strategy
appears to generate excess risk-adjusted returns to arbitrageurs2. This positive ex-
cess return appears to be valid even after considering the market impact costs and
broker fees. In addition to general transaction costs, the existence of these positive
excess returns may be interpreted as compensation for various risks borne by the
merger arbitrage investors trading target stock. The most compelling reason for this
interpretation is that arbitrageurs could be compensated for bearing the deal failure
risks. Larcker and Lys (1987) assume that risk arbitrageurs are better informed than
the market about the likelihood of takeover success and argue that the excess return
could be compensation to arbitrageurs for acquiring costly information related to the
deal outcome. The second reason is that investors may be compensated due to limits
to arbitrage caused by limited capital. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that arbi-
trageurs may not have enough resources to handle the selling pressure caused by the
existing target shareholders, and the consequence of this limited capital keeps the
target stock price below the offer price. Moreover, investors who invest in a merger
arbitrage strategy may be less likely to be diversified because merger arbitrage is a
very specialized strategy that only trades one or two stocks, and so they care about
both systemic and idiosyncratic volatility. As a result, the investors specializing in
merger arbitrage will require some compensation for holding an undiversified portfolio
with limited capital.
Thus, the compensations requested by merger arbitrage investors are similar to
those required by market makers who provide liquidity. A recent survey by Moore
2For example, using a sample of 94 SEC 13D filings from 1977 to 1983, Larcker and Lys (1987)
show that arbitrageurs generate excess returns of 5.3% on their portfolio positions from the trans-
action date to the resolution date. Jindra and Walkling (2004) examine 362 cash tender offers of
publicly traded US targets during the period from 1971 to 1985 and report annualized returns to
arbitrageurs of 46.5%. Using the calendar-time portfolio construction, Baker and Savasoglu (2002)
report an average annualized abnormal return of 7.2% to 10.8% for a sample of 1901 cash and stock
deals during the periods from 1981 to 1996 after controlling for the capital asset pricing model and
Fama-French three-factor.
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et al. (2006) reports some stylized facts about the behaviors of merger arbitrageurs3.
From the survey, merger arbitrageurs have their own private information related to
the announced deals, are limited in their capital, and act as if they are market makers
by providing liquidity during the merger period. So, the compensation for the deal
failure risk can be thought of as an asymmetric information cost, and holding the
undiversified portfolio with limited capital can be regarded as an inventory cost.
Therefore, the compensation requested by merger arbitrage investors can be inferred
from the analysis of the bid-ask spread components.
The estimation results from the state space models with a Kalman filter provide
evidence that each component of the merger stocks appears to have different move-
ment around the merger announcement. First, the estimated bid-ask spreads of both
stocks decrease after the announcement, and are similar to the average effective spread
of each stock. Second, the information components in the bid-ask spreads of both
stocks decrease after the announcement. This finding implies that merger arbitrage
investors may be afraid of the arrival of more informed traders before the announce-
ment. Moreover, the decrease in informational components can be interpreted as the
reduction of informational asymmetry after the announcement. Finally, the inventory
components for the target stocks significantly increase after the merger announcement
while those for the bidder stocks are unchanged. The increase in the inventory com-
3The authors sent surveys to 28 arbitrageurs who worked at brokerage and money management
firms who operate an arbitrage operation within large firms. They received responses from 21 of 28.
The sample covers not only the firms who are required to file 13F to SEC but also hedge funds that
are not required to file the 13F. Even though their sample size is quite small, their survey results
are quite consistent with academic literature. First, most arbitrageurs take their positions within
two weeks after the merger announcement while they do not unwind their positions immediately
when the deal is canceled. Second, arbitrageurs typically use leverage to take arbitrage positions.
This implies that they might face the limited capital problem. Third, only a small number of
arbitragers invest in unannounced deals such as rumored deals or anticipated deals. Moreover, they
use outside consultants such as antitrust attorneys and tax and accounting specialists implying that
many arbitrageurs are more informed traders than the general public investors. Fourth, they use
the position limit rule to control risks in their arbitrage portfolios. For example, they limit their
individual positions based on a percentage of the overall portfolio or the total amount of capital
that can be lost when the deal is canceled. Fifth, they use derivatives in their positions and use the
reverse positions to manage portfolio risks. Finally, they carefully use limit orders to execute their
trades.
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ponents of the target stocks suggests that merger arbitrage investors may play the
role of market makers by providing liquidity to the existing target shareholders who
do not want to hold the shares. The increase in inventory components also suggests
the limit to arbitrage because the limited capital of the arbitrage investors requires
more compensation for providing liquidity to the existing target shareholders.
Next, I investigate the dynamic relation between the bid-ask spread and the merger
arbitrage spread using vector autoregression. The Granger-causality tests show that
the bid-ask spread of each stock helps to predict the future movement of the merger
arbitrage spread. Moreover, the unexpected shock of the bid-ask spread causes the
increase in the merger arbitrage spread. Finally, the unexpected shock to the merger
arbitrage spread appears to affect each bid-ask spread permanently.
Finally, I estimate the informational share proposed by Hasbrouck (1995) to in-
vestigate how each stock reflects the arrival of new information in the merger market.
To do so, I use the vector error correction model because a cointegration relation
exists between the two merger stocks. The estimated results show that the infor-
mational share of each stock after the merger announcement is quite similar to the
proportion of the market value of each stock to the sum of the two firm’s values prior
to the announcement. This relation implies that merger arbitrage investors help to
form the efficient price. In other words, the merger arbitrage investors eliminate the
arbitrage opportunity so that the target stock price reaches the agreed price between
the merger parties. As a result, the positive excess return from merger arbitrage is
thought of as the compensation associated with forming the effective price.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides the
market microstructure model for merger stocks during the merger period and shows
the relation between the merger arbitrage spread and the bid-ask spread. Section 3
describes the data and the variables used in this paper. Section 4 shows the estimation
results derived in section 2 by using the state space model with a Kalman filter.
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Section 5 investigates the relation between the merger arbitrage spread and the bid-
ask spread by using both cross sectional and time series data. Section 6 investigates
the price discovery and the informational share. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Market microstructure model for merger arbitrage
2.1 Model for bidder and target stocks
The analysis in this paper is based on the Huang and Stoll (1997) spread decomposi-
tion model. The model provides a three-way decomposition of the bid-ask spread into
adverse selection, inventory holding, and order processing cost components. Suppose
there is an unobservable stand-alone fundamental value for each firm i = 1, 2, V Alonei,t ,
which is equivalent to the firm value when the merger deal does not exist or fails.
Assume that the stand-alone fundamental firm share value evolves as
V Alonei,t = V
Alone
i,t−1 + αi
si
2
vi,t−1 + ui,t i = 1, 2 (31)
where ui,t is the unexpected public information shock of firm i at time t and vi,t is the
unexpected quote shock or the private information shock incorporated in the quote
of firm i at time t. Suppose the ui,ts are uncorrelated white-noise processes with
mean zero, E[u1,tu2,t] = 0 and E[u
2
i,t] = σ
2
u. The quote innovation vi,ts are correlated
with each other and have mean zero and variance E[v2i,t] = σ
2
vi
. The quote innovation
vi,t can be written as the difference between the observed quote direction and the
information in qi,t−1 that is not a surprise, that is
vi,t = qi,t − E[qi,t|qi,t−1] (32)
If E[qi,t|qi,t−1] = 0, the system in equation (31) is equal to the original assumption
in Huang and Stoll (1997). Alternatively, if E[qi,t|qi,t−1] = ηiqi,t−1 where ηi is the
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transformation of the probability of trade reversal4, then equation (31) will be equiv-
alent to the extended model with induced serial correlation in trade flows, which is
ultimately the AR(1) process for quote direction. But I do not have any specific as-
sumption about the expected value of the quote direction so that the quote innovation
vi,t could have any functions of qi,t−1.
Now, suppose the bidder offers the cash C and the stock with the exchange ratio γ
for each share of target stock. Let V Successi,t and ni be the firm i’s share value and the
total shares outstanding when the merger succeeds. Following Houston and Ryngaert
(1997), the value of the offer to the target and the bidder of the combined firm will
be
n1V
Success
1,t = (1− κ)[Vt(n1 + γn2)− Cn2] (33a)
n2V
Success
2,t = Cn2 + κ[Vt(n1 + γn2)− Cn2] (33b)
where Vt = (n1V
Alone
1,t + n2V
Alone
2,t + S)/(n1 + γn2) is the fundamental share value of
the combined firm , κ = γn2/(n1 + γn2) ∈ [0, 1] is the proportion of the combined
firm that the target shareholders will receive when the deal completes successfully,
and S is any synergies created by combining two firms. Then, the fundamental share
value of each firm i can be written as
V1,t = pi(1− κ)
[
Vt
(
n1 + γn2
n1
)
− Cn2
n1
]
+ (1− pi)V Alone1,t (34a)
V2,t = pi
[
(1− κ)C + κVt
(
n1 + γn2
n2
)]
+ (1− pi)V Alone2,t (34b)
where pi ∈ [0, 1] is the probability of success of the merger. It is then easy to show that
4Assuming that qi,t = ±1 equally likely, then ηi is equivalent to 1− 2φi where φi is the reversal
probability of a trade flow i. Suppose that P (qi,t = +1|qi,t−1 = −1) = P (qi,t = −1|qi,t−1 = +1) = φi
and P (qi,t = +1|qi,t−1 = +1) = P (qi,t = −1|qi,t−1 = −1) = 1− φi. Since the reversal probability φi
is less than one and greater than zero, this condition satisfies the stationarity assumption of AR(1)
process: 0 < φi < 1 implies |ηi| < 1. If ηi = 12 , then ηi will be equal to zero.
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the change of the fundamental value of the bidder firm is ∆V1,t = (1− piκ)∆V Alone1,t +
pi(1 − κ)n2
n1
∆V Alone2,t , and that of the target firm is ∆V2,t = piκ
n1
n2
∆V Alone1,t + (1 − pi +
piκ)∆V Alone2,t .
The midpoints of both stocks should be related to the fundamental value of the
combined firm so that the quote midpoints reflect the information from both the
stand-alone bidder and the stand-alone target. That is, the change in the funda-
mental value of each stock should be embedded in the midpoint of each stock. But
arbitrageurs will believe that the deal will complete successfully and set the midpoint
of the target stock to reflect the midpoint of the offer price, which can be inferred
from the recent trading price of the bidder stock. Moreover, the midpoint of each
stock is set to reflect the inventory component of its stock. Moreover, assume that the
mid-quote point of the target stock is set to follow the offer price at best so that the
expected value of the offer is the same as the current mid-point of the target stock.
Let mi,t be the mid-quote price of firm i at time t where firm 1 is the bidder and firm
2 is the target company. Thus, the midpoint of each stock is assumed to evolve as
m1,t = m1,t−1 + ∆V1,t + β1
s1
2
q1,t−1 (35a)
m2,t = C + γm1,t−1 + ∆V2,t + β2
s2
2
q2,t−1 (35b)
where βi is the proportion of the half-spread attributable to inventory holding costs
5. The econometric specification of the midpoint in equation (35) implies that the
bidder stock and the target stock share a common component based on cointegration.
Because the target stock’s efficient price typically depends on the bidder’s efficient
price except for the cash merger, the cointegrated price system in equation (35)
appears to be appealing. Finally, the observed trade price for each firm can be
5Here, sizes of past trades are assumed to be of a normal one so that −qt = It−It−1 =
∑t
i=1 qi−∑t−1
i=1 qi where It is the cumulative inventory from the market open until time t. So, the inventory
at time t is It = It−1 − qt. If qt = −1 which transaction is seller initiated so that dealer buys, then
It = It−1+1. If qt = +1 which transaction is a buyer initiated so that dealer sells, then It = It−1−1
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written as
p1,t = m1,t +
s1
2
q1,t + δq2,t−1 (36a)
p2,t = m2,t +
s2
2
q2,t (36b)
where δq2,t−1 reflects the hedging activity by arbitrage investors. The coefficient of q2
in equation (36a) measures the change in the bidder stock due to the quote behavior
of the target stock. Under these price systems, it is easy to show that the bid-ask
spread will be s1 and s2 for the bidder and the target, respectively.
2.2 Merger arbitrage spread
A direct calculation shows that the arbitrage position, At = p2,t − (C + γp1,t), is
At =
s2
2
q2,t + β2
s2
2
q2,t−1 + (1− pi)α2 s2
2
v2,t−1 + (1− pi)u2,t
−γ
[s1
2
q1,t + β1
s1
2
q1,t−1 + (1− pi)α1 s1
2
v1,t−1 + (1− pi)u1,t + δq2,t−1
]
(37)
That is, the arbitrage positions can be expressed as the compensation for the asym-
metric information costs, the inventory holding costs, and the transaction costs. If
an investor buys a target stock (q2 = −1) and sells a bidder stock(q1 = 1), then
he should pay At to the arbitrageurs. The first terms in each line reflect the com-
pensation for the simple transaction costs, which are the same as half of the bid-ask
spread. The second terms in each line reflect the inventory holding costs charged
by the arbitrageurs because they manage their portfolio until the deal consummates.
The third and the fourth components in each line are the compensation for the deal
completion risks. The last term in the second line bracket is the compensation that
arises due to the short-selling costs. All of the costs arising from the bidder stock are
proportional to the exchange ratio. So, if the merger structure is a pure cash merger
(γ = 0), there are no costs related to the bidder stock.
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2.2.1 Merger arbitrage spread and information asymmetry
If the deal completes successfully, i.e. pi = 1, then the arbitrage position is
s2
2
q2,t + β2
s2
2
q2,t−1 − γ
[s1
2
q1,t + β1
s1
2
q1,t−1 + δq2,t−1
]
(38)
which implies that the arbitrageurs will be compensated for their physical transaction
costs and inventory holding costs even if the deal completes successfully. Moreover,
there is no asymmetric component in the arbitrage positions unless a deal failure risk
exists. If the deal fails, i.e., pi = 0, then the arbitrage position is
s2
2
q2,t + β2
s2
2
q2,t−1 + α2
s2
2
v2,t−1 + u2,t
−γ
[s1
2
q1,t + β1
s1
2
q1,t−1 + α1
s1
2
v1,t−1 + u1,t + δq2,t−1
]
(39)
so that the arbitrageurs bear the additional informational risk, which is the difference
between the equations (38) and (39).
α2
s2
2
v2,t−1 + u2,t − γ
[
α1
s1
2
v1,t−1 + u1,t
]
(40)
which is the combination of the public and private information of the bidder and
target stocks, implying that the adverse selection components of the bid-ask spread
accurately reflect the deal failure risk.
2.2.2 Merger arbitrage spread and inventory costs
Baker and Savasoglu (2002) provide a simple stylized model assuming that the target
shareholders receive 1 + p with probability pi and receive 1 with probability 1 − pi.
Then, p can be thought of as the premium to the target shareholders offered by the
bidder. Moreover, a number of target shareholders exist who do not want to bear
the deal completion risk and sell a total of X shares. In the market, there is a
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limited number A of arbitrageurs who have the mean-variance utility with absolute
risk aversion zA. Under these assumptions, the mean and variance of the offer will
be µ = 1 + pip and σ2 = pi(1− pi)p2, respectively. The authors demonstrate that the
offering price by the target shareholders should be
pT = 1 + pip− X
A
zApi(1− pi)p2 = µ− X
A
zAσ2 (41)
where zA is the absolute risk aversion coefficient. The second term is then the ad-
ditional compensation to the arbitrageurs offered by the target shareholders. This
premium occurs because the target shareholders sell to a limited number of capital-
constrained arbitrageurs. These authors define the arbitrageurs’ capital as the total
institutional equity holdings, and show that the capital inversely relates to the subse-
quent equity returns. Within the inventory theory of market microstructure, a market
maker should be compensated for providing liquidity service because he bears a level
of risk that is inconsistent with his optimal preferences. The arbitrageurs’ positions
during the merger period are reflected in their portfolios, which are different from
their own preferences. They then want to be compensated for the arbitrage positions
that deviate from their optimal portfolios.
Analytically, the second term in equation (41) is equivalent to the bid-ask spread
derived under the inventory holding cost argument. Suppose only inventory holding
costs exist, i.e., β2 = 1, but no informational costs ui,t = vi,t = 0. Moreover, the mid-
quote price can correctly reflect the payoff of the target share so that µ = C+γm1,t−1.
The buying price of the target share becomes pT = µ− s2 under the situation when
trades occurs at the bid price(q2,t = q2,t−1 = −1). Then, the second term in equation
(41) and the bid-ask spread due to inventory holdings, s2 are equivalent
6. Stoll (1978)
6For complete derivations, see the Appendix
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shows that the proportional bid-ask spread is
s2
pT
= zAσ
2
R|Q| =
X
A
zAσ
2 1
pT
(42)
because σ2R =
σ2
(pT )2
and Q = X
A
pT where σ2R is the variance of the return and σ
2 is the
variance of the stock price. So, the target price can be written
pT = µ− s2 = µ− X
A
zAσ
2 (43)
which is the same as the equation (41). Equation (43) shows that the bid-ask spread
due to the inventory is equivalent to the premium that is offered by the existing target
shareholders. Note that the price in Stoll (1978) is the buying price submitted by
the market makers, while the price in Baker and Savasoglu (2002) is the offer price
provided by the existing shareholders. Thus, the price in equation (43) should be the
market clearing price.
2.3 Estimation
The state-space representation of the dynamics of ∆pt is given by the following system
of equations:
ξt+1 =Fξt + et+1 (44a)
∆pt =A
′xt + H′ξt (44b)
where F,A′, and H′ are matrices of parameters of dimension (r × r), (2 × k), and
(2×r), respectively, and xt is a (k×1) vector of exogenous variables. Equation (44a) is
known as the state equation, and equation eqrefobserve1 is known as the observation
equation. Here, I use the Kalman filter algorithm to estimate the system of equations
(44) by using the maximum likelihood estimation. See the Appendix for details.
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One advantage of the structure in equation (44) is that I can estimate the inventory
component and the information component without further assumptions about the
unobserved vectors of vt. Here, I assume that the quote direction is an exogenous
observable variable. Although the quote direction cannot be observed directly from
the market data, previous studies show that the algorithm of Lee and Ready (1991)
well approximates the actual quote direction.
Based on the assumptions in the previous section, the price difference ∆pt =
(∆p1,t,∆p2,t)
′ can be written as
∆pt = A(L)qt +B(L)ut + C(L)vt
=
[
A0 + A1L+ A2L
2
]
qt + [B0 +B1L] ut +
[
C1L+ C2L
2
]
vt (45)
where ut = (u1,t, u2,t)
′, qt = (q1,t, q2,t)
′ and L is the lag operator with Lkxt = xt−k.
Here, I assume that a trade direction vector qt is the exogenous variable; that is,
xt ≡ qt. The coefficients Ai, Bi and Cis are
A0 =
 s12 0
0 s2
2
 A1 =
 − (1− β1) s12 δ
0 − (1− β2) s22
 A2 =
 0 −δ
γβ1
s1
2
−β2 s22

B0 =
 1− piκ pi(1− κ)n2n1
piκn1
n2
1− pi(1− κ)
 B1 =
 0 0
γ(1− pi) −(1− pi)

C1 =
 (1− piκ)α1 s12 pi(1− κ)α2 s22 n2n1
piκα1
s1
2
n1
n2
[1− pi(1− κ)]α2 s22
 C2 =
 0 0
γ(1− pi)α1 s12 −(1− pi)α2 s22

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ξt =

ut
ut−1
vt
vt−1
vt−2

F =

0 0 0 0 0
I 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 I 0 0
0 0 0 I 0

et =

ut
0
vt
0
0

and
H′ =
(
B0 B1 C0 C1 C2
)
and A′ =
(
A0 A1 A2
)
3 Data and variables
3.1 Sample Construction
The initial sample of mergers and acquisitions is drawn from the Thomson Financial
SDC mergers and acquisitions database. A total of 2,518 US merger and acquisition
deals between January 1, 1994, and December, 31, 2008, meet the following screen
criteria. First, the deal status must be completed or withdrawn. That is, uncertain
or rumored deals are deleted from the sample. Second, the forms of the deals are all
mergers (SDC deal form code: M), acquisition of majority interest (AM), acquisition
of partial interest (AP), and acquisition of remaining interest (AR). Thus, I exclude
all deals classified as exchange offers, acquisition of assets, acquisition of particular
assets, privatization, buybacks, recapitalization, and acquisition (of stock). Third,
the method of payments should be combinations of cash, common stock, or cash
equivalents. Thus, if the deal price is determined based on earnings, sales, or cash
flow after the deal completion, then the corresponding deals is deleted. Moreover,
I keep only the firms whose CRSP share codes are either 10 or 11 (common stock).
Fourth, the bidder must hold less than 50% of shares and be seeking control at the
time of the announcement date. Fifth, both merger parties are U.S. firms publicly
traded on the NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq and have 60 days of price data prior to the
merger announcement. Finally, the deal duration should be more than 15 days after
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the announcement to obtain sufficient stock price data. Basic deal information such
as the announcement date, the deal completion/withdrawal date, and the method of
payment is collected from the SDC. Because the original SDC data have some errors,
I use Lexis-Nexis or EDGAR to correct wrong information by inspecting the original
8-F statement reported to the SEC. I found that there are some errors and missing
data in the SDC database 7.
The merger arbitrage spread can be related to the structure of the payment to
the target shareholders because the wealth of the target shareholders changes in the
case of floating value or fixed exchange ratio deals. The payment method used in
this paper is either cash or stock. When a bidder uses the stock financed mergers,
he could use the fixed exchange ratio or the floating exchange ratio for the merger
consideration. That is, the bidder could offer a fixed number of shares for each target
share or the fixed value of the bidder’s stock to be exchanged for each target share
at the announcement date. A mixed offer is the sum of the fixed cash and fixed
exchange ratio, the fixed cash and floating exchange ratio, or sometimes a fixed value
offer so that the proportion of cash and stock is determined later by the shareholders.
Another interesting merger technique is the collar offer, in which the number of bidder
shares depends on the bidder stock price range over some given period. The collar
offer can be thought of as a mixture of the fixed exchange ratio offer and the floating
exchange ratio offer.
To analyze the effect of the deal structure, I first group the merger deals into
three categories: pure cash deals, pure stock deals, or a mixture of cash and stock.
The pure stock deals are divided into three groups: fixed exchange ratio stock swap,
fixed pricing (or floating exchange) stock swap, and collar. Similarly, the mixed deals
7Overall, the SDC seems to record the final deal condition rather keep the initial contract. For
the time series analysis, however, I need contents both of initial contract and of amended contract.
The SDC also record the exchange ratio of the fixed value deals even though it is not determined
at the announcement date. This may mislead users to misclassify the fixed value deal as the fixed-
exchange ratio deal. Moreover, some deals classify as the fixed value deals even though they are
collar type deal.
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are divided into three groups: cash plus fixed exchange ratio stock, cash plus fixed
value pricing, and collar with a cash payment. Therefore, depending on the payment
structure, I have seven groups.
To analyze the merger arbitrage, I use the TAQ database to extract the trade
and quote data, and the CRSP database to identify the stock information and the
dividend. The entire stock price is adjusted for dividends and for stock splits using
the CRSP cumulative factor (CFACPR). I classify the trade direction by using the
Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm that compares the transaction price to the posted
bid and ask quotes. I first identify the quote, which must be at least five seconds old.
The algorithm is that if a trade is closer to the bid (ask) of the quote, it is classified
as seller (buyer) initiated. If the transaction occurs at the midpoint of the quote, a
tick test is performed. A tick test means that if the last price change prior to the
trade is negative (positive), the trade is classified as seller (buyer) initiated.
3.2 Sample statistics
In Table 5, I provide a summary of the mergers used in this study. Over the sample
period, approximately 28% of the deals was pure-cash deals, and approximately 54%
of the deals was pure stock deals. Among the pure stock exchange deals, the most
frequent deal type is the fixed exchange ratio deal, while the floating exchange deal
type is relatively small. Moreover, collar deals were approximately 16% of the sample.
Consistent with the merger wave literature, the aggregate takeover activities appear
to have been relatively high in the late 1990s. (See Harford (2005)).
Table 6 reports the deal characteristics of my takeover sample. First, the average
deal value is higher when stocks are considered than when a simple cash-like (pure
cash and fixed value stock) deal is considered. When the deal value increases, the
bidders are more likely to use a stock swap rather than a pure cash payment. Second,
the market average value of the bidder firms is always greater than that of the target
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Table 5: Yearly distribution of Mergers and Acquisitions announcements from 1994
to 2008
This table provides the yearly distribution of mergers and acquisitions samples in SDC database
from 1994 to 2008. The sample includes only deals where the deal status must be completed or
withdrawn, and exclude all deals classified as exchange offers, acquisition of assets, acquisition of
certain assets, privatization, buybacks, recapitalization, and acquisition of stock. Moreover, both
target and acquirer firms are listed in the CRSP database and are US public firms. We keep only firms
whose CRSP share codes are 10 or 11. That is, if there exists a stock swap offer, the exchanged stock
must be a common stock. ”Cash” means a pure cash deal, and ”Stock” represents a pure stock deal.
Of the ”Stock” deals, ”Stock(FL)” represents the pure stock deals with fixed value (floating exchange
ratio) while ”Stock(FX)” means the pure stock deals with a fixed exchange ratio. ”Mix” represents
a type of deals that a merger consideration consists of stock and cash. ”Mix(FL)” and ”Mix(FX)”
represent a mixed deal with floating exchange ratio and fixed exchange ratio respectively. ”Collar”
means that there exists a contingent claim in merger deal at announcement date. Of the collar
deals, ”Stock” means that a target shareholder will receive a bidder stock when a deal completes,
and ”Mix” means a target shareholder will receive an additional cash amount as well as a bidder
stock.
Year
No Collar Collar
Total
Cash Stk(FL) Mix(FL) Stk(FX) Mix(FX) Sum Stk Mix sum
1994 38 6 5 51 6 106 25 2 27 133
1995 47 9 1 93 3 153 25 5 30 183
1996 44 7 1 88 9 149 41 6 47 196
1997 54 9 6 140 11 220 55 6 61 281
1998 66 13 6 155 14 254 49 4 53 307
1999 83 5 6 133 16 243 44 18 62 305
2000 60 7 7 124 13 211 21 8 29 240
2001 43 0 1 50 23 117 17 9 26 143
2002 30 1 4 20 15 70 9 7 16 86
2003 30 2 5 29 22 88 11 9 20 108
2004 35 3 13 35 27 113 3 5 8 121
2005 44 1 2 21 31 99 6 3 9 108
2006 62 1 1 20 23 107 5 4 9 116
2007 56 0 3 19 31 109 3 7 10 119
2008 33 0 2 17 18 70 1 1 2 72
Total 725 64 63 995 262 2,109 315 94 409 2,518
firms. Third, the ratio of the target firm value to the deal value is less than one,
implying the existence of synergy effects. Fourth, the deal duration, the difference
between the deal consummation date and the announcement date, is 134 days on
average. The duration is typically longer when considering a stock swap than when
considering only cash. Finally, the average cumulative abnormal return for target
firms is typically high. The average CAR for bidder firms are close to zero or negative
as expected.
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Table 6: The summary of deal characteristics
This table provides the summary of deal characteristics of our samples. The number of observations,
deal value (VDeal), the market values of bidder(V1) and target firms(V2), the ratio of target firm
market value to deal value(V2/VDeal), a deal duration(Dur), and cumulative abnormal return over
a 5-day window of each firm are reported (CARi where i = 1 for bidder and i = 2 for target).
The deal value is extracted from SDC database. The market values of each firm are calculated by
averaging the three day market values prior to the merger announcement. The deal duration is the
difference between the announcement date and the deal completion date or withdrawn date. The
cumulative abnormal return(CAR) of each firm is measured over a 5-day window around the merger
announcement date using a market model. The parameters of market model are estimated over a
180-day window from 240 to 60 days prior to the announcement date.
No Collar Collar
Total
Cash Stock(FL) Mix(FL) Stock(FX) Mix(FX) Stock Mix
Obs. 725 64 63 995 262 315 94 2,518
VDeal( Mill. $) 799 299 1,259 2,250 1,976 700 1,154 1,494
Dur(Day) 99 143 139 147 160 142 167 134
V1 (Mill. $) 19,287 27,729 11,772 11,615 7,989 8,084 3,596 13,119
V2 (Mill. $) 506 206 829 1,583 1,426 428 649 1,023
V2/VDeal(%) 67.66 68.52 67.57 71.96 71.75 70.19 62.89 69.94
V1 (%) 0.58 -0.74 -0.28 -4.71 -3.62 -1.46 -1.28 -2.32
V2 (%) 32.42 24.47 27.05 16.31 19.53 19.99 22.46 22.45
The various average bid-ask spread measures before and after the announcement
are reported in Table 7. The quoted half spread usually measures the total transaction
costs. The effective spread is the absolute value of the difference between the trade
price and the quote midpoint just prior to the trade. The daily average values of these
spread measures are calculated by weighting each spread by the number of trades.
If the trades occur only at the ask or bid quote price, then the quoted spread and
the effective spread should be the same. From table 7, it is obvious that the effective
spread is less than the quoted half spread across all subsamples. The average spread
measures are lower for bidder stocks than for target stocks. This result implies that the
target stocks are usually more illiquid than the bidder stocks. Moreover, both spread
measures decrease after the announcement, consistent with the previous literature.
Before the announcement, it is typical for the spread measures of the target shares
to be greater than those of the bidder firms. After the announcement, however,
the magnitude of the bid-ask spread difference between the bidder and the target is
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Table 7: The summary of bid-ask spread around the merger announcement
This table provides the comparison of the bid-ask spread of bidder and target before and after
the merger announcement. The spread measures presented in this table is daily average of spread
measures using TAQ database. The daily spread is calculated by weighting each observed spread
by the number of trades. The pre-announcement period for calculating the average spread is 100
days prior to the announcement, and the post-announcement period is from the announcement date
to the deal completion date or the withdrawn date. The quoted bid-ask spread is the difference
between the ask price and the bid price. The effective spread is the absolute value of the difference
between the trade price and the quote midpoint just prior to the trade. ”*”, ”**”, ”***” indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
Method Of Bidder Target
Payment Before After Diff T-Value Before After Diff T-Value
Panel A. Quoted Half Spread
Cash 0.063 0.063 −0.001 −0.78 0.116 0.057 −0.059 −16.63∗∗∗
Stock(FxVal) 0.085 0.080 −0.005 −3.47∗∗∗ 0.202 0.133 −0.069 −4.21∗∗∗
Mix(FxVal) 0.108 0.072 −0.035 −1.14 0.122 0.080 −0.041 −6.89∗∗∗
Stock(FxRatio) 0.099 0.082 −0.017 −13.03∗∗∗ 0.150 0.140 −0.010 −3.41∗∗∗
Mix(FxRatio) 0.086 0.076 −0.010 −2.53∗∗ 0.099 0.093 −0.006 −1.82∗
Collar 0.102 0.091 −0.011 −5.71∗∗∗ 0.162 0.137 −0.025 −6.19∗∗∗
Mixed Collar 0.075 0.066 −0.009 −3.74∗∗∗ 0.127 0.089 −0.038 −6.54∗∗∗
Panel B. Effective Spread
Cash 0.048 0.048 0.000 −0.24 0.092 0.045 −0.047 −16.15∗∗∗
Stock(FxVal) 0.062 0.057 −0.005 −3.37∗∗∗ 0.157 0.101 −0.055 −4.10∗∗∗
Mix(FxVal) 0.078 0.054 −0.024 −1.16 0.100 0.061 −0.039 −6.75∗∗∗
Stock(FxRatio) 0.081 0.067 −0.013 −11.09∗∗∗ 0.120 0.111 −0.009 −3.88∗∗∗
Mix(FxRatio) 0.068 0.061 −0.007 −2.86∗∗∗ 0.083 0.072 −0.011 −4.75∗∗∗
Collar 0.079 0.071 −0.008 −5.28∗∗∗ 0.128 0.105 −0.023 −7.12∗∗∗
Mixed Collar 0.059 0.051 −0.008 −3.28∗∗∗ 0.102 0.068 −0.034 −6.35∗∗∗
reduced.
Table 8 shows that the trading volume and the dollar trading volume increase
significantly for both stocks after the announcement. The number of trades for the
bidder stocks increases significantly across the deal payment methods. However, the
number of trades for the target shares is similar before and after the announcement.
This result implies that the trading volume per trade of a target share increases
significantly after the merger announcement. Easley and O’hara (1987) argue that
informed traders prefer to trade large amounts, which cause an adverse selection
problem. The increase in the trading volume in the target stock may be related to
59
Table 8: The summary of trading activities around the merger announcement
This table provides the summary statistics of trading activities around the merger announcement.
The trading activity variables presented in this table is average value of daily measures from the
TAQ database. The pre-announcement period for calculating each variable is 100 days prior to the
merger announcement, and the post-announcement period is from the announcement date to the
deal completion date or the withdrawn date. ”*”, ”**”, ”***” indicate significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels respectively.
Method Of Bidder Target
Payment Before After Diff T-Value Before After Diff T-Value
Panel A. Trading Volume (Million Shares)
Cash 2.507 2.622 0.115 2.50∗∗ 0.233 0.486 0.253 9.33∗∗∗
Stock(FxVal) 1.206 1.295 0.089 2.10∗∗ 0.087 0.135 0.048 2.46∗∗
Mix(FxVal) 2.240 2.513 0.273 1.51 0.754 0.914 0.160 1.70∗
Stock(FxRatio) 1.304 1.746 0.442 8.64∗∗∗ 0.449 0.549 0.100 4.19∗∗∗
Mix(FxRatio) 1.064 1.463 0.399 6.05∗∗∗ 0.403 0.498 0.095 3.22∗∗∗
Collar 0.915 1.222 0.307 4.11∗∗∗ 0.137 0.196 0.058 6.26∗∗∗
Mixed Collar 0.513 0.691 0.178 3.70∗∗∗ 0.130 0.259 0.130 5.34∗∗∗
Panel B. Dollar Trading Volume (Million Dollars)
Cash 94.363 95.631 1.268 0.62 4.572 12.311 7.740 9.18∗∗∗
Stock(FxVal) 67.218 69.122 1.904 0.54 1.802 3.569 1.767 3.08∗∗∗
Mix(FxVal) 69.609 68.113 −1.496 −0.20 16.100 21.802 5.701 1.38
Stock(FxRatio) 70.029 86.049 16.020 4.71∗∗∗ 12.851 16.997 4.146 3.71∗∗∗
Mix(FxRatio) 45.361 59.212 13.851 5.96∗∗∗ 14.437 20.653 6.216 5.35∗∗∗
Collar 43.214 54.850 11.636 2.74∗∗∗ 3.461 6.135 2.674 7.46∗∗∗
Mixed Collar 19.220 25.167 5.947 3.73∗∗∗ 3.307 7.824 4.517 4.95∗∗∗
Panel C. The number of Trades (Thousand)
Cash 4.441 4.883 0.442 3.25∗∗∗ 0.622 0.640 0.018 0.71
Stock(FxVal) 1.233 1.315 0.083 1.93∗ 0.088 0.097 0.009 0.56
Mix(FxVal) 3.976 4.491 0.515 2.02∗∗ 2.005 2.007 0.002 0.01
Stock(FxRatio) 2.125 2.920 0.796 4.23∗∗∗ 0.870 0.895 0.025 0.40
Mix(FxRatio) 2.191 3.191 1.001 6.53∗∗∗ 1.022 1.158 0.136 2.14∗∗
Collar 0.953 1.236 0.284 2.97∗∗∗ 0.147 0.144 −0.003 −0.31
Mixed Collar 0.880 1.241 0.361 2.25∗∗ 0.250 0.304 0.054 2.37∗∗
Panel D. Order Imbalance (Thousand Shares)
Cash 61.777 43.135 −18.642 −2.24∗∗ 0.116 −89.329 −89.445 −17.23∗∗∗
Stock(FxVal) 68.593 77.969 9.376 0.79 1.393 −26.416 −27.809 −5.26∗∗∗
Mix(FxVal) −26.257 −22.681 3.576 0.17 −22.640 −63.293 −40.653 −2.09∗∗
Stock(FxRatio) 50.982 105.750 54.768 8.76∗∗∗ 4.767 −1.649 −6.415 −2.97∗∗∗
Mix(FxRatio) 48.551 89.841 41.290 3.92∗∗∗ 13.239 0.987 −12.253 −3.04∗∗∗
Collar 46.224 71.288 25.064 3.67∗∗∗ 2.072 −16.425 −18.497 −10.13∗∗∗
Mixed Collar 34.658 69.416 34.757 3.70∗∗∗ 4.758 −17.608 −22.365 −4.98∗∗∗
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the increase in the asymmetric component in the bid-ask spread. The order imbalance
before and after the announcement of each firm is reported in panel (D). The order
imbalance measure in this study is the trading volume at the ask price (buying shares)
less the trading volume at the bid price (selling shares). A positive order imbalance
implies a net buying pressure, and a negative value implies a net selling pressure.
Before the announcement, the order imbalances of both stocks are positive, indicating
that buying pressure exists. The average order imbalance of the bidder firms increases
after the announcement, implying that there are more buyers for the bidder stock after
the announcement. An interesting feature is that the average order imbalance of the
target shares becomes negative after the announcement. This result implies that a
selling pressure from the existing target shareholders exists, and the arbitrageurs use
limit orders during the merger period.
4 Estimation results
Table 9 reports the bid-ask spread estimates and their components when the trade
direction is assumed to be observable. I estimate parameters in each deal and report
the average of the estimated component by the methods of payment. All of the
parameter estimates satisfy the convergence criteria. The focus here is on the change
in the bid-ask spread components before and after the merger announcement.
First, the bid-ask spread measures of both stocks drop significantly after the
merger announcement, and the difference is significant. Although the estimated bid-
ask spreads in panel (A) are slightly larger than the actual quoted half spread mea-
sures, the estimated spread measures have quite similar patterns to the actual data.
The decrease in the bid-ask spread measures is consistent with the previous literature
8. The decrease in the estimated bid-ask spreads is more pronounced in the target
shares than in the bidder shares. Moreover, the decrease in the bid-ask spread implies
an increase in liquidity, which can be related to an increase in trading volumes.
8See Conrad and Niden (1992), Foster and Viswanathan (1995)
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Table 9: Estimation of parameters of state space model by using Kalman filter algo-
rithm
This table provides the estimation results of price system in the state space model of (45). The
estimated bid-ask spreads for bidder and target stock are s1 and s2 respectively. The informational
component of bid-ask spread for bidder and target stock are α1 and α2 respectively. The inventory
component of bid-ask spread for bidder and target stock are β1 and β2 respectively. ”*”, ”**”, ”***”
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
Method # of Bidder Target
Of Payment Obs Before After Diff T-Value Before After Diff T-Value
Panel A. Estimated Bid-Ask spread (si)
Cash 725 0.079 0.080 0.002 0.97 0.119 0.048 −0.070 −15.43∗∗∗
Stock(FxVal) 64 0.110 0.106 −0.004 −0.77 0.221 0.111 −0.110 −5.09∗∗∗
Mix(FxVal) 63 0.091 0.078 −0.013 −1.22 0.126 0.073 −0.053 −4.48∗∗∗
Stock(FxRatio) 995 0.149 0.121 −0.028 −9.59∗∗∗ 0.185 0.121 −0.065 −12.14∗∗∗
Mix(FxRatio) 262 0.086 0.071 −0.015 −3.51∗∗∗ 0.087 0.061 −0.027 −4.66∗∗∗
Collar 315 0.147 0.128 −0.019 −4.23∗∗∗ 0.181 0.095 −0.086 −10.78∗∗∗
Mixed Collar 94 0.090 0.073 −0.017 −3.34∗∗∗ 0.116 0.055 −0.062 −5.18∗∗∗
Panel B. Information Component (αi)
Cash 725 0.540 0.496 −0.044 −2.29∗∗ 0.525 0.524 −0.002 −0.08
Stock(FxVal) 64 0.560 0.553 −0.007 −0.13 0.550 0.598 0.048 0.66
Mix(FxVal) 63 0.619 0.500 −0.119 −2.38∗∗ 0.534 0.488 −0.047 −0.81
Stock(FxRatio) 995 0.557 0.517 −0.040 −2.52∗∗ 0.564 0.535 −0.028 −1.80∗
Mix(FxRatio) 262 0.554 0.564 0.010 0.33 0.548 0.574 0.026 0.88
Collar 315 0.550 0.540 −0.010 −0.34 0.553 0.513 −0.041 −1.44
Mixed Collar 94 0.535 0.473 −0.062 −1.23 0.492 0.541 0.048 0.96
Panel C. Inventory Compoenet (βi)
Cash 725 0.426 0.442 0.016 0.98 0.297 0.320 0.023 1.61
Stock(FxVal) 64 0.414 0.436 0.023 0.52 0.214 0.299 0.085 1.77∗
Mix(FxVal) 63 0.375 0.445 0.071 1.50 0.278 0.392 0.115 2.39∗∗
Stock(FxRatio) 995 0.396 0.383 −0.013 −1.32 0.307 0.324 0.017 1.49
Mix(FxRatio) 262 0.487 0.452 −0.034 −1.41 0.405 0.402 −0.004 −0.14
Collar 315 0.393 0.391 −0.002 −0.13 0.251 0.314 0.063 3.19∗∗∗
Mixed Collar 94 0.417 0.373 −0.044 −1.08 0.302 0.413 0.110 2.45∗∗
Second, the information components in the bid-ask spreads of both stocks decrease
after the announcement, although some are insignificant. However, the adverse in-
formation components are still the largest portion of the bid-ask spread, suggesting
that merger arbitrage investors have concerns about the deal failure risks. Copeland
and Galai (1983) and Glosten and Harris (1988) predict that market makers may
adversely increase the bid-ask spread when they expect informed trades. The large
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proportion of adverse information components prior to the merger announcement sug-
gests that market makers recognize the likelihood of informed trading from the market
order flows and widen the bid-ask spread prior to the announcement. However, these
adverse information problems can be resolved by the public announcement, which
results in a decrease in the bid-ask spread.
Third, the inventory components of the bid-ask spreads appear to increase after
the announcement even though the difference in the proportion of inventory compo-
nents for the bidder stocks is unchanged. However, the inventory components for the
target stocks increase significantly after the merger announcement. As reported in
Table 8, a substantial selling pressure exists as a result of selling demands from the
existing target shareholders. This finding supports the limits of arbitrage theory.
Moreover, a significant portion of the inventory costs reflects the carrying costs
of the merger arbitrage portfolios until the deal consummation date. The increase
in the inventory components of the target shares suggests that arbitrageurs can play
the role of a market maker. If arbitrageurs are buyers of target shares in takeover
markets, they will handle these negative imbalances and increase their inventory
holding, which is shown in the increase in the inventory component. This result
implies that arbitrageurs can provide liquidity to sellers, and require compensation
by quoting their best buying price.
The estimated components of the bid-ask spread reported in Table 9 are the pro-
portional elements of the bid-ask spread. The proportion of the bid-ask spread may
not be adequate to explain the change in each component of the bid-ask spread. If the
total bid-ask spread decreases due to pure order processing costs after the announce-
ment and other components still remain, each proportion for the information and
inventory components in the bid-ask spread could increase. To address these issues,
I calculate the dollar spread components. Table 10 reports the dollar information
spread and the dollar inventory spread of each stock around the announcement. The
63
Table 10: Estimated dollar spread of state space model by using Kalman filter algo-
rithm
This table provides the estimation results of price system in the state space model of (45). The
dollar bid-ask spread related with asymmetric information for bidder and target stock are α1s1 and
α2s2 respectively. The dollar bid-ask spread related with inventory component for bidder and target
stock are β1s1 and β2s2 respectively. ”*”, ”**”, ”***” indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively.
Method # of Bidder Target
Of Payment Obs Before After Diff T-Value Before After Diff T-Value
Panel A. Dollar Spread (Information portion)
Cash 725 0.043 0.040 −0.003 −1.27 0.061 0.024 −0.036 −12.09∗∗∗
Stock(FxVal) 64 0.061 0.060 −0.001 −0.17 0.124 0.067 −0.057 −3.11∗∗∗
Mix(FxVal) 63 0.047 0.039 −0.008 −0.96 0.065 0.028 −0.037 −3.82∗∗∗
Stock(FxRatio) 995 0.080 0.063 −0.017 −5.29∗∗∗ 0.105 0.063 −0.042 −9.20∗∗∗
Mix(FxRatio) 262 0.045 0.039 −0.005 −1.40 0.044 0.037 −0.007 −1.59
Collar 315 0.081 0.069 −0.012 −2.17∗∗ 0.096 0.051 −0.045 −6.56∗∗∗
Mixed Collar 94 0.049 0.030 −0.019 −3.47∗∗∗ 0.054 0.031 −0.023 −2.93∗∗∗
Panel B. Dollar Spread (Inventory spread)
Cash 725 0.032 0.034 0.003 1.94∗ 0.025 0.018 −0.006 −3.55∗∗∗
Stock(FxVal) 64 0.036 0.042 0.005 0.96 0.035 0.045 0.011 0.95
Mix(FxVal) 63 0.028 0.028 0.001 0.25 0.027 0.036 0.010 1.15
Stock(FxRatio) 995 0.058 0.046 −0.012 −5.70∗∗∗ 0.050 0.047 −0.002 −0.63
Mix(FxRatio) 262 0.037 0.029 −0.008 −2.00∗∗ 0.026 0.028 0.002 0.59
Collar 315 0.057 0.047 −0.010 −3.54∗∗∗ 0.037 0.036 −0.001 −0.12
Mixed Collar 94 0.034 0.027 −0.007 −2.00∗∗ 0.026 0.028 0.002 0.33
dollar components in the bid-ask spreads appear to display similar patterns to the pro-
portions of the components. The decrease in the bid-ask spreads is more pronounced
in the target stocks. The bid-ask spread due to an adverse information decrease after
the announcement implies that most of the decrease in the bid-ask spread after the
announcement is due to the decrease in information asymmetry. For target stocks,
the inventory bid-ask spread after the announcement appears to be unchanged or to
slightly increase after the announcement, although the inventory bid-ask spread of
cash deals decreases significantly. These results are similar in terms of the results of
the change in the percentage inventory component around the event. However, the
dollar inventory component of the bidder stocks decreases after the announcement,
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especially in fixed exchange stock deals. This decrease may be due to the hedging
demand of arbitrageurs who buy target shares and sell bidder shares simultaneously.
5 Merger arbitrage spread and bid-ask spread
5.1 Cross-sectional relation between merger arbitrage and bid-ask spread
As seen in the previous section, the arbitrage spread can be expressed as a function
of the bid-ask spread components. In this section, I investigate the relation between
the merger arbitrage spread and the bid-ask spread cross-sectionally. The dependent
variable is the daily merger arbitrage spread, which is calculated based on the infor-
mation from the financial statement reported by the merger parties. If there are other
events such as stock splits, dividend payments, or a change in deal conditions, then
I adjust the price for each day. The primary independent variables are the quoted
half spread of each firm. I include the Fama-French 3 factors to control the mar-
ket wide premium for each date. Moreover, I include the interaction term, which is
the product of the market excess return and the indicator variable, which is 1 if the
market excess return is positive, and zero otherwise. This interaction variable can
control the non-linear characteristics of the merger arbitrage returns (Mitchell and
Pulvino (2001)). If the market is volatile, the merger arbitrage spread is likely to
widen due to market uncertainty. I include the volatility index (VIX) to control mar-
ket uncertainty. Moreover, I include other market microstructure variables related to
trading activities. Finally, because the merger arbitrage spread is affected by time
and firm size, I include the time from the announcement date and each firm’s market
value. Table 11 reports the cross-sectional regression for subsamples of deals where
the dependent variable is the merger arbitrage spread.
First, the quoted bid-ask spread of the target firm is positively related to the
merger arbitrage spread across all subsamples. But, the quoted spread of bidder firms
is negative for the fixed value deals while it is positive when the merger deal is varying.
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Table 11: Regressions of merger arbitrage spread for subsamples of deals
This table shows pooled OLS estimates of merger arbitrage spread, defined as at = p2,t − γp1,t −C
where p1,t and p2,t are bitter stock price and target stock price at time t, and γ is the fixed exchange
ratio. Each column is the regression result of subsample: pure cash deal(I), pure stock deal with
fixed value(II), mixed deal with fixed value(III), pure stock deal with fixed exchange ratio(IV), mixed
deal with fixed exchange ratio(V), pure stock deal with collar(VI), and mixed deal with collar(VII).
QSi,t is the daily quoted half-spread of firm i at time t. R
M
t and R
F
t are daily market return and
risk-free rate at time t. I is an indicator variable with one if RMt − RFt > 0, and zero otherwise.
SMBt and SMLt denote the Fama-French factors at time t. V IXt denotes the CBOE volatility
index. Compt is an indicator variable taking one if a deal completes successfully, and zero otherwise.
$V oli,t denotes the daily dollar volume for stock i at time t. MVi,t is the daily market value of stock i
at time t. Tradesi,t denotes the daily number of transaction for stock i at time t. ∆t is the duration
from announcement date to day t. The subscript i is a bidder firm for i = 1 and a target firm for
i = 2. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. ”*”, ”**”, ”***” represents significance at
10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII)
QS1,t −0.439∗∗ −0.624 −0.222∗∗∗ 3.106∗∗∗ 0.022 1.132∗∗∗ 1.549∗∗∗
(0.203) (0.628) (0.079) (0.149) (0.044) (0.165) (0.523)
QS2,t 3.727∗∗∗ 2.123∗∗∗ 1.873∗∗∗ 1.892∗∗∗ 1.467∗∗∗ 2.053∗∗∗ 2.845∗∗∗
(0.242) (0.172) (0.195) (0.064) (0.089) (0.092) (0.236)
RMt −RFt −5.407∗∗ −10.980∗∗∗ −7.590∗∗ 1.319 −3.310∗ −6.194∗∗∗ 0.376
(2.112) (4.073) (3.281) (1.363) (1.820) (2.303) (3.791)
(RMt −RFt ) · I 7.061∗∗ 13.717∗∗ 11.570∗∗ −0.929 11.305∗∗∗ 23.036∗∗∗ −7.044
(3.496) (5.837) (5.130) (2.135) (3.046) (3.404) (5.756)
SMBt 1.236 −2.260 −6.177∗∗ −0.347 3.906∗∗ 3.232 −0.351
(2.179) (3.665) (3.135) (1.301) (1.896) (2.150) (3.283)
HMLt −3.133 −9.254∗ −1.257 −3.318∗∗ 2.137 6.963∗∗ −18.648∗∗∗
(2.188) (4.884) (3.488) (1.503) (1.926) (2.731) (4.026)
V IXt 0.047∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Compt −1.548∗∗∗ −0.253∗ 0.135∗ −2.012∗∗∗ −1.313∗∗∗ −0.698∗∗∗ −1.736∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.134) (0.079) (0.029) (0.043) (0.064) (0.053)
log($V ol1,t) 0.224∗∗∗ −0.092∗∗ −0.085∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.030∗ −0.210∗∗∗ −0.164∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.038) (0.025) (0.013) (0.017) (0.018) (0.028)
log($V ol2,t) −0.078∗∗∗ 0.036 −0.183∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.025) (0.021) (0.011) (0.016) (0.015) (0.026)
log(MV1,t) −0.254∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.034∗∗ −0.321∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.028) (0.028) (0.010) (0.016) (0.015) (0.030)
log(MV2,t) 0.445∗∗∗ 0.418∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.204∗∗∗ 0.959∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.030) (0.028) (0.010) (0.017) (0.015) (0.030)
log(Trade1,t) −0.182∗∗∗ −0.190∗∗∗ −0.215∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗
(0.019) (0.039) (0.023) (0.014) (0.017) (0.020) (0.031)
log(Trades2,t) 0.165∗∗∗ 0.003 0.285∗∗∗ −0.127∗∗∗ −0.104∗∗∗ −0.007 0.068∗∗
(0.018) (0.033) (0.025) (0.014) (0.018) (0.020) (0.033)
∆t 0.003∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 14.56 19.23 10.80 14.13 13.47 11.87 25.42
Obs. 40,384 4,370 5,316 89,720 26,474 25,938 9,597
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Second, the non-linear relation appears to exist between the merger arbitrage spread
and the market excess return, supporting Mitchell and Pulvino (2001). The positive
coefficient for the interaction term implies that the merger arbitrage spread has call
option-like features. Other asset pricing factors are not likely to relate to the merger
arbitrage spread. Third, market volatility is positively related to the merger arbitrage
spread. This result suggests that arbitrageurs may require more compensation when
the market is more volatile. Fourth, when the merger deal is successfully completed,
the merger arbitrage spread should be narrower than when the merger fails. The
negative coefficient of Compt in the regression reflects these predictions. Fifth, heavy
trading volume in a particular stock may narrow the arbitrage spread. Finally, as time
moves far away from the announcement date, the merger arbitrage spread appears
to increase for the fixed value deals, but to decrease for the floating value deals.
The merger arbitrage spread converges to zero when the deal is close to the deal
consummation date. But, for the fixed deals, the merger arbitrage spread appears
to widen as time moves far away from the announcement date, implying that merger
arbitrageurs expect that the deal duration for the fixed value deals ended sooner than
the floating value deals. Finally, it is clear that the merger success and the merger
arbitrage spread are negatively and significantly related across all subsamples.
Overall, this cross-sectional regression confirms that there are clear relations be-
tween the merger arbitrage spread and the bid-ask spread of a target stock. In next
section, I examine the relation between the merger arbitrage spread and the bid-ask
spread using dynamic time series analysis.
5.2 Time-Series analysis
5.2.1 Vector autoregressive regression analysis
This section examines the dynamic behavior of merger arbitrage spreads and bid-
ask spreads. As noted in the previous section, the merger arbitrage spread can be
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expressed as the bid-ask spread components. Each component of the bid-ask spread
can be matched to the different types of compensation to the arbitrageurs. This ability
suggests that the total bid-ask spread should be related with the merger arbitrage
spreads during the merger period. I use the vector autoregression analysis (VAR) to
more precisely analyze the predictability of a bid-ask spread to a merger arbitrage
spread. Let yt = [At, s1,t, s2,t]
′ be the vector of the time series where At is the
arbitrage spread at time t, s1,t is the bid-ask spread of a bidder firm at time t, and
s2,t is the bid-ask spread of a target firm at time t. Then, the reduced-form vector
autoregressive regression(VAR) of order p has the following standard representation:
yt = B0 +
p∑
i=1
Biyt−i + t (46)
where Bi is the (3× 3) coefficient matrix and t is an (3× 1) unobservable zero mean
white noise vector process. The covariance of the vector of reduced-form residuals t
is denoted as Σ. I choose p = 3 to estimate the model in equation (46) based on AIC
criteria.
5.2.2 Granger-causality
Table 12: Granger Causality between merger arbitrage spread and bid-ask spread
This table reports the results of the linear Granger-causality test. At is arbitrage spread at time t
calculated as p2,t − γp1,t −C where p1,t is the price of bidder stock , p2,t is the price of target stock
at time t, γ is the stock exchange ratio per share, and C is the per share cash amount paid to target
shareholders. s1,t and s2,t is the daily quoted half spread of bidder and target at time t respectively.
Each test is conducted by deal by deal. The reported results are percentage of the significance on
overall subsamples. The significance of test in each deal is tested at 5% level.
Method Total Percent Sig Percent Sig Percent Sig Percent Sig
Of Payment Observations At → s1,t At → s2,t s1,t → At s2,t → At
Cash 725 33.24 50.34 13.52 28.14
Stock(FxVal) 64 31.25 43.75 6.25 21.88
Mix(FxVal) 63 55.56 50.79 9.52 23.81
Stock(FxRatio) 995 50.35 57.19 19.50 37.99
Mix(FxRatio) 262 54.58 59.16 22.52 34.73
Collar 315 45.08 50.48 11.75 28.89
Mixed Collar 94 47.87 57.45 12.77 19.15
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In this section, I investigate whether each spread for the merger firms is useful
in forecasting merger arbitrage or vice versa by using the Granger-causality tests.
The Granger-causality tests examine whether the lagged value of one variable helps
to predict another variable. If an independent variable does not help to predict the
dependent variable, then all of the coefficients of the lagged independent variables
are jointly zero. Table 12 summarizes the Granger-causality test results for the VAR
model in equation (46). For each deal, I examine whether one variable Granger-causes
another variable by testing whether the relevant sets of coefficients are zero. I then
count the number of significant samples and calculate the significant percentage in
each set of subsamples based on the payment method.
The results indicate that the merger arbitrage spreads appear to help predict a
bid-ask spread for each stock in approximately half of the samples as shown in the
third and fourth column of Table 12. The results are stronger in the target stocks than
in the bidder stocks. Moreover, the results are much stronger in stock swap mergers
than in cash mergers. These results imply that both the bidder’s and the target’s
bid-ask spread are necessary to predict the merger arbitrage spreads in approximately
half of the sample. The third and fourth column presents the statistics regarding
whether each spread helps to predict the merger arbitrage spreads. The results are
also stronger in the target stocks, and stock-swap deals have more significant results.
5.2.3 Impulse response function analysis
A simple way of capturing the net effects for all the coefficients in the VAR analysis
is to form identified impulse response functions. The VAR model in equation (46)
can be written in the following VMA(∞) manner:
yt = µ+
∞∑
i=1
Θit−i (47)
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Figure 7: The impulse response functions of merger arbitrage to bid-ask spread of
bidder
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where Θi is the unidentified impulse response function which has the interpretation
Θs = ∂yt+s/∂
′
t. That is, the row i and column j element of Θs identifies the conse-
quences of a one-unit increase in the jth variable’s innovation at time t for the value
of the ith variable at time t + s, holding all other innovations at all dates constant.
Because the bid-ask spread shock is correlated with the arbitrage spread shock, it is
uncertain whether the response is the response of the arbitrage spread to the bid-ask
spread, or to a technology shock that happens to occur at the same time as the bid-
ask spread shock. Therefore, the identified impulse response function Ci satisfying
Ciνt−i = Θit−i where E[t′t] = PP
′ = Σ and νt−i = P−1t−i with E[νtν′t] = I3 for
each i must be calculated.
Figures 7 and 8 depict the responses of a merger arbitrage spread to a unit inno-
vation in the bid-ask spread for each stock up to horizon 30 by method of payments.
First, the immediate shock in the bid-ask spread follows the increase in the merger
arbitrage spread. Second, the unexpected rise in the bid-ask spread of bidder stocks
70
Figure 8: The impulse response functions of merger arbitrage to bid-ask spread of
target
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decays over time for the fixed value deals (first rows), and is associated with a persis-
tent increase in the arbitrage spread for the floating value deals. The positive effect
of the target bid-ask spread on the merger arbitrage spread appears to be stronger
than that of the bidder bid-ask spread.
Figures 9 and 10 depict the responses of the bid-ask spread of each stock to a unit
shock in a merger arbitrage spread up to horizon 30 by method of payments. The
impulse response function of the bid-ask spreads to the merger arbitrage spreads has
patterns consistent with the results of the Granger-causality test. The increases in
the merger arbitrage spread have a persistent and positive effect on both the bidder
and the target bid-ask spread. Roll et al. (2007) argue that the increase in the
arbitrage spread induces an increase in incoming orders and eventually widens the
bid-ask spread. The effect of the impulse responses of the bid-ask spreads on the
merger arbitrage spread is stronger in target stocks than in bidder stocks.
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Figure 9: The impulse response functions of bid-ask spread of bidder to merger arbi-
trage
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6 Price discovery and information share
6.1 Cointegration and vector error correction model(VECM)
In this section, I examine the price discovery between two stocks during the merger
period. After the merger, it is typical for the bidder stock company to exist as a
combination of the target and the original bidder companies. As a result, the current
bidder stock price should reflect not only the new information related to the original
bidder company but also the new information related to the target company. When a
merger deal completes successfully, the target shareholders receive the bidder stock in
the case of a stock swap merger. In this case, the target stock price will be affected by
the new information of the target stock itself as well as the information of the bidder
stock. The question is how the new information of the target stock is transmitted to
the bidder stock or vice versa. During the merger period, the target stock price is
likely to be cointegrated with the bidder stock because the current target stock price
is linked to the bidder stock price based on the exchange ratio.
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Figure 10: The impulse response functions of bid-ask spread of target to merger
arbitrage
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I use the vector error correction model to accommodate this cointegrating system
and can identify the price discovery process between the bidder and the target stock.
Suppose a trade direction follows an autoregressive process, that is qt = Υ(L)vt
where Υ(L) is some autoregressive function. One possible specification for a trade
direction is assumed to follow the AR(1) process of qi,t = ηiqi,t−1 + vi,t to admit the
serial correlation in trade flows as in Huang and Stoll (1997) and Madhavan et al.
(1997). Then, the autoregressive coefficient ηi is related to the reversal probability
9.
Assuming that a trade direction follows some autoregressive process, the price
9Assuming that qi,t = ±1 equally likely, then ηi is equivalent to 1 − 2φi. Suppose that
P (qi,t = +1|qi,t−1 = −1) = P (qi,t = −1|qi,t−1 = +1) = φi and P (qi,t = +1|qi,t−1 = +1) =
P (qi,t = −1|qi,t−1 = −1) = 1 − φi where φi is the reversal probability of a trade flow i. Since the
reversal probability φi is less than one and greater than zero, this condition satisfies the stationarity
assumption of AR(1) process: 0 < φi < 1 implies |ηi| < 1. If ηi = 12 , then ηi will be equal to zero.
Moreover, there is a correlation between two order flows, i.e., E[q1,tq2,t] = ρ. The innovation vi,t
has mean zero with variance E[v2i,t] = 1− η2i , and E[v1,tv2,t] = (1− η1η2)ρ.
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system in equation (45) can be written in the following VMA(∞) manner:
∆pt = B(L)ut + [A(L)Υ(L) + C(L)]vt
≡ Ψ(L)t where Ψ(L) =
∞∑
j=0
ΨjL
j and Ψ0 = I2 (48)
and new innovation vector t is uncorrelated white-noise with E[t] = 0 and E[t
′
t] =
Ω. In general, equation (48) can be estimated from some appropriate V AR(p) model
. But the polynomial Ψ(L) may not be invertible when L = 1, and no finite order
vector autoregressive model could describe ∆pt. These problems can be resolved by
employing the vector error correction model proposed by Engle and Granger (1987)
and used in the microstructure application by Hasbrouck (1995).
Under the price structure defined in the previous section, the price vector pt and
the difference in the price vector ∆pt can be written as
pt = Ψ(1)
t∑
s=0
s + Ψ
∗(L)t (49)
∆pt = Ψ(1)t + (1− L)Ψ∗(L)t, (50)
where Ψ∗(L)t is covariance stationary and (1 − L)Ψ∗(L)t is a stationary, nonin-
vertible moving average. Now, consider the merger arbitrage strategy At = p2,t −
γp1,t −C = α′pt −C where α = [−γ 1]′ is the cointegrating vector. Premultiplying
equation (49) by α′ and rearranging the equations result in
zt = α
′Ψ(1)
t∑
s=0
s + α
′Ψ∗(L)t (51)
where zt = α
′pt ≡ At + C which implies that it must α′Ψ(1) = 0 where Ψ(1) =
I2 + Ψ1 + Ψ2 + · · · for the requirement of α′pt to be stationary. Thus, one possible
long-run impact matrix can be written as Ψ(1) = α⊥ψ where ψ = (ψ1, ψ2) denote
the common row vector in Ψ(1) and α⊥ satisfies α′α⊥ = 0. Then, the price system in
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equation (49) becomes
pt = α⊥ψ
t∑
s=0
s + Ψ
∗(L)t (52)
Hasbrouck (1995) argues that the term ψt represents the random-walk component
impounded permanently in the price due to new information. To derive the vector
error correction form, suppose that the price level pt can be represented as a non-
stationary pth-order autoregression:
Φ(L)pt = t (53)
where Φ(L) = I2 − Φ1L− Φ2L2 − · · · − ΦpLp. It is easy to show that Φ(1)Ψ(1) = 0,
thus it follows that there exists a (2 × 1) vector β such that Φ(1) = βα′. Then, by
the Granger representation theorem(Engle and Granger (1987)) there exist (2 × 2)
matrices Γ1,Γ2, · · · ,Γp−1 such that
∆pt = Γ1∆pt−1 + Γ2∆pt−2 + · · ·+ Γp−1∆pt−p+1 − β(α′pt−1 −E
[
α′pt−1
]
) + t (54)
where Γs = −[Φs+1 + Φs+2 + · · ·+ Φp] for s = 1, 2, · · · , p− 1 and β is error correction
vector.
I need to examine whether there exists a cointegration relation between a bidder
stock and a target stock to justify the vector error correction model specification in
equation (54). I employ the methodologies in Johansen (1991) and Stock and Watson
(1988) to test the null hypothesis that two time series are not cointegrated.
Table 13 shows the results of the cointegration tests between two stocks. After
performing the cointegration tests for each deal, I count the number of significant
cases at the 5% level. Both test results reveal similar patterns across the method of
payments. First, the successful deals appear to be more cointegrated than the failed
deals, suggesting that both stock prices efficiently reflect the relevant information.
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Table 13: Cointegration Test results
This table shows the cointegration test results. Two tests are performed: Stock-Watson common
trend test and Johansen cointegration test. Each test is conducted by deal by deal. The reported
results are percentage of the significance on overall subsamples.
Method Total Observations Stock-Watson Test(% ) Johansen Test(% )
Of Payment Fail Success Fail Success Fail Success
Cash 61 664 26.23 52.11 27.87 58.58
Stock(FxVal) 8 56 25.00 44.64 62.50 50.00
Mix(FxVal) 9 54 22.22 46.30 55.56 51.85
Stock(FxRatio) 86 909 59.30 90.21 63.95 93.62
Mix(FxRatio) 17 245 64.71 81.22 70.59 85.71
Collar 10 305 40.00 65.25 60.00 74.10
Mixed Collar 10 84 20.00 54.76 40.00 61.90
Total 201 2317 36.78 62.07 54.35 67.97
Second, both test statistics show that there is a substantial cointegration relation
between two stocks when the merger parties consider the fixed exchange ratio stock
deals. Among the successful deals, approximately 90% of fixed exchanged stock deals
show that there exists a strong cointegration relation between two stocks. There is
lower cointegration relation in the case of fixed value deals, but approximately half
of the sample appears to be cointegrated. Although the fixed valued deal with stock
payment (Stock(FxVal)) is the same structure as the pure cash payment, there is a
stronger cointegration relation in stock deals than in pure cash deals.
Overall, over half of the successful deals are shown to be cointegrated, while
there are few cointegrated relations in failed deals. Thus, the vector error correction
specification may be inappropriate for the failed deals. However, this model is well
suited for the successful deals. In the next section, I analyze price discovery and the
information share using the vector error correction model discussed in this section.
6.2 Price discovery and information share
Hasbrouck (1995) introduces the information share measure to explain where the
price discovery occurs. The information share of one security can be defined as the
76
proportional contribution of the security’s innovations to the common innovations. If
the price innovations are correlated across securities, Hasbrouck (1995) suggests using
the Cholesky factorization of Ω = FF
′ to remove the contemporaneous correlation.
Then, the information shares are provided by
Sj =
([ψF ]j)
2
ψΩψ′
(55)
where [ψF ]j is the jth element of the matrix ψF and F is the lower triangular matrix.
According to Hasbrouck (1995), this information share is a relative measure allocating
information to the different securities and simply measures the informational trans-
mission speeds in the process of price adjustment.
It is natural that the target stock price should reflect the information of its own
shares as well as the information of the bidder stocks when there are stock exchange
mergers. Regardless of the payment method, the bidder stock price should reflect the
new information for the target shares because all of the information related target
firms could affect the acquirer firm values and the shareholder values of the bidder
firms. For example, the target stock price does not depend on the bidder stock price
when the method of payment is pure cash. However, paying cash to the target firm
shareholders forces the bidder firms to use internal funds or to finance additional
capital to meet the deal conditions. Moreover, unexpected changes in the target
shares may affect the future cash flows of the target firms, and ultimately affect the
future cash flows of the bidder firms. In this sense, the information share of the
efficient stock price is similar to the ratio of each firm’s value to the total firm value,
which is the sum of the bidder stock and the target stock.
Suppose each party derives the deal condition to reflect each firm value at its
best; then, the stock price of the bidder after the merger announcement should reflect
each firm’s value proportionally well through the trading activities. I calculate the
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Table 14: Information share of efficient price and the ratio of firm value
This table provides the estimation results of information shares and the ratio of firm value. The
information share is calculated from the fitted residuals of vector error correction model. The ratios
of each firm are calculate to divide each firm value by the sum of target and bidder firm values. Each
firm equity value is the average of the product of the market closing price and the shares outstanding
30days prior to the merger announcement.
Method Total Ratio Std Dev (Ratio)
Of Payment Observations Bidder Target Bidder Target
Panel A. Information Share of the efficient price
Cash 725 87.20 12.80 0.196 0.196
Stock(FxVal) 64 80.46 19.54 0.259 0.259
Mix(FxVal) 63 76.97 23.03 0.270 0.270
Stock(FxRatio) 995 89.28 10.72 0.158 0.158
Mix(FxRatio) 262 71.30 28.70 0.317 0.317
Collar 315 89.81 10.19 0.168 0.168
Mixed Collar 94 78.12 21.88 0.267 0.267
Panel B. The ratio of firm value to total firm values
Cash 725 89.10 10.90 0.133 0.133
Stock(FxVal) 64 93.82 6.18 0.109 0.109
Mix(FxVal) 63 84.44 15.56 0.167 0.167
Stock(FxRatio) 995 80.65 19.35 0.160 0.160
Mix(FxRatio) 262 78.47 21.53 0.166 0.166
Collar 315 87.72 12.28 0.126 0.126
Mixed Collar 94 80.27 19.73 0.149 0.149
proportion of firm value by dividing each firm’s total stock value by the sum of the
stock values of the bidder and target firms. I use the -45 days to -30 days prior to the
merger announcement to avoid the effect of the target price run-up before the merger
announcement.
Table 14 provides the estimated information share of the efficient price by using
the vector error correction model and the ratio of firm value. Panel A reports the
information share of the efficient price after the announcement and Panel B calculates
the ratio of firm value before the announcement. Most estimated numbers for the
information share of the efficient price are quite similar to the ratio of firm value
except for the fixed value deals using stocks as a method of payment. Although
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the information share is estimated from the post-merger stock price data, it reflects
the information content of the bidder stock. The difference between the information
share and the ratio of firm value is the smallest in the pure cash deal. This result
may be due to the minimal asymmetric information between the bidder and target
shareholders. While the difference between the two measures in the bidder share is
7.71% in the fixed exchange deals, the difference is reduced to 0.22% when merger
parties use the collar deals.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I analyze the activities of arbitrageurs playing the role of market maker
in the takeover markets. The cost function for the market makers is reflected in the
quoted bid-ask spread. Merger arbitrageurs typically use limit orders to exploit the
arbitrage opportunity. The merger arbitrage strategy is promising, as reported in the
previous literature.
I show that the merger arbitrage spread is closely related to the bid-ask spread.
The existence of merger arbitrage is due to transaction costs, deal failure risk, and
the limits of arbitrage. These three arguments are similar to the bid-ask components
in market microstructure theory: order handling costs, adverse information costs,
and inventory holding costs. Using the spread decomposition model in Huang and
Stoll (1997), I provide evidence that arbitrageurs play the market maker role during
the mergers and acquisition period because their inventory costs for target shares
increase after the merger announcement. Moreover, the information components of
both stocks decrease after the announcement.
Next, I investigate the relation between the merger arbitrage spread and the bid-
ask spread by both cross sectional regression and time series analysis. I find that
there is a positive and significant relation between the merger arbitrage spread and
the bid-ask spread. This result is also confirmed in a time series vector autoregressive
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analysis. The impulse response function analysis shows that the effect of one variable
on another appears to be persistent.
Finally, the cointegration analysis suggests that there exists a cointegration re-
lation between the bidder stock and the target stock. The cointegration relation is
much stronger in fixed exchange ratio deals than in fixed value deals. In addition,
I calculate the information share to test whether the information of each stock is
appropriately reflected in the efficient price series using the vector error correction
model. If the information of each stock transmits to the efficient price effectively,
the information share should be similar to the ratio of each stock to the sum of each
stock’s market value. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that the market
is efficient even though some arbitrage opportunity exists. Therefore, the arbitrage
opportunity is the reasonable compensation to the arbitrageurs who provide liquidity
to the existing target shareholders.
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Appendix
A Inventory holding costs and the limits of arbitrage
Suppose there exist only inventory costs, i.e. β2 = 1, but no information contents:
ui,t = vi,t = 0. Then, the price of target stock becomes
p2,t = C + γm1,t−1 +
s2
2
(q2,t + q2,t−1) (A.1)
Now, suppose the offer price, C + γm1,t−1, can correctly reflect the expected payoff
of the target price so that µ = E[p2,t] = C + γm1,t−1 because E[q2,t] = 0. The buying
price from the arbitrageurs or the selling price from the existing target shareholders
(q2,t = q2,t−1 = −1) becomes
pT = µ− s2 (A.2)
under the assumption that trades occurs at bid price. Further, assume that arbi-
trageurs have the mean-variance utility function
U(W˜ ) = E[W˜ ]− zA
2
V ar(W˜ )
Stoll (1978) argues that the dealer must be compensated to offset the expected utility
loss by deviating from his initial portfolio. Let Q denote the dollar value of a trans-
action in target stock having return R with E[R] = µR and V ar[R] = σ
2
R. Let Re be
the efficient portfolio return with E[Re] = µe and V ar[Re] = σ
2
e . Let W1 and W2 be
the terminal wealth of the initial portfolio and the new portfolio after the transaction.
Suppose that the dealer has initially the optimal portfolio, i.e., the dollar value of
stocks in trading account is zero. Then,
W1 = W0 [1 + kRe + (1− k)Rf ] = W0(1 +R∗) (A.3)
W2 = W0(1 +R
∗) + (1 +R)Q− (1 +Rf )(Q− C) (A.4)
where k is the optimal fraction of the dealer’s wealth in optimal portfolio Re and Rf
is the risk-free rate. First, the optimal fraction k can be obtained by solving
∂EU [W1]
∂k
= W0(µe −Rf )− kW 20 zAσ2e ≡ 0⇒ k∗ =
µe −Rf
W0zAσ2e
Next, the dollar cost to the dealer must EU [W1] ≡ EU [W2], that is
C =
1
2
zAσ
2
RQ
2 −Q
[
(R−Rf )− (Re −Rf )σieσ2e
]
1 +Rf
(A.5)
The capital asset pricing model states R − Rf = (Re − Rf )σieσ2e and assume the zero
risk free rate(Rf = 0), we have
C =
1
2
zAσ
2
RQ
2 (A.6)
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and the the unit cost c = C/Q will be 1
2
zAσ
2
RQ. Then, the proportional bid-ask
spread can be expressed as
2c =
pT,a − pT
pT
+
pT − pT,b
pT
=
s2
pT
= zAσ
2
R|Q| (A.7)
where pT,b and pT,b are the bid and ask price of the target share. Here, since σ2R =
σ2
(pT )2
and Q = X
A
pT , the proportional spread can be written as
s2
pT
= zA
σ2
(pT )2
X
A
pT =
X
A
zAσ
2 1
pT
So, equation (A.2) can be written
pT = µ− s2 = µ− X
A
zAσ
2
which is equivalent to the equation (41)
B State space representation and Kalman filter
The state-space representation of the dynamics of ∆p is given by the following system
of equations:
ξt+1 =Fξt + et+1 (B.1a)
∆pt =A
′xt + H′ξt (B.1b)
where F,A′, and H′ are matrices of parameters of dimension (r × r), (2 × k), and
(2×r), respectively, and xt is a (k×1) vector of exogenous variables. Equation (B.1a)
is known as the state equation, and (B.1b) is known as the observation equation. The
(r × 1) vector et is vector white noise:
E[ete
′
s] =
{
Q for t = s
0 otherwise.
(B.2)
where Q is (r × r) matrix. Assume that ξ1 is uncorrelated with any realizations of
et: E[etξ
′
1] = 0.
Consider the linear projection of ξt+1 on Pt and a constant:
ξˆt+1|t = Eˆ[ξt+1|Pt]
where Pt = (∆p
′
t,∆p
′
t−1, · · · ,∆p′1)′. The Kalman filter calculates these forecasts
recursively, generating, ξˆ1|0, ξˆ2|1, · · · , ξˆT |T−1 in succession. Associated with each of
these forecasts is a mean squared error matrix, represented by the following (r × r)
matrix
Pt+1|t = E
[(
ξt+1 − ξˆt+1|t
)(
ξt+1 − ξˆt+1|t
)′]
(B.3)
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Given starting values ξˆ1|0 and P1|0, the state vector can be written
ξˆt+1|t = Fξˆt|t−1 + Kt
(
∆pt −A′xt −H′ξˆt|t−1
)
(B.4)
where Kt = FPt|t−1H(H′Pt|t−1H)−1 is known as the gain matrix and the mean
squared error matrix is
Pt+1|t = F[Pt|t−1 −Pt|t−1H(H′Pt|t−1H)−1H′Pt|t−1]F′ + Q (B.5)
Finally, all the parameters can be estimated using the maximum likelihood esti-
mation where the density function for ∆pt is
f(∆pt|Pt−1) = (2pi)−1
∣∣H′Pt|t−1H∣∣−1/2
× exp
{
−1
2
(
∆pt −A′xt −H′ξˆt|t−1
)′ (
H′Pt|t−1H
)−1 (
∆pt −A′xt −H′ξˆt|t−1
)}
(B.6)
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CHAPTER III
Liquidity risk and Exchange-traded-fund returns, variances, and tracking
errors
1 Introduction
Since its introduction in 1993, the US exchange-traded fund (ETF) market has grown
explosively. ETFs are designed to provide an alternative investment opportunity
for particular markets, countries, or sectors by following a specific representative
index. With index-based ETFs, investors can benefit from access to foreign markets
or different asset categories with low costs. The fundamental risk of ETFs is the
market risk associated with the underlying index. In addition, each ETF also has
its own idiosyncratic risk, i.e. tracking error risk, after removing the market risk.
ETFs trade on the stock exchange but their shares are created and redeemed on the
primary market. This structure results in the existence of two prices for a single
asset; one is market ETF prices determined on stock exchanges and the other is the
fund’s net-asset value (NAV) calculated based on the value of underlying securities.
Intuitively, no arbitrage condition implies that the daily market closing price and the
daily closing net asset value of an ETF must be same. However, various factors can
widen the gaps between the NAV prices and the ETF prices. Among various factors,
this paper particularly focuses on the role of illiquidity in the ETF market.
ETFs are fundamentally same as the open-ended mutual funds1. They are struc-
tured, managed, and regulated just like traditional mutual funds 2. One difference
1SEC defines ETFs as ”Exchange-traded funds, or ETFs, are investment companies that are
legally classified as open-end companies or Unit Investment Trusts (UITs), ...”. For more details,
see http://www.sec.gov/answers/etf.htm
2There are similar products with ETFs. These products include exchanged-traded-notes (ETN)
and exchanged-traded-commodity (ETC). The exchanged-traded-note is a senior unsecured debt
obligation designed to track the total return of an underlying index or benchmark. The ETNs are
exposed both to the market risk of the linked indexes and the credit risk of the issuer. The exchange-
traded-commodity (ETC) is similar to ETFs, but it holds physical commodities or currencies. Both
ETNs and ETCs are not registered under the Investment company act of 1940 but are regulated
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from conventional mutual funds is that ETFs are traded continuously in the stock
markets like closed-end funds. That is, ETFs are designed to combine the creation
and redemption process of open-end funds with the continuous exchange trading of
the closed-end funds. The creation/redemption process in ETFs is the crucial mecha-
nism that enables ETF prices to stay close to their NAVs 3. The ETF price deviation
from its NAV can be eliminated by the arbitrage activity of authorized participants
who have the responsibility of creating/redeeming ETF shares or constructing the un-
derlying ETF portfolios. However, this arbitrage mechanism can be limited if either
ETFs or the underlying securities are illiquid. The lack of liquidity in the underlying
securities may result in a tracking error of the NAV on the index. Illiquid ETFs may
also have a mispricing problem with respect to their NAVs. Thus, illiquidity and
ETF tracking errors are quite related. Moreover, illiquidity risk is another risk factor
to determine the asset returns.
There are numerous studies investigating the effect of liquidity on asset returns
and suggesting that systemic liquidity risk is priced in the asset return4 . Acharya and
Pedersen (2005) develop a liquidity adjusted capital asset pricing model(LCAPM) and
find that the individual asset return is affected by the liquidity risk. They argue that
their LCAPM explains the asset return better than the standard CAPM. Similarly,
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) empirically find that the individual stock return is
affected by the aggregate market liquidity, which is a cross-sectional average of the
individual return reversal estimates. In addition to studying the relation between
asset returns and liquidity in the US equity market, there are also numerous studies
investigating the effect of liquidity on asset returns in different markets or assets, for
under Securities Act of 1933. In this paper, I exclude both ETNs and ETCs for the consistent
analysis.
3The closed-end funds are also listed in the major stock exchanges and are traded like common
stocks. Unlike ETFs, however, the closed-end funds typically trade at a discount to the portfolio
value. This is called ”closed-end fund discount puzzle”. See Pontiff (1996) for more details.
4For example, see Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Huang and Stoll (1994), Brennan and Subrah-
manyam (1996), Chordia et al. (2001), Amihud (2002)
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example, emerging markets (Bekaert et al. (2007)) and global markets(Lee (2011)),
hedge funds (Getmansky et al. (2004), Sadka (2010)), IPO markets (Eckbo and Norli
(2005)), and closed-end-funds(Cherkes et al. (2009)).
However, there are only few papers that study the effect of liquidity on the ETF
return and variance. The related existing studies include the ETF pricing for the
Flash Crash of May 6, 2010 (Borkovec et al. (2010), Madhavan (2011)), the interaction
between the ETF market and the underlying securities market (Cespa and Foucault
(2012), Ben-David et al. (2011)), and whether ETFs are priced efficiently with respect
to the NAV or the underlying index (Engle and Sarkar (2006), Elton et al. (2002)).
Regarding the lack of liquidity in the market, Borkovec et al. (2010) report that a
sharp increase in the bid-ask the spread leads to a failure in ETF price discovery
during the Flash Crash. Studies have also investigated the interaction between the
ETF and its underlying securities. For example, Cespa and Foucault (2012) argue
that the lack of liquidity in ETFs may lead to an increase in the uncertainty of the
underlying securities, which results in a decrease in the liquidity of the corresponding
ETFs. However, there are no existing studies that cover the effects of liquidity on
ETF returns and tracking errors comprehensively.
In the first part of this paper, I begin by analyzing the relations between ETF
tracking errors and market illiquidity. I present evidence that tracking errors and ETF
illiquidity are positively related 5. That is, the cross-sectional analysis shows that the
level of illiquidity is positively related to the ETF-NAV or ETF-index tracking errors.
Moreover, equity-type or domestic ETFs tend to have the smaller tracking errors. US
equity markets are the most liquid markets in the world. Thus, the negative relation
between tracking errors and such funds can be consistent with the fact that illiquidity
and tracking errors are positively related.
5ETF tracking errors are similar to the relation between futures and underlying asset prices. Roll
et al. (2007) study the interactions between illiquidity and the futures basis in the S&P 500 futures
markets. They conclude that the contemporaneous shocks to the futures basis and bid-ask spreads
are positively correlated.
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Next, I investigate whether liquidity shocks in ETFs are priced based on the
LCAPM of Acharya and Pedersen (2005). Using every ETF ever listed in the US
markets, I first construct 10 portfolios sorted on liquidity and 10 portfolios sorted on
tracking errrors. The sorted portfolios provide evidence that illiquidity is positively
related to ETF returns and to ETF tracking errors. In addition, the portfolios show
that the illiquidity and the tracking errors of ETFs are shown to be persistent over
time, suggesting that there exist positive common shocks affecting both ETF illiquid-
ity and tracking errors. I also estimate the portfolio betas in Acharya and Pedersen
(2005) to investigate whether there exist any systemic risk factors associated with
illiquidity. The results of estimated betas show that illiquid ETFs tend to have large
absolute liquidity betas and positive liquidity risk premium. That is, illiquid ETFs
tend to be more sensitive to either market liquidity or the market return. Using
pre-estimated betas, I also estimate the liquidity premium using GMM method. The
annualized return due to the liquidity risk is approximately 0.36%, suggesting that
there exists a positive liquidity premium in the US ETF market.
Finally, I investigate whether infrequent trading affects ETF variances with re-
spect to NAV variances. Lo and MacKinlay (1990) develop an econometric model to
show that the asset variance increases when the asset is not traded frequently. Extend-
ing the Lo and MacKinlay (1990) econometric model to consider the autocorrelation
of the index return, I provide evidence that the nontrading probability is positively
related to an increase in the ETF variance with respect to the NAV variance. The
derived equation shows that the ETF return variance can be expressed as the sum
of NAV return variance and positive terms associated with nontrading probability.
Moreover, the existence of autocorrelation in the index return could increase the gap
between the ETF variance and the NAV variance when the ETFs are illiquid. The
panel regression also confirms that nontrading probability and the difference between
ETF and NAV return variances is positively related, suggesting that illiquid ETFs
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have more risk when the ETFs are traded actively in the market.
The bottom line of this paper is that a lack of liquidity is related to the expected
return and the variance of ETFs. Illiquid ETFs tend to have large tracking errors
with respect to their underlying index or their NAV returns. These findings imply
that illiquid ETFs may be vulnerable to a sudden change in the liquidity level such
as the Flash Crash on May 6, 2010.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the data
sources, sample construction procedure, and variable constructions. In section 3, I
investigate whether the level of illiquidity is related to the ETF tracking errors. In
section 4, I provide the estimation results of the LCAPM and the cross-sectional
evidence for the liquidity risk in the ETF market. Section 5 derives the closed form
of the ETF variance when ETFs are not traded frequently and compares the variance
of ETFs with the variance of the NAV. The cross-sectional regression analysis is also
provided for whether the nontrading probability is related to the difference between
the ETF variance and the NAV variance. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 ETF data and variables
2.1 Exchange traded fund data
The ETF sample used in this paper includes all of the ETFs that have ever been
listed and traded in the major US stock exchanges from 1993 through 2012. The
country of domicile for each ETF must be the US at the inception date. The initial
data also include all of the delisted ETFs that were traded in the US market during
the sample period. All ETF data are extracted from the Bloomberg database. The
Bloomberg provides all daily historical prices for ETFs, NAVs, and the underlying
indexes as well as detailed information about the ETFs6. When the necessary data
from Bloomberg are not available, the data are collected from the ETF product web-
page when available.
6Petajisto (2011) reports that the Bloomberg data cover up to 90% of all ETFs
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Table 15: ETF sample construction
This table presents the process of constructing the sample used in this paper. Initial Exchange-
traded-fund(ETF) data are extracted from the Bloomberg database for all of the ETFs that have
ever been listed and traded in the US from 1993 through 2012.
Description Number of ETFs
Initial Sample (1) 1495
ETFs on the BATs (2) 17
Actively Managed Funds (3) 57
Underlying Index data is missing
- Barclays Capital Bond Index (4) 68
- The combination of commondity prices (5) 11
- Index level data is not available (6) 20
NAV data is missing (7) 6
Price data is missing (8) 9
Total number of samples deleted ( (2) (8)) (9) 188
Final Sample (1) - (9) 1307
To effectively investigate the effect of liquidity on the ETF returns and variances,
actively managed funds are excluded from the sample. Actively managed funds first
appeared in 2008 and are managed to achieve excess return on the typical benchmark
index by frequently buying or selling assets in the portfolio rather than passively
following the index. As a result, actively managed funds are more likely to deviate
from a particular underlying index return because their portfolio composition weights
change frequently. Because the tracking error in actively managed funds could be
caused by the management style, it is not easy to separate the effect of liquidity
from the effect of the management style on the return and the variance. Therefore,
excluding actively managed funds from the sample is reasonable for an analysis of
liquidity’s effect on the return and variance. That is, the final sample in this paper
only includes index-based ETFs.
In addition, if an ETF has no available information about the traded price, the
NAV, or the underlying index during the sample period, then it is excluded from the
sample. Table 15 shows the sample construction procedure for this paper. The final
sample consists of 1307 US listed exchange traded funds.
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Table 16: ETF trends
This table reports the annual breakdown of the sample by number of funds incepted, number of
funds delisted, number of funds available at the end of year, average market value, average trading
volume and average dollar trading volume. The sample includes all the US ETFs which were listed
on the US exchange during 1993-2012.
Year Incept Delist N MV Volume Dollar Volume
(Bill. $) (Mill. Shares) (Bill. $)
1993 1 0 1 0.26 0.2 0.01
1994 0 0 1 0.47 0.4 0.02
1995 1 0 2 0.67 0.3 0.02
1996 17 0 19 1.67 1.2 0.07
1997 0 0 19 4.01 3.7 0.30
1998 10 0 29 10.01 9.9 0.90
1999 1 0 30 20.63 25.4 2.05
2000 50 0 80 46.42 45.9 4.19
2001 21 0 101 72.07 98.0 5.41
2002 15 3 113 91.31 151.7 7.27
2003 12 6 119 116.41 155.3 8.02
2004 35 0 154 176.38 206.3 11.56
2005 52 0 206 250.49 272.8 16.59
2006 157 1 362 355.95 390.1 24.41
2007 268 0 630 502.33 701.6 54.70
2008 162 50 742 556.80 1449.0 93.68
2009 127 51 818 608.84 1409.9 69.92
2010 180 48 950 839.38 1162.8 68.23
2011 231 15 1166 1043.69 1259.2 77.48
2012 155 82 1239 1203.74 923.2 56.19
Constructing 10 liquidity and tracking error portfolios, I restrict the data to after
2002 for the following two reasons. First, a sufficient number of ETFs is needed to
construct 10 portfolios. At the end of 2001, 101 ETFs are listed in the US market,
which enables each portfolio to contain more than 10 ETFs each year. Table 16
reports the annual breakdown of the sample by number of funds initiated, number of
funds delisted, number of funds available at the end of year, average market value,
average trading volume and average dollar trading volume. As seen in Table 16
and Figure 11, the number of funds and trading volume increases sharply after the
early 2000s, thus the number of ETFs traded in the US increases to 1440 by the
end of 2012. Consequently, each portfolio in 2012 should have more than 100 ETFs.
Second, the minimum tick size of the bid-ask spread reduces from 1/16 to 1/100 in
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Figure 11: The number of funds and the market value of ETFs
This figure illustrates the number of ETFs and market value of US ETFs at the end of year from
1993 to 2012.
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2001. The change in the minimum tick size is related to the exogenous shock to the
liquidity. Moreover, figure 11 shows that there appears to be a significant increase in
the trading volume of the ETF market after 2002 7. The increase in trading volume
and the decrease in the bid-ask spread imply an important change in the liquidity
measure, so I use the data from 2002.
2.2 Liquidity measure
The daily liquidity of each ETF is measured by using the daily relative effective spread
calculated from the trading and quote data of the NYSE TAQ database. The daily
relative effective half spread is defined as the ratio of the effective half spread to the
trade price. The effective half spread is defined as the difference between the quote
7In the middle of 2001, the NYSE began trading three unlisted ETFs(DIA, SPY, and QQQ)
which are listed on the American Stock Exchange. Another 27 ETFs are allowed to trade on the
NYSE on April 15, 2002. Boehmer and Boehmer (2003) report that these events lead to a large
improvement in liquidity due to the competition for order flow among market centers.
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midpoint and the corresponding trade price. That is,
cit =
1
nit
nit∑
k=1
|pik,t −mik,t|
pik,t
(56)
where pk,t is the traded price, mk,t is the quote midpoint, and nt is the number of
trades at time k on day t for security i. The relative effective spread is close to the
liquidity measure of ’dollar cost per dollar invested’ used in Acharya and Pedersen
(2005). Their empirical studies use the normalized illiquidity measure by transforming
the Amihud Illiquidity measure where the cross-sectional mean and variance are equal
to the effective half spread reported in Chalmers and Kadlec (1998). As a result, their
liquidity measure is ultimately similar to the relative effective half spread, which can
be obtained from the TAQ data directly. One advantage of the use of the illiquidity
measure from the TAQ data is that the relative effective spread can be observed
on a daily basis. Daily illiquidity measures will provide considerably large data set
containing more stock information. Moreover, the daily liquidity measure is suitable
for the levered or inversed ETFs because the use of the monthly measure may cause
the difference between the monthly realized return and the monthly holding return
of levered funds.
2.3 Tracking errors
I use two measures of tracking errors. The first definition is calculated from the
regression analysis. This tracking error is the absolute difference between one and
the coefficient of the regression of two return series; ETF return vs NAV return,
NAV return vs index return, or ETF return vs index return. The second defini-
tion is measured by calculating the standard deviation of return difference between
two return series. Table 17 provides the summary statistics and cross-sectional cor-
relations of estimated tracking errors for ETFs from the inception date to the end
of 2012 or the delisting date. This table exhibits some interesting features. First,
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Table 17: Summary statistics and correlations of ETF tracking errors
This table provides the summary statistics and correlations of estimated tracking errors for ETFs
from the inception date to the end of 2012 or the delisting date. Two tracking errors are defined.
θ(Y −X) is the tracking error by taking the absolute value of the difference between one and the
coefficient of X from regression of Y on X. σ(Y − X) is the standard deviation of the return
difference between Y and X. The six tracking errors are estimated for each ETF using all daily
return. rt, vt, and ft denote the daily ETF, NAV, and index returns, respectively.
Variables σ(rt − ft) σ(vt − ft) σ(rt − vt) θ(rt − ft) θ(vt − ft) θ(rt − vt)
Panel A. Summary Statistics for estimated tracking errors
Mean 1.200% 0.427% 1.153% 15.884% 4.169% 16.526%
Std. Dev. 1.221% 0.952% 1.002% 17.675% 9.305% 17.548%
Panel B. Tracking error correlations for individual ETFs
σ(rt − ft) 1.000
σ(vt − ft) 0.712 1.000
σ(rt − vt) 0.810 0.317 1.000
θ(rt − ft) 0.436 0.133 0.399 1.000
θ(vt − ft) 0.301 0.524 0.083 0.326 1.000
θ(rt − vt) 0.307 −0.010 0.444 0.805 0.094 1.000
panel A shows that NAV-index tracking errors are smaller than ETF-NAV tracking
errors. In addition, ETF-index return tracking errors are similar to the ETF-NAV
tracking errors suggesting that ETF-index tracking errors seem to be explained by
the ETF-NAV tracking errors. Second, panel B shows that tracking errors from re-
gression are highly correlated with those calculated from standard deviations. Third,
the correlations between ETF-NAV and NAV-index tracking errors are lower than
other correlation numbers (0.317 for standard deviation tracking errors and 0.094 for
regression tracking errors). This result suggests that there are some factors, for e.g.,
ETF market conditions, that could be related to the ETF-NAV tracking errors but
not be associated with NAV-index tracking errors.
3 The effect of illiquidity on ETF tracking errors
3.1 Arbitrage activity of authorized participants
Three observed return series (ETF, NAV, and index returns) must be same on the
daily basis due to the ETF structures. However, the market data shows that there
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exist gaps among these return series. Those return differences can be caused by
various factors such as trading activity, product structures, illiquidity of underlying
securities, or ETF market conditions. This section investigates whether illiquidity is
related to ETF tracking errors by using the panel regression analysis.
Authorized participants in the ETF market play the important role to keep the
return series close to each other. The return differences are typically removed away by
the arbitrage activity of authorized participants. Authorized participants or market
makers keep ETF prices in line with the value of their underlying portfolios by trading
both ETFs and underlying securities simultaneously, so called creation-redemption
process. For instance, if an ETF price is lower(higher) than its NAV, APs buy(sell)
ETF shares and sell(buy) the basket of securities. More precisely, if the current market
prices of an ETF become higher than its NAVs, APs buy underlying securities to form
a creation unit and deliver it to the ETF provider. After receiving the ETF shares
from the ETF issuer, APs sell these ETF shares to the market 8.
The arbitrage activity in the ETF market would be possible when authorized par-
ticipants are able to trade ETFs or underlying securities immediately and limitlessly.
However, APs may get into trouble with constructing the basket of securities or with
trading ETFs if underlying securities or ETF markets suffer from the lack of liquidity.
Because each ETF has its own way of portfolio construction, the ETF provider could
choose the appropriate method to replicate the underlying index return precisely 9.
Depending on the ETF prospectuses, authorized participants or market makers can
borrow the underlying securities or use derivatives to construct the basket of portfolios
so that ETF portfolios (i.e. NAVs) can achieve the promised returns. So, there are
many alternatives to tie the NAV returns to the underlying index returns. Depending
8It is obvious that there exist other types of arbitrage opportunities. For example, investors can
use both S&P 500 futures contracts and S&P 500 index based ETFs to achieve the arbitrage profits
9There are broadly two ways of creation and redemption process. The ”in-kind” method is that
authorized participants create a basket of securities which is exchange for ETF shares. Another
technique is ”Cash” method. The ”Cash” creation/redemption process is allowed for some ETFs so
that authorized participants deliver cash to the issuer and receive the ETF shares.
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on the market conditions, however, observed ETF prices are frequently different from
their announced NAVs. That is, the lack of liquidity or low trading volume in the
ETF market could lead to the large price impact or the presence of stale prices thus
can cause the price gap between the ETF and its NAV. As a result, APs may bear
unwanted costs related to borrowing underlying securities or holding inventories to
make the ETF market if ETFs or underlying securities markets are not fully liquid.
This situation implies that the lack of liquidity in the ETF market causes the increase
of trading costs as well as ETF tracking errors.
3.2 ETF tracking errors and illiquidity
Figure 12 shows the relations between ETF and NAV returns (left) and between NAV
and index returns (right) for all the US ETFs in the sample. Each point in the figure
represents the average daily return of each ETF from the inception date to the end of
2012 or the delisting date. The solid lines indicate the fitted regression lines between
two return series, and the dotted lines are the 45 degree lines. From the right side
of Figure 12, most US ETFs appear to be managed correctly to track the underlying
indexes although some ETFs are shown to have some tracking errors. The coefficient
of NAV-index cross-sectional regression is 0.95 which is close to one, suggesting that
US ETF portfolios are managed to track the underling indexes precisely. On the
contrary, the left panel shows that there exist relatively large tracking errors between
ETFs and their NAVs. The fitted coefficient of ETF-NAV regression is 1.34, implying
that ETF returns appear to more frequently deviate from NAV returns than NAV
returns do from index returns. Thus, figure 12 suggests that ETF returns can deviate
from their NAV returns although ETF portfolios are managed precisely to mimic
underlying indexes.
Figure 13 and 14 also provide the same illustrations for the individual ETFs.
Figure 13 depicts the return relations for SPDR S&P 500 ETF Trust (SPY) and
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Figure 12: Return distributions among ETF, NAV, and index returns
This figure illustrates relations between ETF returns and NAV returns(left figure), and between
NAV returns and underlying index returns(right figure). Each point represents the daily average
returns for the entire sample period.
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figure 14 is for iShares MSCI Emerging Markets Index (EEM). Both ETFs are very
liquid assets in the US markets. Incepted in 1993, the SPY, the oldest and the largest
ETF in the US, tracks the price and yield performance of the S&P 500 index. From
figure 13, the fitted coefficient of ETF-NAV regression is 0.96 with R2= 92% and that
of NAV-index regression is 0.99 with R2 = 96%. These results suggest that the SPY
ETF tracks the S&P 500 index correctly and its market prices are formed close to its
NAVs.
On the contrary, the EEM in figure 14 appears to have relatively larger tracking
errors than the SPY does10. The EEM, one of the most popular international ETFs in
the US, is designed to track the price and yield performance of MSCI emerging market
10In 2012, the average trading volume for the SPY is 136 million shares and that for the EEM
is 53 million shares. The average relative bid-ask spread for SPY is 0.01% and that for the EEM
is 0.017%. The average turnover for the SPY is 18.96% and that for the EEM is 5.45%. For the
comparison, the average trading volume is 0.70 million shares, the average relative bid-ask spread is
0.24%, the average turnover is 3.6% for entire ETFs in 2012.
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Figure 13: Return distributions among ETF, NAV, and index returns (SPY)
This figure illustrates ETF, NAV, and index returns of SPY. SPY is SPDR S&P 500 ETF issued
by State Street Global Advisors. The left panel depicts the relation between daily ETF and NAV
returns, the right panel depicts the relation between daily NAV and index returns from Jan 22,1993
to Dec 31, 2012.
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index. Because the EEM holds the emerging market stocks directly, the EEM market
prices may not reflect the movements of underlying securities immediately, thus they
have some tracking errors although the EEM is a quite liquid asset. Although the
EEM is managed correctly to track the underlying index (R2 = 84% and coefficient
is 1.01), its market prices are shown to more frequently deviate from its NAVs (R2 =
70% and coefficient is 1.18). In sum, both figures suggest that tracking errors in the
ETF-NAV returns appear to be more severe than those in NAV-index returns.
The time series relation between return differences and illiquidity are illustrated in
figure 15. The first line depicts the average of the daily relative bid-ask spread. The
bottom two lines are the average absolute daily return differences between ETFs and
NAVs, and NAVs and indexes. First, both return differences and illiquidity co-moved
over time. That is, there appears to be common factors affecting both illiquidity
and return differences. Second, the ETF-NAV return differences are generally higher
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Figure 14: Return distributions among ETF, NAV, and index returns (EEM)
This figure illustrates ETF, NAV, and index returns of EEM. EEM is iShares MSCI Emerging
Markets Index ETF issued by iShares. The left panel depicts the relation between daily ETF and
NAV returns, the right panel depicts the relation between daily NAV and index returns from Apr
11,2003 to Dec 31, 2012.
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than NAV-index return differences over the sample period. This result confirms that
ETF-NAV tracking errors are larger than NAV-index tracking errors. Finally, both
ETF market illiquidity and tracking errors increase during the financial crisis period
after 2008, suggesting the illiquidity measure reflects the recent liquidity crisis well.
3.3 Panel regression
Three dimensions of tracking errors are used to investigate the effect of liquidity on
tracking errors: ETFs vs NAVs, ETFs vs Indexes, or NAVs vs Indexes. As defined
in the above, I use two types of tracking errors to investigate the effect of liquidity
on tracking errors. The main variable of interest is illiquidity which is defined as
the average of the relative effective half spread during the year. Thus, high values of
relative spread imply the high illiquidity.
It is obvious that ETF prices are affected by both product structures and ETF
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Figure 15: Daily time series for illiquidity and return differences
This figure illustrate historical time series of illiquidity and absolute values of return differences from
2002 to 2012. The average illiquidity is the equal-weighted daily average of daily relative effective
spreads of all the US ETFs. The absolute return differences are absolute values of daily return
differences between NAV and index returns or ETF and NAV returns.
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market conditions. That is, the ETF-NAV tracking errors could exist when ETF
market is illiquid although the underlying portfolios are constructed to track the un-
derlying index correctly and perfectly. On the other hand, the NAV-index return
tracking error could be affected by ETF structures as well as by the ETF trading
activity. For instance, ETFs replicating the US market indexes are less likely to devi-
ate from the underlying indexes than ETF investing in other countries. Furthermore,
the NAV-index return tracking error could be caused by the way of replicating the
index such as holding underlying securities directly or creating the return using either
futures or swaps. Thus, I include different types of variables to capture both market
conditions and fund characteristics.
Controlling the ETF market conditions, I include dollar trading volume, underly-
ing index return volatility, shares outstanding, and volatility of shares growth. If the
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underlying index return is very volatile, the ETF price may not reflect the underlying
index movement promptly because the market makers or ETF investors need to trade
the ETFs more frequently. The annual underlying index return volatility is added
to control this effect. Moreover, the log of the average dollar trading volume during
the year is included. The ETFs with a large dollar trading volume may cause track-
ing error because a heavy trading volume is related to unnecessary price pressure.
Finally, ETF shares are easily created based on the market demand. The number
of shares represents the size of the ETF or the cash flows into funds. Further, the
volatility of the shares growth rate indicates how active the ETF is in the market. A
frequent change in outstanding shares implies the active management by authorized
participants to reduce tracking error or the volatile fund cash flows. To control these
effects, I include the log of the average number of shares and the standard deviation
of the shares growth rate during the year.
Aside from the variables associated with market conditions, the ETF character-
istics variables are also included to capture any additional effects caused by fund
structures. Those are (1) US Based: whether the underlying securities in the ETF
baskets invest in US assets, (2) Derivatives Based: whether an ETF uses derivatives
to replicate the underlying index return, (2) Swap Based: whether an ETF uses swaps
to replicate the underlying index return, (3) Futures Available : whether an ETF has
a futures product based on it, (4) Options available: whether an ETF has options
based on it, (5) Levered Fund: whether an ETF is levered or inversed, (6) Expense
Ratio: the annual expense ratio of the ETF.
3.4 Empirical results
Tables 18 reports results from the pooled panel regression of yearly tracking errors
on illiquidity as well as other control variables. Because the dependent variables are
tracking errors, positive coefficient signs imply larger tracking errors. The tracking
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errors are calculated by taking the absolute value of difference between one and the
regression coefficient, which is estimated from regressing one return series on another
return series for each ETF every year. From left to right, the dependent variable in
each column represents the tracking error between the ETF return and the underlying
index return, between the ETF return and the NAV return, and the NAV return and
the underlying index return respectively. All regression specifications include year
fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the fund level.
Columns 1 and 2 show that the coefficients on average illiquidity are positive
and significant at the 1% level. These results suggest that illiquid ETFs tend to be
more likely to deviate from their NAVs or underlying index returns. The coefficient
of 13.98 indicates that if an ETF’s average relative spread increases by 1%, then
the tracking error in ETF-index return increases by 14% when holding the other
characteristics constant. This illiquidity measure also affects similarly in the ETF-
NAV return tracking error in column 2. Interesting thing is that both magnitudes of
coefficients on illiquidity are similar (13.98 and 13.80). However, the results in the
third column (NAV-index tracking error) show that ETF illiquidity is not associated
with the tracking error between NAV and underlying index returns. In other words,
the ETF market conditions don’t account for the tracking error between NAV and
index returns.
Large trading volume doesn’t seem to widen the ETF tracking errors. Heavy
trading volume can increase the efficiency of the asset price because large trading
volume indicates the presence of informed traders. The test results show that the
coefficients on dollar trading volume are shown be positive for ETF-NAV and be
negative for ETF-index and NAV-index tracking errors, albeit insignificantly. The
coefficients on the number of shares, which could measure the size of the fund, are
shown to be negative for all tracking errors but only significant for ETF-NAV tracking
errors. These results imply that large ETFs tend to have smaller tracking errors.
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Table 18: Illiquidity and tracking errors from regrssion
Dependent variables are tracking errors, calculated by taking the absolute difference between one
and regression coefficients of ETF returns on underlying index returns(I), of ETF returns on NAV
returns(II), or of NAV returns on underlying index returns(III). Independent variables are the follow-
ing: the average of daily relative bid-ask spread(Average liquidity), the average of daily dollar trad-
ing volume(Dollar Trading Volume), the standard deviation of the underlying index return(Index
Volatility), the log of the average shares outstanding (Shares Outstanding), the standard devia-
tion of shares’ growth rate(Shares Volatility), a dummy being equal to 1 if an ETF uses deriva-
tives(Derivatives Based), a dummy being equal to 1 if an ETF uses swaps(Swap Based), a dummy
being equal to 1 if underlying securities in the ETF baskets invest in US assets (Invested in US
assets),a dummy being equal to 1 if an ETF has a futures or options based on it (Futures Available
, Options Available), a dummy being equal to 1 if an ETF is levered(Levered Fund), the annual
expense ratio(Expense Ratio).The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Year fixed effects are in-
cluded, and standard errors are clustered at the fund level. ”*”, ”**”, ”***” represents significance
at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
θ(ETF-IND) θ(ETF-NAV) θ(NAV-IND)
Intercept 37.15∗∗∗ 49.44∗∗∗ 14.73∗∗∗
(3.42) (7.41) (3.55)
Average illiquidity 13.98∗∗∗ 13.80∗∗∗ −0.43
(2.65) (2.64) (−0.45)
Dollar Trading Volume −0.02 0.51 −0.07
(−0.04) (1.63) (−0.33)
Index Volatility 0.10 −0.95∗ 0.77
(0.17) (−1.88) (1.20)
Shares Outstanding −0.79 −1.48∗∗∗ −0.38
(−1.39) (−3.54) (−1.44)
Shares Volatility −17.29∗∗ −17.36∗∗∗ 3.19
(−2.14) (−3.30) (1.03)
Derivatives Based −7.93∗∗∗ −10.59∗∗∗ −1.46
(−2.79) (−3.04) (−0.94)
Swap-Based 9.78∗ 2.52 8.89∗
(1.84) (0.79) (1.87)
Equity-type ETF −12.95∗∗∗ −14.49∗∗∗ −5.99∗∗∗
(−4.74) (−7.62) (−5.02)
Invested in US assets −4.83∗∗∗ −3.73∗∗∗ −3.96∗∗∗
(−4.35) (−3.93) (−6.07)
Futures Available −0.91 −0.14 −1.35∗
(−0.74) (−0.12) (−1.79)
Options Available 0.10 −0.67 1.38
(0.09) (−0.69) (1.65)
Levered Fund −3.89 3.46∗ −6.97
(−0.64) (1.74) (−1.18)
Expense Ratio −1.32 −0.55 −0.11
(−0.81) (−0.42) (−0.08)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,459 5,472 5,595
Adjusted R2 8.99 19.84 10.76
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The coefficients on the shares growth volatility are negative and significant for
ETF-NAV or ETF-index tracking errors. The share growth volatility is measured as
the standard deviation of the shares growth rate. The large value of shares volatility
implies that the cash flows through ETFs are volatile. Thus, the high volatility in the
shares growth rate implies the attractiveness of ETFs in the market. Alternatively, the
frequent adjustment share of the ETF can be interpreted as the active management
of market makers to reduce the tracking error between the ETF and the NAV or the
underlying index.
Regarding the fund characteristics, the tracking error decreases when the ETF uses
derivatives to replicate the underlying index return, when the underlying securities
in the ETF baskets invest in US assets, and when futures are available for the ETF.
Market makers are able to manage the ETF shares more easily when they use futures
to replicate the index return because they need to manage only one or two assets.
In addition, because the index futures are created based on the index, managing the
ETF using futures can reduce the gap between the ETF and the index. Consistent
with previous studies, ETFs replicating the US based indexes tend to have small
tracking errors 11. This finding is not surprising because the US market is one of the
most liquid markets in the world, and traders can trade both ETF and underlying
securities without a time lag. In addition, the equity-type ETFs tend to have smaller
tracking errors than non-equity ETFs. This result implies that the arbitrage activity
of authorized participants for equity type-ETFs can easily manage their portfolios
because equity or equity-based derivatives markets are more liquid than other asset
markets.
Table 19 confirms the results in Table 18. The dependent variables used in Table
19 is the yearly standard deviation of daily return differences to measure tracking
11Engle and Sarkar (2006) investigate the premiums (discounts), which is the same as the ETF-
NAV tracking errors, for 21 domestic and 16 international ETFs. They find that the tracking errors
for domestic ETFs are generally small and temporary but those for international ETFs are large
and persistent.
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Table 19: Illiquidity and tracking errors from standard deviation of return difference
Dependent variables are tracking errors, calculated by taking the standard deviation of return series
between ETF returns and underlying index returns(I), between ETF returns and NAV returns(II),
or between NAV returns and underlying index returns(III). Independent variables are the following:
the average of daily relative bid-ask spread(Average liquidity), the average of daily dollar trad-
ing volume(Dollar Trading Volume), the standard deviation of the underlying index return(Index
Volatility), the log of the average shares outstanding (Shares Outstanding), the standard devia-
tion of shares’ growth rate(Shares Volatility), a dummy being equal to 1 if an ETF uses deriva-
tives(Derivatives Based), a dummy being equal to 1 if an ETF uses swaps(Swap Based), a dummy
being equal to 1 if underlying securities in the ETF baskets invest in US assets (Invested in US
assets),a dummy being equal to 1 if an ETF has a futures or options based on it (Futures Available
, Options Available), a dummy being equal to 1 if an ETF is levered(Levered Fund), the annual
expense ratio(Expense Ratio).The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Year fixed effects are in-
cluded, and standard errors are clustered at the fund level. ”*”, ”**”, ”***” represents significance
at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
σ(ETF-IND) σ(ETF-NAV) σ(NAV-IND)
Intercept 1.07∗∗∗ 1.23∗∗∗ 0.31
(3.92) (5.13) (0.89)
Average illiquidity 1.37∗∗∗ 1.52∗∗∗ 0.10
(13.91) (16.66) (1.62)
Dollar Trading Volume −0.01 0.00 −0.01
(−0.91) (−0.17) (−0.54)
Index Volatility 0.28∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗
(6.33) (4.96) (2.66)
Shares Outstanding −0.04∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ 0.00
(−2.08) (−3.42) (−0.07)
Shares Volatility −0.18 −0.42∗ −0.05
(−0.78) (−1.85) (−0.22)
Derivatives Based −0.09 −0.21 −0.13
(−0.44) (−1.15) (−0.95)
Swap-Based 0.02 −0.46∗ 0.55∗
(0.05) (−1.92) (1.86)
Equity-type ETF −0.16∗ −0.16∗ −0.26∗∗
(−1.86) (−1.93) (−2.22)
Invested in US assets −0.54∗∗∗ −0.34∗∗∗ −0.38∗∗∗
(−12.90) (−10.57) (−9.39)
Futures Available −0.01 0.05 −0.07
(−0.17) (0.96) (−1.35)
Options Available 0.01 −0.04 0.00
(0.22) (−1.10) (0.02)
Levered Fund 0.06 0.37 −0.36
(0.16) (1.51) (−0.94)
Expense Ratio 0.07 0.15∗∗ −0.10
(1.02) (2.41) (−1.00)
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,459 5,472 5,595
Adjusted R2 52.58 48.87 30.89
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errors. Results are very similar with this alternative tracking error measure. The
coefficients on illiquidity are still positive and significant for ETF-index and ETF-
NAV tracking errors. ETFs with investing in the US assets or with equity-based tend
to have small tracking errors. One different feature is that coefficients on index return
volatility is positive and significant, suggesting that authorized participants can have
trouble in tracking underlying indexes or constructing portfolios when underlying
indexes are volatile.
Overall, ETF tracking errors are severe when ETFs are not actively traded in
the market. Given the negative relation between the number of shares and tracking
errors, increase in the number of shares can lead to the liquidity increase of the
ETFs because large ETFs could attract more investors and be easily traded in the
markets. Investors can also avoid high transaction costs when investing in index-
based ETFs that trace inaccessible markets. Illiquid ETFs, however, may be riskier
than investing directly in underlying assets due to the high tracking errors. In these
situations, investors face systemic liquidity risk, which results in different outcomes.
4 The effect of liquidity on ETF returns
4.1 Liquidity adjusted asset pricing model
This section investigates the effect of liquidity on the expected ETF return and on the
ETF tracking error with respect to the index using the liquidity adjusted capital asset
pricing model. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) developed this model, which leads to
three different types of risk premium associated with liquidity risk as well as market
risk, and they argue that the asset price reflects these risk premiums. That is, the cost
adjusted net asset return has a linear relation with the market return considering the
market transaction cost. They show that the individual net return can be expressed
as
107
E(rit − rft ) = E(cit) + (β1i + β2i − β3i − β4i)E(rMt − cMt − rf ) (57)
where four betas are defined as
β1i =
cov(rit, r
M
t )
var(rMt − cMt )
β2i =
cov(cit, c
M
t )
var(rMt − cMt )
β3i =
cov(rit, c
M
t )
var(rMt − cMt )
β4i =
cov(cit, r
M
t )
var(rMt − cMt )
(58)
From equation (57), the net beta consists of four different betas. In addition to
the conventional market beta (β1i), there additionally appear three liquidity betas
that represent the relation between market liquidity and individual asset liquidity
(β2i), between market liquidity and the individual asset return (β3i), and between
individual asset liquidity and the market return (β4i).
β2i,representing the relation between individual liquidity and market liquidity, is
expected to be positive. Illiquid stocks tend to have large values for β2i, implying that
they are significantly affected by the lack of liquidity when the market is illiquid. β3i,
which shows the relation between the individual asset return and market liquidity, is
expected to be negative. The expected return on the illiquid stock decreases further
because the illiquid assets should be sold at a lower price than expected when the
market is illiquid. Finally, β4i also has a negative value and measures the relation
between the market return and the individual stock liquidity. This negative value
implies that the expected return on the illiquid asset decreases when the market
declines.
Like general common stocks, the liquidity of the ETF market also affects the
expected return of individual ETFs, which replicate the specific index return. An
ETF with lower liquidity than the market liquidity may not be able to correctly
reflect the level of the underlying index. In other words, the price of an ETF with
high liquidity immediately reflects the movement of the underlying index when the
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underlying index changes. However, insufficient trading may cause the illiquid ETF
to fail to trace the underlying index accurately. As a result, a tracking error occurs
if an ETF suffers from a lack of liquidity due to insufficient trading activity.
Another issue related to the tracking error is that the tracking error could be
caused by the illiquidity of the underlying securities in the ETF baskets. That is,
the NAV may not fully reflect the current value of the underlying index due to the
illiquidity of the underlying securities in the case of in-kind ETFs. If the underlying
securities in the ETF are not traded actively in the market, the market makers fail
to properly create or redeem the ETF unit. In this case, the liquidity problem in
the underlying securities may cause the difference between the NAV return and the
underlying index return. Thus, this type of liquidity problem is not related to ETF
market liquidity. Even though the effect of the liquidity of the underlying securities is
also an important issue, in this paper, I focus on ETF market liquidity and investigate
the effect of ETF liquidity on the return and the variance.
To investigate the liquidity effect, I first estimate the portfolio betas of LCAPM
by using 10 liquidity portfolios and 10 tracking error portfolios. However, calculating
portfolio betas may lose important information regarding the ETF characteristics
because each ETF has its own benchmark index and traces that index rather than
the entire ETF market. To mitigate these concerns, I calculate the betas for each
individual ETF and report the average of the betas within each portfolio by assuming
that the corresponding underlying index return for each ETF is treated as the market
return.
4.2 Portfolio construction
I construct 10 liquidity portfolios and 10 tracking error portfolios to investigate the
effect of liquidity on the ETF return. All of the ETFs are equally weighted within
each portfolio. The 10 liquidity portfolios are constructed for each month t by ranking
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all ETFs with their liquidity measures at the end of month t − 1. The liquidity for
each month is the average of the daily relative effective half spread of each ETF
having at least 15 observations in each month. Similarly, 10 tracking error portfolios
are formed for each year y by sorting the ETFs having at least 60 observations in
the previous year with tracking error. The tracking error is defined as the absolute
difference between one and the estimated coefficient from the regression of the ETF
return on the underlying index return. The daily return of each portfolio is simply
the average daily return of the ETFs included in each portfolio.
rMt =
Nt∑
i=1
witf
i
t (59)
The daily market return is computed as the average of the underlying index return
for each ETF used in constructing portfolios. The underlying index return traced by
each ETF is not actually traded in the market. The use of the underlying index
return to calculate the market return avoids potential measurement error due to
trading effects such as the bid-ask bounce or price reversal.
The daily portfolio liquidity is the average of the relative effective bid-ask spreads
of the securities included in each portfolio. That is,
cpt =
∑
i∈p
wpt c
i
t (60)
where p is either portfolio or market.
Similarly, the daily market liquidity is calculated by taking the average of the
relative effective bid-ask spreads of all ETFs included in the portfolio’s construction.
Given the persistence of liquidity, it is desirable to use liquidity innovation rather
than the observed relative effective bid-ask spread. The liquidity innovation of each
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security is obtained from the fitted residual of the following AR(2) specification.
cit = a0 + a1c
i
t−1 + a2c
i
t−2 + u
i
t (61)
The portfolio liquidity innovation and the market liquidity innovation are calculated
in the same way.
4.3 Liquidity risk
Table 20 shows the characteristics of the liquidity portfolios (Panel A) and the tracking
error sorted portfolios (Panels B and C). As seen in each panel, the liquidity and
tracking error portfolios show similar patterns. That is, the transaction cost and the
tracking error increase as liquidity decreases even if the portfolios are constructed
based on the past illiquidity and the past tracking error of the ETF. This result
implies that both illiquidity and the tracking error of the ETF are persistent.
Panel A shows that the expected transaction cost(E[c]) is shown to monotonically
increase from portfolio 1 through portfolio 10. For instance, the expected transaction
cost for portfolio 1, which is the most liquid portfolio, is only 0.032% while that of
portfolio 10 is 0.438%. Although the liquidity cost differences are reduced for the
tracking error portfolios in panels B or C, the increasing pattern in the liquidity cost
through the portfolios is similar to the liquidity portfolios. Moreover, the turnover
rate, which measures how an ETF is actively traded in the market, is shown to be
lower in the low liquidity portfolio than in the high liquidity portfolio. Next, the
portfolio volatility in column 9 shows that that there is no big difference between
the portfolios. However, the volatility of the difference between the ETF and the
underlying index returns, which is another definition of the tracking errors, increases
as liquidity decreases. This result implies that an ETF with low liquidity cannot
perfectly follow the underlying index return and that liquidity and the tracking errors
are positively related.
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Table 20: Properties of sorted portfolios
This table presents the characteristics of 10 equal-weighted liquidity and tracking error portfolios.
The 10 liquidity portfolios are constructed for each month t by ranking all ETFs with their liquidity
measures at the end of month t−1. The liquidity(c) for each month is the average of the daily relative
effective half spread of each ETF having at least 15 observations in each month. The 10-tracking
error portfolios are formed for each month t by sorting the ETFs having at least 15 observations
in the previous year with tracking error. The tracking error (|1 − θ|) is defined as the absolute
difference between one and the estimated coefficient (θ) from the regression of the ETF return on
the underlying index return. Prem is the ETF premium or discount defined as the difference between
the ETF price and the NAV divided by the NAV. trn denotes the daily ETF turnover defined as
the trading volume divided by the ETF shares outstanding. σ(rp) is the standard deviation of the
daily portfolio return. σ(re,p) is the standard deviation of the daily portfolio excess return on the
underlying index return. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
β1p β2p β3p β4p E(cp) |1− θ| Prem trn σ(rp) σ(re,p)
(.10) (.10) (.10) (.10) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Panel A. Illiquidity portfolios
1 11.043 0.002 −0.051 −0.010 0.032 8.202 0.032 7.989 1.200 0.207
(185.32) (54.94) (−7.22) (−5.51)
2 11.259 0.005 −0.054 −0.018 0.054 9.327 0.046 6.493 1.224 0.184
(183.43) (49.72) (−7.48) (−4.20)
3 9.943 0.005 −0.048 −0.028 0.067 9.716 0.043 6.485 1.087 0.178
(170.27) (76.43) (−7.32) (−7.39)
4 10.001 0.007 −0.049 −0.024 0.082 9.851 0.039 6.826 1.088 0.170
(181.60) (66.00) (−7.52) (−4.25)
5 10.027 0.008 −0.053 −0.034 0.098 11.365 0.034 4.766 1.100 0.215
(163.78) (77.98) (−8.11) (−5.65)
6 10.448 0.009 −0.054 −0.052 0.117 14.723 0.026 3.765 1.142 0.222
(171.58) (75.63) (−7.96) (−8.19)
7 11.101 0.010 −0.054 −0.064 0.142 14.917 0.030 3.078 1.212 0.257
(174.50) (70.03) (−7.59) (−8.58)
8 11.595 0.014 −0.064 −0.074 0.182 18.791 0.030 2.516 1.259 0.343
(186.78) (76.33) (−8.54) (−7.45)
9 11.012 0.015 −0.069 −0.097 0.252 20.994 0.048 2.123 1.223 0.492
(144.91) (61.98) (−9.54) (−8.44)
10 11.352 0.026 −0.081 −0.147 0.438 24.890 0.055 1.944 1.282 0.489
(126.61) (58.56) (−10.68) (−7.19)
Panel B. Tracking Error Portfolios (Regression)
1 10.910 0.006 −0.050 −0.052 0.099 6.164 0.044 6.188 1.218 0.171
(140.93) (47.52) (−7.04) (−8.96)
2 11.198 0.009 −0.058 −0.034 0.103 6.570 0.047 6.251 1.227 0.179
(171.12) (55.77) (−7.94) (−4.75)
3 10.822 0.008 −0.050 −0.055 0.106 6.868 0.046 6.407 1.180 0.166
(183.30) (60.63) (−7.17) (−8.45)
4 11.081 0.010 −0.058 −0.043 0.114 7.714 0.047 5.865 1.215 0.183
(169.97) (61.88) (−8.14) (−5.35)
5 10.336 0.009 −0.055 −0.060 0.123 8.716 0.049 5.586 1.136 0.188
(164.20) (60.95) (−8.19) (−8.41)
6 10.644 0.012 −0.056 −0.053 0.137 10.632 0.058 4.712 1.161 0.195
(179.22) (64.63) (−8.33) (−5.91)
112
Table 20: Properties of sorted portfolios - Continued
β1p β2p β3p β4p E(cp) |1− θ| Prem trn σ(rp) σ(re,p)
(.10) (.10) (.10) (.10) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
7 11.003 0.010 −0.058 −0.061 0.157 12.982 0.086 3.971 1.197 0.262
(188.54) (57.12) (−8.23) (−7.39)
8 11.336 0.010 −0.060 −0.056 0.179 16.626 0.101 3.571 1.234 0.348
(186.05) (48.21) (−8.20) (−6.35)
9 10.624 0.014 −0.067 −0.066 0.198 22.466 0.158 2.794 1.177 0.470
(151.01) (53.63) (−9.87) (−5.50)
10 8.897 0.011 −0.056 −0.063 0.219 39.775 0.141 2.445 1.015 0.609
(120.10) (33.39) (−9.40) (−5.28)
Panel C. Tracking Error Portfolios (Excess Return Volatility)
1 10.699 0.005 −0.048 −0.023 0.057 4.262 0.029 3.931 1.171 0.085
(173.24) (57.73) (−7.07) (−5.56)
2 10.828 0.006 −0.051 −0.027 0.068 5.398 0.031 4.859 1.184 0.098
(175.24) (75.03) (−7.32) (−5.92)
3 10.175 0.007 −0.048 −0.030 0.083 7.530 0.039 5.673 1.123 0.157
(156.91) (72.92) (−7.21) (−5.89)
4 9.647 0.008 −0.042 −0.042 0.096 9.409 0.043 6.167 1.068 0.161
(152.84) (87.67) (−6.70) (−7.08)
5 10.084 0.010 −0.051 −0.050 0.115 10.556 0.045 6.810 1.102 0.165
(175.52) (78.50) (−7.82) (−7.02)
6 10.631 0.015 −0.058 −0.050 0.145 12.250 0.060 5.727 1.163 0.198
(173.86) (57.50) (−8.43) (−4.18)
7 10.975 0.014 −0.058 −0.078 0.186 15.745 0.085 4.436 1.213 0.301
(155.66) (71.07) (−8.17) (−7.50)
8 11.913 0.011 −0.082 −0.059 0.209 19.011 0.141 3.057 1.315 0.495
(157.98) (44.26) (−10.78) (−5.89)
9 12.135 0.011 −0.078 −0.112 0.228 23.690 0.140 2.654 1.352 0.715
(143.91) (45.54) (−9.78) (−10.99)
10 9.841 0.012 −0.052 −0.085 0.255 30.500 0.165 4.573 1.202 0.714
(85.98) (31.95) (−7.35) (−6.29)
The relation between illiquidity and the tracking error is well illustrated from
the distribution of the tracking error in column 6. The tracking error for the low
liquidity portfolio appears to be larger than that for the high liquidity portfolio.
That is, the price of the ETF with low liquidity tends to deviate more frequently
from its underlying index. Moreover, the average premium of the ETF relative to
the NAV is positive and increases as the liquidity decreases. The ETF-NAV return
differences are affected by both the illiquidity of the underlying securities and the ETF
liquidity. Arbitrageurs in the ETF market try to trade the ETF close to the publicly
announced NAV price and the underlying index. However, if an ETF does not have
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enough liquidity so that traders cannot immediately trade the ETF to respond to the
movement of the underlying index, the ETF market illiquidity causes the disparity
between the ETF price and the underlying index.
The estimated betas are also reported by multiplying by 10 for convenience. It is
not surprising that β1p, measuring the market risk, is close to one, which implies that
the ETFs in the US stock exchange trace the underlying index well on average. More-
over, three liquidity betas reflect the characteristics of the liquidity well even though
the magnitude is small. The portfolio β2ps, indicating the relation between market
liquidity and individual liquidity, are positive, implying that individual liquidity de-
creases when market liquidity decreases. Illiquid ETFs have large values for β2p and
are more sensitive to market liquidity shocks. As expected, both the β3ps and the β4ps
have negative values. Moreover, the ETFs in the low-liquidity or high-tracking error
portfolios tend to have large absolute values for β3p and β4p. This result suggests
that illiquid ETFs are more likely to deviate from the underlying index return and
are more sensitive to a change in the market return or the market liquidity.
The discussion above relies on the portfolio betas rather than the individual ETF
betas. However, it is desirable to calculate the individual ETF betas because each
ETF is designed to follow the specific underlying index. Considering the underlying
index return as the ETF’s market return, the calculated market and liquidity betas
provide more reliable variables for measuring the market and liquidity risk. To ac-
count for these concerns, I provide the average betas in each portfolio after estimating
the individual ETF betas. The yearly portfolios are formed using the same method
as the previous portfolio beta calculation. Table 21 reports the average betas of the
liquidity and tracking error portfolios. Overall, the results are quite similar to the
patterns in the portfolio betas. The illiquid ETFs tend to be more sensitive to market
liquidity or the market return. Moreover, the illiquid ETFs are more likely to deviate
from their underlying index return.
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Table 21: Properties of sorted portfolios based on individual ETFs
This table presents the characteristics of 10 equal-weighted liquidity and tracking error portfolios.
The method for constructing portfolios and variable definitions are the same as in Table 20. After
estimating yearly betas for each ETF, equal weighted averages within portfolios are reported. Other
statistics follow the same procedure. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.
β1p β2p β3p β4p E(cp) |1− θ| Prem trn σ(rp) σ(re,p)
(.10) (.10) (.10) (.10) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Panel A. Illiquidity portfolios
1 9.407 0.001 −0.030 −0.008 0.033 5.606 0.024 7.774 1.325 0.369
(142.74) (1.64) (−5.08) (−4.56)
2 9.398 0.002 −0.029 −0.009 0.057 6.386 0.049 7.562 1.467 0.412
(87.11) (1.84) (−4.73) (−2.72)
3 9.304 0.015 −0.048 −0.012 0.071 7.328 0.037 7.424 1.545 0.475
(136.70) (1.11) (−2.33) (−4.96)
4 9.379 0.002 −0.021 −0.017 0.085 6.662 0.019 5.339 1.625 0.507
(77.14) (1.97) (−2.11) (−3.85)
5 9.332 0.003 −0.030 −0.021 0.098 7.458 0.030 4.497 1.654 0.561
(66.55) (1.96) (−4.37) (−3.73)
6 9.226 0.004 −0.029 −0.025 0.116 8.195 0.016 3.152 1.622 0.579
(80.61) (1.82) (−3.85) (−2.66)
7 9.103 0.005 −0.043 −0.029 0.139 11.187 0.071 3.251 1.659 0.687
(96.20) (2.01) (−3.48) (−3.29)
8 8.866 0.010 −0.042 −0.053 0.187 14.038 0.085 2.321 1.797 0.914
(77.28) (2.02) (−2.92) (−4.02)
9 8.636 0.007 −0.054 −0.063 0.240 15.848 0.113 2.234 1.847 1.067
(80.05) (1.33) (−3.11) (−4.69)
10 8.740 0.015 −0.044 −0.156 0.377 14.865 0.107 1.846 1.803 1.186
(59.85) (2.67) (−3.87) (−6.14)
Panel B. Tracking Error Portfolios (Regression)
1 9.783 0.003 −0.034 −0.019 0.087 2.941 0.021 5.337 1.649 0.354
(213.05) (1.52) (−2.87) (−2.43)
2 9.755 0.002 −0.027 −0.019 0.086 2.845 0.045 7.546 1.592 0.355
(188.40) (1.70) (−4.30) (−3.03)
3 9.685 0.003 −0.028 −0.023 0.100 3.776 0.061 5.230 1.589 0.385
(174.55) (1.85) (−4.31) (−3.43)
4 9.594 0.002 −0.025 −0.025 0.107 4.711 0.023 5.988 1.656 0.438
(119.58) (2.25) (−5.03) (−4.98)
5 9.510 0.004 −0.028 −0.031 0.124 5.426 0.062 6.285 1.714 0.547
(144.59) (2.63) (−4.14) (−3.40)
6 9.487 0.003 −0.029 −0.038 0.140 6.651 0.054 5.377 1.671 0.637
(137.21) (1.97) (−3.75) (−6.98)
7 9.339 0.008 −0.036 −0.039 0.173 8.696 0.061 3.404 1.669 0.768
(100.93) (2.33) (−5.10) (−3.21)
8 8.993 0.006 −0.033 −0.045 0.168 12.363 0.096 2.039 1.552 0.848
(63.43) (2.68) (−3.74) (−4.06)
9 8.283 0.010 −0.042 −0.084 0.208 17.700 0.094 1.836 1.626 1.084
(88.80) (2.37) (−3.10) (−5.37)
10 6.916 0.025 −0.090 −0.073 0.203 32.958 0.043 2.490 1.630 1.329
(27.25) (1.64) (−3.44) (−3.76)
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Table 21: Properties of sorted portfolios based on individual ETFs - Continued
β1p β2p β3p β4p E(cp) |1− θ| Prem trn σ(rp) σ(re,p)
(.10) (.10) (.10) (.10) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Panel C. Tracking Error Portfolios (Excess Return Volatility)
1 9.737 0.002 −0.028 −0.013 0.050 2.294 0.017 4.664 1.260 0.182
(211.39) (1.58) (−5.91) (−2.83)
2 9.658 0.004 −0.032 −0.015 0.062 3.203 0.027 4.590 1.334 0.232
(172.06) (2.04) (−2.43) (−2.39)
3 9.592 0.029 −0.058 −0.020 0.081 5.437 0.017 5.579 1.438 0.301
(126.97) (1.91) (−3.04) (−2.73)
4 9.485 0.008 −0.033 −0.026 0.093 5.621 0.056 5.028 1.504 0.374
(98.42) (2.42) (−4.79) (−2.58)
5 9.489 −0.001 −0.041 −0.025 0.108 6.298 0.023 5.262 1.614 0.448
(112.62) (−0.25) (−3.49) (−3.49)
6 9.415 0.005 −0.033 −0.040 0.151 8.561 0.050 6.799 1.681 0.619
(94.27) (1.85) (−3.84) (−3.46)
7 9.133 0.006 −0.038 −0.059 0.183 10.903 0.062 4.163 1.745 0.780
(71.81) (2.32) (−3.16) (−3.54)
8 8.885 0.004 −0.047 −0.060 0.194 13.518 0.142 2.830 1.693 0.974
(56.16) (2.47) (−2.81) (−5.93)
9 8.223 0.005 −0.034 −0.058 0.227 18.492 0.118 2.864 1.822 1.194
(63.66) (2.69) (−3.94) (−4.78)
10 7.751 0.003 −0.028 −0.080 0.251 23.455 0.051 3.849 2.271 1.650
(33.94) (3.51) (−4.01) (−4.80)
In sum, the above results support that liquidity is the important factor in deter-
mining the ETF return, and it causes the tracking error of the ETF with respect
to the underlying index or the NAV returns. The estimated portfolio betas suggest
that the liquidity risk is the undiversified systemic risk even if constructing the port-
folio. Moreover, the liquidity risk is closely related to the ETF tracking errors. In
general, the return difference between the ETF and the underlying index or the NAV
can be removed through arbitrage activity. However, a lack of liquidity in the ETF
can cause an unexpected loss to the arbitrageurs when they fail to trade the ETF on
their target price. Thus, liquidity plays an important role in eliminating the arbitrage
opportunity in the ETF market. ETF investments provide a valuable opportunity to
indirectly invest in inaccessible markets. However, if there is a tracking error due to
a lack of liquidity, investing in ETFs brings a different result from the direct invest-
ment in the particular markets. Moreover, if the liquidity risk is the systemic risk
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that exists even after constructing the portfolio from ETFs, the merit of investing in
the ETF is less attractive. If liquidity risk from investing in the ETF exists, the ETF
investors must be compensated for bearing this liquidity risk. Thus, the next section
investigates how the liquidity risk affects the expected ETF return.
4.4 Liquidity premium
This section investigates the effect of liquidity on the expected return of the ETF from
a cross-sectional regression by using pre-estimated betas. The regression is estimated
by using the GMM method. As did in Acharya and Pedersen (2005), the standard
error is calculated by using Newey and West (1987) with lag 2. The following three
equations are used to estimate parameters:
E(rpt ) = α + κE(c
p
t ) + λβ
net,p (62)
E(rpt ) = α + κE(c
p
t ) + λ1β
1p + λβnet,p (63)
E(rpt ) = α + κE(c
p
t ) + λ1β
1p + λ2β
2p + λ3β
3p + λ4β
4p (64)
The above models are estimated either when the coefficient on the expected trad-
ing cost, κ, is fixed as the average turnover rate or when it is considered to be the free
parameter. The equations are estimated by either using pre-estimated portfolio betas
or pre-estimated individual ETF betas. The estimated parameters using portfolio
betas are reported in Table 22 and those using individual betas are reported in Table
23. Panel A of each table reports the estimated results from the liquidity portfolios
and panels B and C do the same for the tracking error portfolios. The odd and even
lines of each panel report the estimation results when κ is fixed as the average daily
turnover rate and treated as the free parameter, respectively.
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Table 22: Illiquidity and tracking error portfolios: portfolio betas
This table presents the estimated coefficients from cross-sectional regressions of the liquidity-adjusted
CAPM for 10 equal-weighted portfolios using daily data during 2002-2012. The odd and even lines
of each panel report the estimation results when κ is fixed as the average daily turnover rate and
treated as the free parameter, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics
Constant E(cp) β1p β2p β3p β4p βnet,p
(.10) (.10) (.10) (.10) (.10) (.10) (.10)
Panel A. Illiquidity portfolios
1 −0.01∗∗∗ 4.60 0.05∗∗∗
(−8.44) (8.90)
2 −0.02∗∗∗ −119.99∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
(−10.32) (−10.81) (8.97)
3 −0.07∗∗∗ 4.60 −0.81 0.89
(−10.75) (−1.02) (1.14)
4 −0.07∗∗∗ 18.92∗∗∗ −0.89 0.97
(−10.77) (3.66) (−1.12) (1.24)
5 −0.01∗∗∗ 4.60 0.02 2.63 −5.85 1.32
(−8.30) (0.15) (0.04) (−0.19) (0.16)
6 −0.02∗∗∗ −112.21∗∗∗ −0.03 −0.10 −16.88 2.93
(−9.96) (−10.63) (−0.23) (0.00) (−0.56) (0.34)
Panel B. Tracking Error Portfolios(Regression)
1 −0.01∗∗∗ 4.78 0.04∗∗∗
(−8.17) (7.14)
2 −0.02∗∗∗ −94.23∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
(−10.04) (−9.93) (7.37)
3 −0.07∗∗∗ 4.78 −6.93∗∗∗ 6.95∗∗∗
(−10.90) (−3.03) (3.07)
4 −0.07∗∗∗ 32.78∗∗∗ −6.90∗∗∗ 6.92∗∗∗
(−10.82) (5.92) (−3.00) (3.04)
5 −0.01∗∗∗ 4.78 0.00 −21.69 −5.75 −5.56
(−7.66) (0.02) (−0.25) (−0.17) (−0.71)
6 −0.02∗∗∗ −97.64∗∗∗ 0.01 −6.11 −2.69 −5.23
(−9.55) (−10.16) (0.06) (−0.07) (−0.08) (−0.67)
Panel C. Tracking Error Portfolios(Standard Deviation)
1 −0.01∗∗∗ 4.79 0.04∗∗∗
(−7.08) (6.05)
2 −0.02∗∗∗ −157.90∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
(−9.17) (−9.92) (5.99)
3 −0.06∗∗∗ 4.79 1.57 −1.46
(−10.26) (1.23) (−1.16)
4 −0.07∗∗∗ 10.20 1.64 −1.53
(−10.32) (1.46) (1.29) (−1.22)
5 −0.01∗∗∗ 4.79 0.05 4.22 3.13 −0.18
(−7.03) (0.90) (0.14) (0.31) (−0.04)
6 −0.02∗∗∗ −148.14∗∗∗ 0.05 −4.74 2.80 −0.27
(−9.24) (−10.10) (1.05) (−0.15) (0.28) (−0.06)
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The first line of each panel is the GMM estimation result of equation (62). The
risk premium is positively significant at the 1% level and quite similar in either the
liquidity or the tracking error portfolios (0.05%, 0.04%, and 0.04%) when using the
fixed κ. The results are unchanged even when κ is estimated as the free estimator
(line 2). The negative coefficient for the expected cost κ can be interpreted as a result
of the managerial fees for the ETFs. Finally, the alpha is negatively significant, which
is due to the fixed costs including the managerial fees from the ETF.
In lines 3 and 4, the risk premium is estimated to separate the liquidity risk from
the market risk by using equation (63). As pointed out in Acharya and Pedersen
(2005), a substantial multicollinearity problem exists even when using the ETF data.
The βnet,p is shown to be positive and significant in panel B and insignificant in
panel A as well as C. The coefficient for β1p is negative and significant in panel B,
which is not necessarily true because the market premium cannot be negative and
the net beta also contains the value of β1p. For example, the estimated market
premium using the liquidity portfolio is still positive, i.e., −0.093β1p + 0.095βnet,p =
0.002β1p + 0.095(β2p − β3p − β4p) 12. This result implies that both the market risk
and the liquidity risk are positively related to the expected ETF return.
Finally, lines 5 and 6 report the estimation results of equation (63) when each
beta is considered as a separate variable. All of the estimated coefficients are not
significant, suggesting the existence of the severe multicollinearity problem.
The economic significance can be found in the investment performance by calcu-
lating the return difference between portfolios 1 and 10. The effect of β2p, β3p, and
β4pon the annualized return difference between liquidity portfolio 1 and 10 is 0.04%,
0.06%, and 0.26%, respectively. Thus, the annualized return due to the liquidity risk
is approximately 0.36%. Consistent with Acharya and Pedersen (2005), the effect of
12The market premium is also positive in panel A because −0.081β1p + 0.089βnet,p = 0.008β1p +
0.089(β2p − β3p − β4p). In panel C, the market premium is 0.011. But, both market premiums in
panels A and C are insignificant.
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Table 23: Illiquidity and tracking error portfolios: individual ETF betas
This table presents the estimated coefficients from cross-sectional regressions of the liquidity-adjusted
CAPM for individual securities using daily data during 2002-2012. The odd and even lines of each
panel report the estimation results when κ is fixed as the average daily turnover rate and treated as
the free parameter, respectively. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics
Constant E(ci) β1i β2i β3i β4i βnet,i
(.10) (.10) (.10) (.10) (.10) (.10) (.10)
1 −0.01∗∗∗ 5.72 0.03∗∗∗
(−11.71) (14.08)
2 −0.01∗∗∗ −1.28 0.03∗∗∗
(−11.71) (−0.60) (14.08)
3 −0.04∗∗∗ 5.72 0.01 0.06∗∗∗
(−23.24) (0.39) (2.74)
4 −0.04∗∗∗ 16.06∗∗∗ 0.00 0.07∗∗∗
(−22.86) (6.74) (−0.18) (3.23)
5 −0.01∗∗∗ 5.72 0.02∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ −0.03
(−9.48) (12.80) (−3.04) (−6.65) (−0.79)
6 −0.01∗∗∗ −4.96∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ −0.03
(−11.18) (−2.35) (12.90) (−3.00) (−6.62) (−0.92)
the covariance of an ETF’s illiquidity to market returns seems to have the largest
impact on the expected returns. Furthermore, this liquidity risk is still an important
factor even when investing in the tracking error portfolio. The portfolio with a large
tracking error gains more excess return than that with a small tracking error. For
instance, the total annualized return difference between regression (standard devia-
tion) tracking portfolios 1 and 10 is 0.03% (0.11%), consisting of 0.01%(0.01%) for
β2p, 0.01% (0.01%)for β3p, and 0.03% (0.09%) for β4p. These results imply that the
tracking error is related to the liquidity risk, which is a non-negligible risk in ETF
investment.
In sum, the liquidity of the ETF market is also an important factor for determining
the expected return of the ETF because the ETF is traded like a common stock in the
market even if the ETF is designed to strongly replicate the particular index return.
Moreover, the liquid ETF tends to track its underlying index better than the illiquid
one.
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5 The liquidity effect on volatility
5.1 Nontrading probability and variance difference
In this section, the effect of liquidity on the ETF variance is investigated using Lo
and MacKinlay (1990)’s econometric model. In particular, I investigate whether a
lack of liquidity could cause the difference between the NAV return variance and
the ETF return variance. Lo and MacKinlay (1990) develop an econometric model
to explain the effect of infrequent trading and shows that nontrading increases the
return variance and causes negative serial correlation. If an individual security trades
very frequently without any time delays, then the variance of the observed return
must be same as the variance of the true asset return. However, the increase in the
expected nontrading days can cause a gap between the observed return and the true
return.
It is not easy to evaluate whether infrequent trading can increase the asset return
variance with respect to the true return variance because the true asset return cannot
be observed in general. However, the NAV return can be regarded as the ETF’s
true return, which is publicly announced in the market. Given the NAV return,
it is attractive to test whether nontrading causes the increase in the ETF return
variance or in the gap between the ETF return variance and the NAV return variance.
Moreover, the NAV return can be easily modeled using a single linear factor model
because each ETF is designed to trace its particular index. For the NAV return series,
assume the following linear relation between the NAV return and the underlying index
return.
vt = α + βft + t (65)
where vt is the NAV return and ft is the underlying index return on day t. If an
ETF replicates the underlying index perfectly, then the β should be close to one and
the α should be close to the fund’s expense ratio. While Lo and MacKinlay (1990)
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assume that the factor return is serially uncorrelated, it is more realistic to assume
that a serial correlation exists in the factor return series. The following autoregressive
process is suitable to account for the serial correlation of the factor return series:
ft = φ0 + φft−1 + ξt (66)
where ξt is zero mean noise with variance σ
2. The coefficient of the lagged return
is the well-known autocorrelation function of the AR(1) process and is equal to the
autocorrelation of lag 1.
As introduced in Lo and MacKinlay (1990), the following two random variables
are defined to explain the ETF return process with the nontrading effect. First, the
indicator variable δt is defined as having the value one if ETF does not trade at the
particular date t with probability p. Second, the indicator variable Xt(k) is defined
as being one if ETF trades at time t but has not traded in the k previous periods.
The indicator variable Xt(k) can be expressed as
Xt(k) = (1− δt)δt−1δt−2 · · · δt−k, k > 0
=
 1, with probability(1− p)p
k
0, with probability1− (1− p)pk
(67)
Given the definition of the indicator variable Xt(k), the ETF return can be written
as
rt =
∞∑
k=0
Xt(k)vt−k (68)
From equation (68), the daily ETF return and the daily NAV return should be
same if the ETF is traded every day. So, equation (68) means that the ETF return
at time t can be expressed as the sum of the NAV returns from time t− k to time t
if the ETF has not been traded during the previous k period. Given the definition of
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the ETF return in equation (68),the variance of the ETF return can be expressed as
V ar(rt) = V ar(vt) +
2p
1− p(α + βµ)
2 +
2φp
1− φpβ
2V ar(ft) (69)
Equation (69) shows that the ETF return variance is composed of the NAV return
variance and the terms associated with the nontrading and the autocorrelation effects.
If the ETF trades every day, which means that the nontrading probability is close
to zero, the ETF return variance should be the same as the NAV return variance.
The third term, which is related to the product of the nontrading probability and the
serial correlation in the underlying index return, is not shown in Lo and MacKinlay
(1990). The important aspect in equation (69) is that the nontrading probability
plays a critical role in increasing the ETF return variance. The no trading effect does
still exist even though there is no serial correlation in the underlying index return.
Moreover, the expected return for the ETF is always same as the NAV return; the
nontrading probability does not cause any difference between the ETF return and
the NAV return. An increase in the nontrading probability could cause the increase
in the ETF return variance but not cause any change in the expected return for the
ETF. Thus, if an ETF has a high probability of nontrading due to the lack of trading
volume, the risk of investing in the ETF could also increase.
Table 24 reports the variance of each return series and the difference between
return series. The reported variance is the annualized cross-sectional average of each
ETF’s variance calculated from the daily return series during the sample period.
Panel A shows the average of variances by asset category. First, there exist significant
differences between the ETF return variance and the NAV return variance except for
the domestic/sector and the real estate ETFs. In particular, the commodity type
ETFs tend to have the largest variance difference. Although the differences in the
currency ETFs or debt ETFs are small, they are still significant. For the equity-type
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Table 24: Variance comparison
This table reports the variance differences among ETF return, NAV return, and underlying index
return. The variance is calculated for individual ETF from the inception date to the end of year
2012 or the delisted date. σ2r , σ
2
v , and σ
2
f denote the annual variance of ETF returns, NAV returns,
and underlying index returns. The underlying index returns are adjusted for the leverage factor.
”*”, ”**”, ”***” represents significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
Category N σ2r σ
2
v σ
2
f σ
2
r − σ2v σ2r − σ2f σ2v − σ2f
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Panel A. Asset Category
Asset Allocation 40 13.27 9.23 8.13 4.04∗∗∗ 5.15∗∗∗ 1.11
Commodity 42 21.02 16.99 17.41 4.03 3.61 −0.43
Currency 20 2.58 2.14 2.14 0.44∗∗ 0.44∗∗ 0.00
Debt 109 2.53 1.23 1.08 1.29∗∗ 1.44∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
Domestic/Equity 318 12.21 11.07 10.83 1.14∗∗∗ 1.38∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗
Domestic/Sector 259 18.82 18.67 17.14 0.15 1.68∗ 1.53
Global/Equity 329 18.32 11.39 14.63 6.92∗∗∗ 3.69 −3.23
Global/Sector 147 15.28 10.91 10.51 4.37∗∗∗ 4.77∗∗∗ 0.40
Real Estate 43 20.52 18.82 18.31 1.70 2.21∗ 0.51
Panel B. Levered or Inversed
Non-levered 1115 10.43 6.78 7.89 3.65∗∗∗ 2.54∗ −1.11
Levered 192 41.78 42.81 38.79 −1.02∗ 2.99∗∗ 4.01∗∗∗
ETFs, the variance difference for the ETFs based on US equity is smaller than that
based on international equity. Next, the difference between the NAV return variance
and the index return variance is also significant, although it is smaller than that
between the ETF return and the NAV return. This result implies that the price
movement of the ETF is more volatile than that of the Index, suggesting that there
could be a substantial tracking error in the ETF with respect to the Index.
Panel B reports the averages of the variance difference based on whether the ETF
is levered or non-levered. On average, the levered ETFs have higher variances than
the non-levered ETFs. Moreover, the ETF variances are higher than the NAV return
variance whether the ETFs are levered or not. The return difference between the
ETF return and the NAV return is bigger in the non-levered products than in the
levered products. Moreover, there is no significant difference between the NAV return
variance and the index return variance for the non-levered ETFs, but a significant
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Figure 16: Variances of ETF return, NAV return, and Index return by leverage
This figure illustrates the averages of ETF, NAV, and index return variances by leverage factors.
The return variances are calculated from ETF daily returns.
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difference exists for the levered products. This result suggests that leverage may
cause an increase in the true variance, but it does not necessarily cause an increase
in the variance relative to the true variance. Figure 16 illustrates the variances of the
different return series by the degree of leverage. The variance of the index return is
calculated after considering the leverage factor. Figure 16 shows that the variance
also increases when the degree of leverage increases. The plot also suggests that the
leverage does not necessarily and directly cause the increase in the variance of the
trading asset ETFs. In any case, there exists a difference between the ETF return
variance and the NAV return variance regardless of whether the ETFs are levered or
not. In sum, the return variance or volatility increases when the ETF is not actively
traded in the market.
The return variance of the illiquid ETF increases because the price of the illiquid
ETF cannot immediately reflect the price of the index; thus, it should reflect all of
the past fluctuations of the index, which are not involved in the price due to the
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nontrading of the asset. As a result, the lack of liquidity could cause an increase in
the risk of investing in the ETF because it increases the return variance and decreases
the ETF performance even if the expected return is independent of the illiquidity.
5.2 Nontrading probability and the variance
In the previous section, the Lo and MacKinlay (1990) model shows how infrequent
trading could affect the ETF return variance compared to the NAV return variance.
This section provides empirical evidence to support the previous econometric model.
The variance of each ETF is calculated based on the daily data from 2002 to 2012. In
the case of an ETF incepted after 2002, the variance is calculated from the inception
date. The probability of nontrading is simply defined as the proportion of nontrading
days to the actual trading days during the sample period.
Table 25 provides average values for ETF and NAV return variances classified by
the nontrading probability. An average of each variance is calculated for each stock
from the sample period. Category 1 includes only the ETFs that have been traded
every day during the sample period. That is, the nontrading probability of category
1 is zero. The remaining categories are constructed by sorting ETFs that have at
least one nontrading day during the sample period with the nontrading probability.
The reported variances are annualized for convenience. Equation (69) shows that the
difference between the ETF variance and the NAV variance is related to not only the
nontrading probability but also to the autocorrelation of the underlying index return.
The average autocorrelations for the underlying index return are also reported in the
table.
Table 25 shows that the nontrading probability is related to the difference be-
tween the ETF variance and the NAV variance. First, as the nontrading probability
increases, the difference between the ETF variance and the NAV variance also in-
creases. For instance, ETFs included in category 10 were not traded for 70% of
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Table 25: Nontrading probability and variances
This table presents the summary statistics of variances, no trading probability, the expected no
trading day of ETFs. In addition, the first-order autocorrelation, the AR(1) coefficient, and the
sum of the autocorrelations from lag 1 to lag 10 for the underlying index returns are reported. All
of the statistics are calculated from the daily return series for the entire sample period. σ2r and
σ2v denote the variance of ETF returns and the variance of NAV returns, respectively. No trading
probability,p, is the ratio of observations to total trading days. E(k) is calculated by p/(1 − p). ρi
denotes the lag i autocorrelation. φ denotes the coefficient of the AR(1) for the underlying index
return.
σ2r σ
2
v σ
2
r − σ2v p E(k) ρ1 φ
∑
i ρi
(%) (%) (%) (%) day (%) (%) (%)
1 10.86 10.51 0.35 0.00 0.00 1.82 1.83 −1.38
2 20.87 21.66 −0.79 0.12 0.00 −1.57 −1.57 −5.35
3 19.18 19.60 −0.42 0.28 0.00 1.61 1.60 0.27
4 14.18 14.28 −0.1 0.76 0.01 1.46 1.52 0.46
5 13.72 13.17 0.55 1.92 0.02 1.33 1.34 −0.59
6 11.17 10.73 0.44 4.48 0.05 −0.36 −0.37 −1.58
7 11.75 10.35 1.4 9.12 0.10 1.46 1.44 3.08
8 14.71 9.42 5.29 19.89 0.25 1.99 2.08 −6.55
9 15.63 7.77 7.86 40.01 0.69 −0.27 −0.95 −8.02
10 25.70 6.00 19.7 66.91 2.40 0.19 0.09 −9.16
the trading days and the annual variance difference for those ETFs is 28%. Second,
the number of expected nontrading days also increases when the nontrading prob-
ability increases. The ETFs included in category 10, which show the least trading
activity, have not been traded during three consecutive days on average. Third, the
autocorrelation with lag 1 and the AR(1) coefficient for the underlying index return
are reported in column 6 and column 7. Moreover, the sum of the autocorrelations
from lag 1 to lag 10 for the underlying index return is reported in the last column.
Columns 6 and 7 show that there is no clear relation between the autocorrelation of
the underlying index return and the nontrading probability of the ETF.
5.3 Cross-sectional regression of variance difference
Equation (69) shows that the variance difference appears to be closely related to the
nontrading probability and the autocorrelation. In particular, the nontrading prob-
ability plays the role of increasing the ETF volatility relative to the NAV volatility.
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The regression analysis is performed to investigate whether the nontrading probabil-
ity, the autocorrelation of the index return, and the interaction between the two are
related to the difference between the ETF return variance and the NAV return vari-
ance. In this regression analysis, I use annual variables to control the seasonal effect
and to obtain more observations. In each year, the variables are calculated from the
daily data for each ETF that has more than 60 observations. The annual nontrading
probability is calculated from the proportion of the observed data to the actual mar-
ket trading days. The primary dependent variable in this regression analysis is the
difference between the ETF return variance and the NAV return variance.
Table 26 reports the panel regression results. As seen in column 1 of the table, the
coefficient for the nontrading probability is positive and significant. This evidence
suggests that the ETF risk can increase when the ETF is not traded actively in
the market. This coefficient value is quite stable even if other control variables are
included in column 4.
Columns 2 and 3 investigate the effect of the autocorrelation of the underlying
index return on the ETF variance. First, both estimated coefficients in columns 2
and 3 are quite stable (0.017 and 0.016). Second, the existence of autocorrelation in
the underlying index return also is positively related to the difference between ETF
and NAV variances.
Column 4 considers all three variables: the nontrading probability, the autocor-
relation, and the interaction term between the nontrading probability of the ETFs
and the index autocorrelation. Consistent with the previous results, the nontrading
probability and the autocorrelation are positively related to the difference between
the ETF variance and the NAV variance.
Finally, column 5 reports the regression result when the related variables are trans-
formed to follow the form in equation (69). After including the transformed variables
in the regression, the nontrading probability term is still positive and significant but
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Table 26: Nontrading probability and difference between ETF and NAV return vari-
ances
The dependent variable of this regression is the annual variance difference between ETF and NAV
returns. p is the ratio of total observations to trading days. φ is the coefficient of the AR(1) for the
index. Other variables are the following: average dollar trading volume(Dollar Trading Volume), std.
dev. of the index return(Index Volatility), log of average shares(Shares Outstanding), the std. dev.
of shares’ growth(Shares Volatility), a dummy of 1 if an ETF uses derivatives or swaps(Derivatives
Based, Swap Based), a dummy of 1 if ETF underlying assets invest in the US(Invested in US assets),a
dummy of 1 if an ETF has futures or options based on it (Futures Available , Options Available), a
dummy of 1 if an ETF is levered(Levered Fund). The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. ”*”,
”**”, ”***” represents significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Intercept −0.057∗∗∗ 0.019 0.019 −0.061∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗
(−4.280) (1.460) (1.450) (−4.560) (−2.090)
Notrading Prob(p) 0.103∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(10.320) (10.470)
AR(1) coefficient(φ) 0.017∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(3.210) (3.020) (5.420)
p ∗ φ 0.020 0.008
(0.290) (0.130)
p/(1− p) 0.023∗∗∗
(6.830)
pφ/(1− pφ) 0.061
(1.170)
Dollar Trading Volume −0.003∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(−4.690) (−4.940) (−4.930) (−4.570) (−5.060)
Shares Outstanding 0.004∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.001 0.004∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗
(4.430) (−0.840) (−0.830) (4.400) (2.460)
Shares Volatility −0.007 −0.034∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ −0.008 −0.013
(−0.530) (−2.640) (−2.640) (−0.670) (−1.030)
Derivatives Based 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(−0.040) (0.180) (0.170) (0.170) (0.090)
Swap-Based 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.006
(0.900) (0.210) (0.220) (0.780) (0.630)
Equity-type ETF 0.004∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.004∗
(1.750) (2.120) (2.110) (2.430) (1.810)
Invested in US assets −0.013∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗
(−12.290) (−8.150) (−8.180) (−9.170) (−11.710)
Futures Available −0.001 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.000 0.002
(−0.520) (4.340) (4.340) (−0.290) (1.560)
Options Available 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.002∗ 0.002 0.002
(1.670) (1.710) (1.720) (1.490) (1.470)
Levered Fund −0.011 −0.015∗ −0.015∗ −0.011 −0.013
(−1.480) (−1.810) (−1.810) (−1.400) (−1.570)
Year Fixed Effects Y es Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 6061 6061 6061 6061 6061
Adjusted R2 20.99 10.36 10.36 21.42 19.23
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the interaction term is not significant.
In sum, these empirical findings support the relation shown in equation (69). The
ETF variance can increase relative to the NAV variance when the ETF is not actively
traded in the market. These results suggest that the lack of liquidity due to infrequent
trading could increase the risk of ETF investment.
6 Conclusion
The ETF market has grown tremendously over the last two decades. ETFs are
considered as being more transparent, less expensive, and more tax-efficient than
traditional mutual funds. Moreover, ETFs provide investment opportunity to access
other inaccessible markets or asset categories.
This paper investigates the effect of liquidity on the ETF return and variance.
Similar to general common stocks, liquidity is an important risk factor affecting the
ETF return and variance. Illiquid ETFs are more sensitive to the market return and
market liquidity. The liquidity risk explains approximately 0.31% of the ETF returns
annually. The level of liquidity is also related to the tracking error of the ETF with
respect to the underlying index or the NAV.
Moreover, the lack of liquidity increases the ETF variance with respect to the NAV
variance. Extending the Lo and MacKinlay (1990) econometric model to consider the
autocorrelation of the underlying index return, the ETF variance can be decomposed
into the NAV variance and the terms related to the nontrading probability. This
finding implies that the variance of the ETF can increase when the ETF is traded
infrequently. The calculated ETF variances are shown to be larger than the NAV
variance. Moreover, the cross-sectional regression shows that the ETF variance is
positively related to the nontrading probability.
ETFs are recognized as effective investment vehicles that provide the opportunity
to access new markets. ETFs are designed to trace a particular index representing
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a particular market or sector. Therefore, an ETF must provide the same expected
return as the return of the particular index. However, if ETFs have liquidity risks
and thus substantial tracking error, investors may bear another risk in addition to the
market risk. Therefore, investors must be cautious when investing in illiquid ETFs.
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Appendix
A Proof of the variance
Under the AR(1) process, the autocovariance of ft is
Cov(ft, ft−k) = φkV ar(ft) (A.1)
For l > k,
E[vt−kvt−l] = E[(α + βft−k + ξt−k)(α + βft−l + ξt−l)]
= α2 + 2αβE[ft] + β
2E[ft−kft−l]
= α2 + 2αβE[ft] + β
2(E[ft]
2 + φl−kV ar(ft))
= (α + βE[ft])
2 + β2φl−kV ar(ft)
= E[vt]
2 + β2φl−kV ar(ft)
The second moment of the rt is
E[r2t ] = E
[ ∞∑
k=0
Xt(k)vt−k
∞∑
l=0
Xt(l)vt−l
]
=
∞∑
k=0
E
[
X2t (k)v
2
t−k
]
+ 2
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=k+1
E [Xt(k)Xt(l)]E [vt−kvt−l]
=
(
V ar(vt) + E[vt]
2
) ∞∑
k=0
(1− p)pk + 2
∞∑
k=0
∞∑
l=k+1
(1− p)pl (E[vt]2 + φl−kβ2V ar(ft))
= V ar(vt) + E[vt]
2 + 2E[vt]
2
∞∑
k=0
pk+1 + 2β2V ar(ft)(1− p) φ
1− φp
∞∑
k=0
pk+1
= V ar(vt) + E[vt]
2 +
2p
1− pE[vt]
2 +
2φp
1− φpβ
2V ar(ft)
The expected return of the ETF return is simply
E[rt] = E
[ ∞∑
k=0
Xt(k)vt−k
]
=
∞∑
k=0
E[Xt(k)]E[vt−k]
= E[vt]
∞∑
k=0
(1− p)pk = E[vt]
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So, the variance of the ETF return is
V ar(rt) = E[r
2
t ]− E[rt]2
= V ar(vt) +
2p
1− pE[vt]
2 +
2φp
1− φpβ
2V ar(ft)
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